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We live in a world surrounded by uncertainty and within this uncertainty human beings 
have to decide every action, every turn of life. “To be or not to be, that is the question” is 
the starting line of Hamlet´s musings (Shakespeare, 1602) contrasting the pain of life with 
the fear of the uncertainty of death. Hamlet‟s dilemma exemplifies the relevance of beliefs, 
in his case about the consequences of death, determining individuals‟ actions, Hamlet‟s 
decision  about  to  live  or  to  die.  When  individuals  take  decisions  the  true  value  of 
parameters relevant for that decision are usually unknown and rarely important ex-ante. 
The  final  outcome,  realized  ex-post,  indeed  depends  on  the  true  parameters,  but  the 
decision  does  not.  It  usually  depends  just  on  the  beliefs  individuals  have  about  these 
parameters. The aim of this dissertation is to contribute to a better understanding of the 
formation of individuals‟ beliefs under realistic economic environments.  
 
The neoclassical approach of decision making has been widely challenged by behavioral 
economics  during  the  last  century.  The  simplified  assumptions  of  the  neoclassical 
approach (rational individuals with well behaved preferences), even though useful given 
the  framework  from  a  normative  point  of  view,  add  tractability  to  the  analysis  to  the 
detriment  of  really  explaining  observed  human  behavior.  This  research  relies  on  the 
recognition  that  behavioral  economics  “increases  the  realism  of  the  psychological 
underpinnings of economic analysis, improving economics on its own terms: generating 
theoretical insights, making better predictions of field phenomena and suggesting better 
policy”  (Camerer,  Loewenstein  and  Rabin,  2003).  The  new  paradigm  opens  novel 
perspectives to better understand individuals‟ behavior.  
 
The complexity of human behavior was noticed at an early stage in an economic context 
by  Adam  Smith  in  “The  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiment”  (1759)
1.  Smith  built  a  pluralistic 
approach  to  morality  based  on  a  multitude  of  psychological  motives.  He  explains  the 
observed  behavior  of  human  beings  as  the  struggle  between  their  “passions”  and  the 
“impartial  spectator”.  These  “passions”  refer,  for  example,  to  basic  biological  needs, 
                                                           
1  See  Ashraf,  Camerer  and  Loewenstein  (2005)  for  a  deeper  analysis  of  Smith’s  influence  on  modern 
Behavioural Economics. 





emotions, feelings, hopes, expectations; anything that could trigger a human reaction. The 
role  of  the  “impartial  spectator”,  from  Smith‟s  point  of  view,  is  to  guide  individuals  to 
behave by following the rules of morality. Smith states the “perfection” of human nature is 
the ability to “self-command” our “ungovernable passions” through virtuously sympathizing 
with  others.  Even  at  this  early  stage,  Smith  presaged  many  insights  that  have  later 
appeared  in  the  literature  and  this  thesis  also  highlights  some  important  of  his  early 
observations.  
 
Smith was a pioneer in noticing the intertemporal choice and self-control of human beings: 
"The pleasure which we are to enjoy ten years hence interests us so little in comparison 
with that which we may enjoy today, the passion which the first excites, is naturally so 
weak in comparison with that violent emotion which the second is apt to give occasion to, 
that the one could never be any balance to the other, unless it was supported by the sense 
of propriety." Smith also discussed the overconfident nature of individuals, noticing that 
"the chance of gain is by every man more or less over-valued, and the chance of loss is by 
most men under-valued, and by scarce any man, who is in tolerable health and spirits, 
valued more than it is worth." Specifically related to performance, he commented about the 
"over-weening conceit which the greater part of men have of their own abilities." These two 
observations, the self-control problem and the recognition of overconfidence, are central to 
Chapter 1. The last two chapters of this thesis are related to Smith´s discussion regarding 
Social Preferences. The central forces determining a given social output would strongly 
depend  on  the  degree  of  “sympathy”  among  individual,  citizens,  nations,  etc.  Smith 
believed that humans have a natural tendency to care about the well being of others for no 
other reason than the pleasure one gets from seeing them happy. It is logical to also infer 
that this sympathy at an aggregate level (social preferences) could materialize in beliefs 
about  social  outcomes  that  affect  societies  as  a  whole.  Chapter  2  deals  with  the 
determinants of aggregate beliefs and, even though not explicitly discussed by Smith, with 
the  dynamics  of  beliefs  over  time.  Chapter  3  explores  the  determinants  of  trust  or,  in 
Smith´s words, “mutual sympathy”. 
 





The recognition that information is, most of the time, incomplete and imperfect is essential 
in understanding the nature of the formation of beliefs. Information matters in the formation 
of beliefs and so also, for decision making. In the first stage, I am interested in knowing 
how people deal  with available  information to update beliefs. One important branch of 
individual decisions is that of human capital accumulation, where one of the key variables 
for the investment decision is the individual‟s ability. It is important to realize the agent 
never knows his/her true ability. He/she only has an ex-ante notion of his/her believed 
ability and the truth is only revealed ex-post. Once the true ability is known and the payoffs 
realized, we observe different reactions that range from disappointment to happiness. The 
logical question is then, who would have preferred not to know the truth? Chapter 1 deals 
with the information acquisition decisions of individuals who face uncertainty about their 
own  ability.  At  a  theoretical  level  (Bénabou  and  Tirole,  2002),  it  has been  shown  that 
overconfident individuals (people with beliefs about themselves higher than reality) with 
time inconsistent preferences have more at stake when they face the decision of learning 
the truth about themselves than more pessimistic agents. To test this prediction, I design a 
field  experiment  where  students  face  the  decision  of  learning,  or  not,  their  true  ability 
before performing a test. It will be shown that overconfident students indeed more often 
decide not to learn their true ability.  
 
It is also important to notice that the formation of beliefs is a dynamic process, where the 
relevance for decision making is especially important when related to social outcomes. 
The  support  politicians get  is  strongly  connected  to  the  beliefs  of  citizens.  Democratic 
leaders  around  the  world  would  have  never  been  elected  if  people  would  have  not 
believed in them and in their promises. I am interested in exploring what affect aggregate 
beliefs  and  their  dynamic  over  time.  Chapter  2  explores  the  dynamics  of  beliefs  with 
respect  to  the  benefits  of  the  introduction  of  the  single  currency  (Euro)  in  Europe.  I 
propose a framework where the formation of beliefs is the result of the interaction between 
demand (intrinsic motivation) and supply forces (interested actor manipulating individuals‟ 
beliefs). The main result supports the existence of more optimistic beliefs during both the 
dates  of  the  introduction  of  the  Euro  (the  non-physical  introduction  in  1999  and  the 
physical introduction in 2002) with respect to the period before and the period after the 
implementation. There  is  empirical  evidence  of  demand forces,  specifically  self-serving 





beliefs, in the neighborhood of the implementation dates, reflected in the higher impact of 
these forces diminishing the probability of being against the Euro. The most relevant effect 
after the physical introduction of the Euro in 2002 is the diminished impact of supply side 
forces (interested actors). However, there is an increased role of European institutions in 
sustaining  the  credibility  of  the  Euro  among  citizens,  especially  after  the  physical 
implementation of the single currency in 2002. 
 
Finally, Chapter 3 explores the determinants of trust in order to better estimate the causal 
effect of trust on social efficiency. This is an issue closely related to Smith‟s statement 
concerning “mutual sympathy” among human beings, as previously discussed. The main 
problem when estimating the effect of trust on social efficiency is the weak specification of 
the relevant causal relationship. Whilst it may be true that trust can facilitate cooperation 
and, as a result, social efficiency it may be equally valid that efficient social institutions 
promote  trust.  The  reverse-causality  problem,  which  leads  to  spurious  coefficient 
estimates, is addressed by introducing an innovative set of instruments for trust from the 
field of neuroeconomics, as research in this area has shown that the levels of oxytocin in 
the brain facilitate trusting behavior among humans. Following Zak and Fakhar (2006), 
proxy measures for levels of these neuroactive hormones are used to instrument for trust. 
The depurated effect is higher than in previous research, emphasizing the relevance of 
trust in increasing the efficiency of social organizations. 
 
To  understand  the  mechanisms  behind  the  formation  of  individuals‟  beliefs  is  the  key 
ingredient  in  better  understanding  human  behavior.  This  thesis  attempts  to  empirically 
contribute to this research in economics from a positive point of view and to bring the 
evidence for further normative analysis. 
 
 
   















   





   





Chapter 1: I prefer not to know! Analyzing the decision of 





1.1 Introduction  
 
Is information always valuable for the decision making process, as it is in classical decision 
theory?  This  question  is  easily  answered  when  the  decision  makers  are  fully  rational 
individuals  maximizing  a  well-behaved  utility  function  with  uncertain  inputs. Information 
about the unknown is indeed always valuable in this setting. However, when individuals 
exhibit time inconsistent behavior (for example, hyperbolic preferences) with incomplete 
and imperfect information, access to information can damage more than help during the 
decision  making  process  for  certain  types  of  people.  This  heterogeneity  amongst 
individuals is related to how close/far are their beliefs about states of the world, which are 
relevant for their utility functions, from the truth. If the relevant state of the world for the 
decision making is the ability of the individual, when his believed ability is above his true 
ability, we observe overconfidence. Bénabou and Tirole (2002) emphasizes the theoretical 
detrimental effect of information about true ability when performing a task for overconfident 
individuals with time inconsistent preferences. In this chapter, I design and implement a 
field
2 experiment to test this hypothesis in order to provide supporting empirical evidence.  
 
This chapter builds on three hypotheses. First, most of the information about fundamentals 
in the real world is unknown or partially known. Information is not perfect or complete. 
Second,  individuals  have  beliefs  about  these  fundamentals  which  are  relevant  to  their 
decision making process. Therefore, decisions are made based on beliefs when accurate 
information  is  not  available.  Third,  in  a  variety  of  situations  individuals  exhibit  time 
inconsistent preferences. Bénabou and Tirole (2002) provides a theoretical model showing 
                                                           
2 I used the word “field” to emphasis the experiment was applied to students in standard Universities, not to 
a social laboratory using volunteers. However, the key element of field experiments is not present in the 
setting here, i.e. the introduction of exogenous variation.    





that overconfident people (i.e. people whose beliefs are „better‟ than the truth) prefer not to 
get information about their true ability when they have the option to decide. The key crucial 
assumptions for this prediction are the time inconsistent nature of human beings and the 
recognition of heterogeneity across individuals in their believed confidence. The authors 
model the self-control problem  of an individual with hyperbolic preferences that has to 
decide whether or not to learn his true ability before performing a task. Utility depends 
directly on ability. They provide theoretical support for the trade-off between the risk of 
overconfidence (engaging on a project when you are not capable enough to succeed) and 
the self-confidence maintenance  (abandoning the project even though  a priori you are 
capable enough to succeed). When the self-confidence maintenance motive is big enough 
the  individual  prefers  not  to know  his  true  ability.  This  happens  only  for  overconfident 
individuals. Information, then, is not always valued as it is in classical decision theory. On 
the other hand if the person is under-confident (accurate), information is always valuable 
(neutral).  Moreover,  if  the  assumption  of  time  inconsistent  preferences  is  ignored,  the 
heterogeneity on believed confidence is irrelevant and information is always valuable.  
   
The contribution of this chapter is the design and implementation of a field experiment in 
the area of education to test the predictions of the Self Control model by Bénabou and 
Tirole  (2002).  The  sample  consists  of  students  from  standard  taught  courses  at 
undergraduate or postgraduate level. The structure of the course has to have (at least) 
one  test  accounting  for  X%  of  the  final  score  and  a  (1-X)%  final  exam.  The  official 
information rule and common knowledge is that the result of the test(s) is not revealed until 
the final exam has been taken. The experimental setup is the following: immediately after 
the X% test, students are given the option to decide if they want to privately learn the 
score they got in test X% immediately before (minutes) the final exam (or the next test). 
Given the student knows how much he studied and the difficulty of the X% test they just 
performed, I assume that the score is a good private signal to proxy for ability. According 
to the Bénabou and Tirole model, we would expect overconfident students to decide more 
often not to learn the result of the preceding test. A general questionnaire is applied to all 
the students of the class during the term. The most important measures to classify the 
students  by  their  degree  of  overconfidence  will  be  extracted  here.  Also,  individual 
characteristics like age, gender and degree of risk aversion are collected.  
 





In  practice,  to  finally  provide  the  feedback  to  the  students  according  to  their  stated 
preferences  was  not  possible  because  of  Institutional  rules.  Immediately  after  the  test 
corresponding to the X%  of the final degree, the professors did communicate that the 
result of the test could not be revealed until the next test (or final exam). Therefore, the 
students had the option to decide on the information structure in advance. Students were 
asked to answer a small questionnaire in which they had to state whether or not they 
wanted to privately learn the result of the actual test immediately before the next test. With 
this information, and as the setting required, the professor would then reveal the scores 
accordingly. In the next lecture, the professor apologized and communicated that the rules 
of the Institution with respect to the partial scores had to be applied (in general, students 
have  the  right  to  learn  their  scores  weeks  in  advance  the  next  test,  for  pedagogical 
reasons).  Therefore,  at  the  end  the  rules  of  the  Institution  were  not  modified,  but  the 
students stated their preference for knowing or not their true ability believing they had the 
option to decide, exactly the behavior I wanted to catch.  
 
The experiment was applied to 282 undergraduate students during the Spring term 2009 
(September-December)  in  Santiago,  Chile.  They  came  from  compulsory  courses  in 
Chemistry (1
st year), Statistics and Economics (4
th year) in the Engineering Faculty of 
the University of Chile; and compulsory Micro- and Macroeconomics courses (2
nd and 3
rd 
year) at Universidad Diego Portales. The result supports the prediction that the decision of 
learning  the  true  ability  is  decreasing  in  the  degree  of  overconfidence:  the  more 
overconfident, the less the students were likely to want to learn their previous score before 
the next test.  
 
Information  on  overconfidence  and  other  characteristics  was  also  collected  for  473 
additional students, corresponding to five parallel Chemistry classes in the Engineering 
Faculty  of  the  University  of  Chile,  Spring  term  2009.  Score  records  for  most  of  these 
classes,  in  addition  to  the  classes  in  the  experiment,  were  also  available.  The  scores 
students  obtain  in  their  respective  classes  are  a  mix  of  ability  and  effort,  which  are 
impossible to disentangle under this setting. Therefore, to look for the causal effect of 
overconfidence on performance would give spurious results. In any case, the result of no 
correlation between performance and overconfidence is interesting.  
 





This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the literature relevant for the 
present research. Section 1.3 develops the model from Bénabou and Tirole (2002), adding 
the analysis for different degrees of risk aversion. Section 1.4 presents the experiment 
design and the details of the implementation. Section 1.5 describes the data collected and 
some important sample statistics. Section 1.6 presents the main results and Section 1.7 
concludes.    





1.2. Literature Review 
 
The  empirical  question  analyzed  in  this  chapter  relies  on  three  fundamental  pillars  of 
decision making analysis in modern economics.  
 
The first is the recognition that human behavior does depart from the homos economicus 
standard.  The  interrelation  between  psychology  and  economics  has  been  widely 
developed during the last decades. The predictions coming from fully rational individuals 
and well-behaved preferences have been challenged by an increasing number of authors. 
Behavioral economics amends the assumption of fully rational agents and takes seriously 
the malleability of human beliefs. Gleaser (2004) states that “the promise of economics 
and  psychology  is  that  the  tools  of  economics  can  predict  the  extent  that  beliefs  and 
preferences are manipulated in the market”. 
 
Beliefs are relevant for decision making because information is imperfect and incomplete 
most of the time. The information acquisition process to update beliefs has exogenous and 
endogenous components. Individuals are supposed to deal optimally with the information 
they have access to, costly or not. This is the second key element of the present research 
framework: the information acquisition process under uncertainty is essential for the utility 
maximization process.  
 
There are many examples from psychology supporting the idea that individuals indeed 
manipulate  at  their  convenience  (or  believed  convenience)  the  information  to  update 
beliefs about personal characteristics.  Thus, Bénabou and Tirole (2001) puts together 
observational  findings  in  psychology  to  better  understand  their  main  economic 
implications. The paper is able to give formal content to individuals‟ traits such as self-
confidence, intrinsic motivation, dependence/autonomy and power of will, as well as to 
cognitive processes such as wishful thinking or selective memory, self monitoring and the 
setting of personal rules. It departs from the typical rational economic agent allowing for 
imperfect self-knowledge, imperfect willpower and imperfect recall. Specifically, imperfect 
self-knowledge refers to the uncertainty that people face about their own abilities and even 
preferences, which could exert some behavioral bias toward instant gratification. Imperfect 
willpower reflects the fact that people do not always act in their best interest, therefore self-





destructive behavior and also time inconsistent preferences are allowed. Finally, imperfect 
recall takes into account that memory is imperfect, attention is limited and awareness can 
therefore only be selected.  At the same time, Bénabou and Tirole (2001) maintains the 
classical approach with the intertemporal utility maximization problem the individual has to 
solve when choosing an action, i.e., the agent tries to do what is best for himself given his 
current (often inaccurate) perception of his own interests and abilities. The skepticism with 
respect  to  the  messages  of  others  and  one‟s  own  memories  or  rationalizations  is 
represented by Bayes‟ rule. It is under this framework that self-confidence emerges as a 
valuable asset in the decision making process. 
 
Bénabou  and  Tirole  (2002)  derives  important  implications  on  how  agents  process 
information  and  make  decisions.  It  highlights  the  importance  of  self-confidence for  the 
individual decision making process via three channels: consumption value in the sense 
that self-image is included simply as another argument of the utility function;  signaling 
value because if you really think you are “good” (or a “high type” in the typical task-effort 
agent problem) you can more easily convince others of this; and motivation value in the 
sense  that  self-confidence  improves  individuals‟  motivation  to  undertake  projects  and 
persevere  in  the  pursuit  of  their  goals,  in  spite  of  the  setbacks  and  temptations  that 
periodically test their willpower. The authors emphasize this last channel because of its 
substantially broader explanatory power. More particularly, the motivation value channel 
yields  an  endogenous  value  of  self-confidence  that  responds  to  the  situations  and 
incentives  the  individual  faces,  in  a  way  that  can  account  for  both  “can-do”  optimistic 
beliefs about themselves and others, and “defensive” pessimism.  
 
There  is  evidence  of  heterogeneity  across  individuals‟  beliefs  on  a  variety  of  topics. 
Bénabou and Tirole (2006) develops a theoretical framework to explain why most people 
need to believe in a just world (you get what you deserve, effort pays, etc.). The paper 
argues  that  differences  in  the  valuation  of  these  beliefs  across  countries  and  their 
prevalence could explain important international divergences in aggregate macroeconomic 
variables. I would like to emphasize this need to believe which, implicitly, makes reference 
to a characteristic of human beings that is going to be the third pillar of this research.    
 





It has been observed that individuals are sometimes willing to sustain false (or inaccurate) 
beliefs about themselves, even though accurate information is available. Gleaser (2004) 
claims that, given the psychological evidence of malleability of human perceptions and 
emotional states, decisions are made based on local influences more than on long-run 
wellbeing. He discusses an economic model of false beliefs and the implications for their 
prevalence, where beliefs are the result of external and internal influences. In the present 
research we are interested  in the  beliefs  that  individuals sustain about their perceived 
ability and how they deal with the available information to update these beliefs, to become 
closer  (or  not)  to  the  truth.    Bénabou  and  Tirole  (2002)  provides  a  theoretical  model 
showing that overconfident people (i.e. people with beliefs about themselves above the 
truth) prefer not to get information about their true ability when they have the option to 
decide. The third pillar of the present research is the recognition of heterogeneity across 
individuals  in  their  believed  confidence  with  respect  to  the  truth.  Therefore,  the  time 
inconsistent  nature  of  human  beings  under  uncertainty  and  their  different  degree  of 
overconfidence  imply  different  responses  in  the  information  acquisition  problem.  The 
model  that  forms  the  basis  of  the  experimental  setting,  the  Self  Control  Problem,  is 
developed in detail in the next section. 
 
Confidence can be understood in terms of the feeling of certainty about a state of reality. 
The  strength  of  this  feeling  is  what  it  is  known  as  confidence  (Pulford,  1996).  Self-
confidence refers to how certain we are about our own ability in different situations. In this 
context, overconfidence appears when your predicted ability is higher than in reality. One 
of the manifestations of overconfidence, relevant for this study, is miscalibration
3.   
 
At the empirical level, research in psychology has focused on how to properly measure 
overconfidence (West and Stanovich, 1997; Pulford, 1996; Klayman et al, 1999; among 
others).  The  main  conclusions  are  that  on  average  people  have  a  tendency  towards 
overconfidence, that there is a lot of heterogeneity in confidence across individuals, that 
overconfidence increases with the difficulty of the task and that there is apparent domain 
specificity in confidence judgments.  
 
                                                           
3 The other most common manifestations of overconfidence relevant to economics are known as the “better 
than average” effect and the “illusion of control” (Deaves, Lüders and Luo, 2009).  





Empirical  research  in  economics  has  mainly  studied  the  impact  of  overconfidence  on 
economic outcomes. The main result is that overconfidence does matter. For example, 
based  on  a  controlled  asset  experiment,  Deaves,  Lüders  and  Luo  (2009)  provides 
evidence  of  additional  trade  gathered  by  overconfidence.  Biais,  Hilton,  Mazurier  and 
Pouget  (2002)  provides  evidence  supporting  the  idea  that  overconfident  traders  are 
expected to suffer particularly from the winner´s curse, as they tend to overestimate the 
precision of their signals. In fact, these traders are found to earn relatively low trading 
profit. 
 
In  a  different  context, closer  to the  one  analyzed  in  the  present  study,  Bandiera  et  al 
(2005)  introduces  the  idea  of  overconfidence  in  an  attempt  to  evaluate  the  impact  of 
feedback  on  academic  performance.  This  paper  distinguishes  theoretically  between 
overconfident  and  underconfident  students,  showing  the  ambiguous  a  priori  effect  of 
feedback on effort (and then, in final performance) depending on the prevalence of the 
motivation effect versus slacker effect. They find robust evidence that feedback (about 
past performance) has an effect higher or equal to zero on final performance (or final score 
in taught postgraduate courses) over the whole distribution of ability. Therefore, under the 
feedback regime both underconfident and overconfident student should theoretically exert 
more  effort  that  with  no  feedback.  However,  the  paper  does  not  have  measures  of 
students‟ overconfidence to check this result empirically. Even though the purpose of the 
paper is not to know which regime these different types of individuals would prefer if they 
had the option to decide, it is interesting to think about the different a priori theoretical 
answers to the question, given the degree of overconfidence.  
 
In  the  area  of  behavioral  finance,  Guiso  and  Japelli  (2006)  empirically  studies  the 
information acquisition effect on portfolio performance. For rational investors, information 
is  always  beneficial  and  improves  portfolio  performance.  However,  for  overconfident 
individuals,  information  could  be  detrimental.  The  introduction  of  overconfidence  here 
accounts for investors systematically overestimating the value of the private signals. For 
this reason, they spent too much money and time acquiring information which leads to 
inefficient portfolio allocations. The time spent looking for financial information is shown to 
be  negatively  correlated  with  portfolio  performance,  supporting  the  hypothesis  of 
overconfident  investors.  This  effect  is  stronger  for  investors  “suspected  to  be”  more 





overconfident. There exists two main differences with my own research. First, the authors 
do  not  have  a  measure  of  overconfidence for  each  individual  so  they  cannot  properly 
measure the effect of overconfidence on information acquisition. They empirically observe 
a detrimental effect of information on portfolio performance which is consistent with the 
overconfidence  hypothesis.  Then,  looking  at  variables  that  are  supposed  to  be  more 
frequently associated to overconfident investors, they conclude that the detrimental effect 
of information on portfolio performance is stronger the more overconfident the investor. 
Second, the variable for information is time spent acquiring financial information. They do 
not  refer  to  the  quality  of  information;  they  only  state  that  whatever  the  quality  of 
information, an overconfident investor tends to overstate its veracity. The investor does not 
have the option to know how far his believed signal is from the truth, which would be the 
equivalence with my research.        
 
To  my  knowledge  there  is  no  empirical  research  analyzing  the  information  acquisition 
decision  about  personal  characteristics  for  individuals  with  different  degrees  of 
overconfidence. This study tries to take a first step in filling this gap. 
 
  





1.3. The Model  
 
The basic model is developed by Bénabou and Tirole (2002), which provides theoretical 
support for the tradeoff between the risk of overconfidence (engaging in a project when 
you  are  not  capable  enough  to  succeed)  and  the  self-confidence  maintenance 
(abandoning the project even though, a priori, individuals are capable enough to succeed). 
This trade off becomes relevant when individuals are given the option to learn accurate 
information  about  their  ability  before  performing  a  task  where  the  associated  utility 
depends  directly  on  ability.  When  the  self-confidence  maintenance  motive  is  strong 
enough, then the individual would prefer not to know his true ability. Overconfident people 
(individuals with believed ability higher than the truth) have more at stake when the true 
ability is revealed and therefore more often prefer not to learn their true ability. Additional 
to the theoretical conclusions of Bénabou and Tirole, I analyze the role of risk aversion 
given  confidence.  The  value  of  information  is  declining  in  risk  aversion:  risk  averse 




Bénabou and Tirole (2002) analyzes a game that consists of three periods. In the first 
period  (t=0)  an  agent  has  to  decide  the  information  structure  about  his  ability  at  t=1 
( =ability or probability of succeeding in a task when trying        ). He decides between 
learning   for sure or learning nothing than he did not know at t=0 (i.e. F1( )=F0( ) where 
Ft( )  is  the  cumulative  distribution  ability  function  at  date  t).  At  t=1  the  agent  decides 
whether to undertake a project (or exert effort in a project). He is imperfectly informed 
about  the  probability  of  succeeding  in  a  task  when  trying  or,  equivalently,  about  his 
ability  . In the last period (t=2) information is revealed and payments realized.   
 
   





The payments associated with each period are given by: 
 
        The decision of the information structure for the next period is costless. 
 
      
    
 
   if taking a project and exerting effort 
if not 
 
          
 
   if succeeding 
if not 
 
where c>0 is the cost of effort (constant for simplicity),   is the probability of succeeding if 
trying (or the ability of the individual), with Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) Ft( ), 
and V>0 a constant.  Note that there are complementarities between effort and ability: the 
higher one‟s ability in the activity, the stronger the incentive to undertake the project. 
 
The player is a risk neutral student
4 and a collection of his incarnations per period of time. I 
call Self-t a student incarnation in time t. The individuals are utility maximizing agents with 
hyperbolic utility functions, to account for the salience of the present. Therefore, from the 






           reflects the momentary  salience  of the  present  and             is  a  standard 
discount factor. 
 
Solving the problem from the point of view of Self-0, the individual only undertakes the 
project  if  his  belief  about  his  expected  ability  is  higher  than  a  certain  threshold,  i.e.  
                 
 
   
 
                                                           
4 The role of risk aversion is analysed later in this chapter. 
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Solving the problem from the point of view of Self-1, the individual only undertakes the 
project  if  his  belief  about  his  expected  ability  is  bigger  than  a  certain  threshold,  with 
outcomes higher than the one solving Self-0 problem, i.e.                   
 
   .  
 
Therefore, due to the time inconsistency of the game, there is a zone in the domain of 
ability where even though Self-0 was willing to exert effort (or undertake the project), when 
time passes Self-1 finds it optimal to procrastinate. Figure 1.1 shows this schematically.  
 
Figure 1.1: The Self-Control Problem 
 
 
Included in the diagram is a hypothetical distribution function of ability that generates an 
expected belief of ability equal to   . In this case, the individual at time t=0 decides to exert 
effort but, at t=1 he procrastinates given that, from Self-1‟s point of view, it is no longer 
optimal to undertake the project. If the expected ability     would have been in the “effort” 
zone, the individual always exerts effort given that, for that value of ability, it is always 
optimal to undertake the project. Similarly, if the expected ability     would have been in the 
“no-effort” zone, the individual never exerts effort as for that value of ability it is always 
optimal not to undertake the project.  
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The value of Information 
 
Remember that we are interested in the information acquisition decision at t=0, i.e. we 
want to know what kind of individuals are more willing to decide to learn their true ability 
before  undertaking  the  project.  As  such,  we  introduce  the  concept  of  overconfidence, 
underconfidence and accuracy. 
 
Confidence can be understood in terms of the feeling of certainty about a state of reality. 
The  strength  of  this  feeling  is  what  it  is  known  as  confidence  (Pulford,  1996).  Self-
confidence refers to how certain we are about our own ability in different situations.  
 
In this context, overconfidence appears when you think your predicted ability is higher than 
it  truly  is  in  reality.  Following  the  same  logic,  underconfidence  appears  when  your 
expectation is below the truth (Figure 1.2). A well calibrated or accurate person would be 
the individual holding a belief about his ability similar to the truth.   
 
Figure 1.2: Overconfidence, Accuracy and Underconfidence.  
 
 
Notice that you never know the truth in the setting for the information acquisition decision. 
The only information you have are your beliefs about   or, more specifically, the expected 
value of ability given your beliefs:              
 
  . 
 
Now we focus attention on the problem of an overconfident individual in the context of the 
game under analysis. Assume that the individual has beliefs about ability above  
 
    while 





the  truth  is  below.  The  individual  thus  thinks  he  is  inside  the  “effort”  zone.  Therefore, 
without information, it is always optimal to exert effort. The value of information for this 
individual will be given by: 
 

























The first term (GF) contains the gain from being informed. If the true ability of the individual 
is below 
 
   but he does not know this, he inappropriately perseveres in the project and GF 
accounts for the gain of correcting his behavior at date 1. The second term (LF) represents 
the loss from being informed, which may depress the individual‟s self-confidence: if he 
learns that   is inside the procrastination zone, he will procrastinate at date 1 even though, 
ex ante, it was optimal to exert effort. Information is therefore detrimental to the extent that 
it  creates  a  risk  that  the  individual  will  fall  into  the  time  inconsistency  region.  If  this 
confidence maintenance motive is strong enough (LF > GF), the individual will prefer to 
remain  uninformed
5.  Therefore,  overconfident  people  would  be  more  frequently  in  this 
situation. 
 
Notice that when the individual is underconfident, i.e. with beliefs below 
 
    but true ability 
above, information is always valuable. Self-1 will always exert (weakly) less effort than 
Self-0 would have wanted to. Therefore, information can only help the individual to restore 
his deficient motivation.  
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5 “In the absence of time inconsistency (=1) we have        and thus       : in classical decision theory, 
information is always valuable” (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002). 





The role of risk aversion 
 
The  qualitative  characteristics  of  the  model  are  maintained  when  analyzing  separately 
individuals with different degrees of risk aversion: the time inconsistency creates a zone 
were the maintenance of personal motivation makes overconfident people prefer not to 
know their true ability when performing a task. 
 
However,  given  the  beliefs  about     for  a  given  individual,  we  want  to  know  how  risk 
aversion affects the information acquisition decision.  
 
To understand this more easily, I analytically solved the game above for a risk averse, risk 
neutral  and  risk  loving  individual  whose  ability  (or  probability  of  success  when  trying) 
          have a uniform distribution. The payments associated to period 2 (given effort) 
differ over risk aversion as follow: 
 
Risk averse  Risk neutral  Risk lover 
                            
 
Solving the problem, the new thresholds obtained for each degree of risk aversion are: 
 
Self-0 point of view  Self-1 point of view 





                         
 




                      
 
  
                        
 
   
 
                      
 
  
                        
 
   
 
 
As    
 
      , the following order applies:  
 
                                                                    
 





The intuition behind this is that risk loving agents have a marginal utility of commitment 
lower than risk neutral and risk averse individuals. Therefore, effort is only exerted for very 
high values of believed  . On the other hand, more risk averse individuals are equally 
happy with much less utility, therefore they commit to effort for lower values of  . Overall, 
risk loving individuals would decide to undertake the project less often than less averse 
agents for a given distribution of ability. Remember there is not disutility for not engaging in 
the project. Therefore the risky decision here is “not to do it”.  
 
The value of information across risk aversion 
 
Solving  the  information  acquisition  decision  problem  analytically  for  the  three  different 
degrees of risk aversion, we found that information is more valuable, given confidence, for 
risk loving agents.  
 
Risk averse  Risk neutral  Risk lover 
    
  
          
 
  
                   
  
   
    
 
  
              
 
 
   
     
 





Given the individual is exerting effort, i.e. his belief about his ability is above his respective 
threshold at date 1, a risk loving agent is more willing to learn if he is making an incorrect 
choice of undertaking the project. His gain from being informed (GF) is thus much bigger 
than for risk neutral and averse individuals.  Moreover, the loss from being informed (LF), 
or the confidence maintenance motive, is higher for risk averse people, making the overall 
value of information even higher for risk lovers.   
 
Summarizing, the model predicts that overconfident agents would more often prefer not to 
learn their true ability. Besides, given overconfidence, the value of information is declining 
in risk aversion: risk averse individuals would more often prefer not to know the truth.   
   





1.4. Experiment design 
 
The  sample  consists  of  students  from  a  standard  taught  course  at  undergraduate  or 
postgraduate level. The structure of the course has to have (at least) one test accounting 
for  X%  of  the  final  score  and  a  (1-X)%  final  exam.  The  official  information  rule  and 
common knowledge is that the result of the test(s) is not revealed until the final exam has 
been  taken.  The  experimental  setup  is  the  following:  immediately  after  the  X%  test, 
students are given the option to decide if they want to privately learn the score they got in 
X%  test  immediately  before  (minutes)  the  final  exam  (test  (1-X)%).  Given  the  student 
knows how much he studied and the difficulty of the X% test they just performed, I assume 
that the score is a good private signal proxy of his ability. According to the Bénabou and 
Tirole model, we would expect overconfident students to decide more often not to learn the 
result of the preceding test.  
 
A general questionnaire will be applied to all the students of the class during the term. The 
most important measures to classify the students by their degree of overconfidence will be 
extracted here. Extra questionnaires measuring overconfidence are applied as robustness 
checks. Also, individual characteristics like age, gender and degree of risk aversion are 
collected.  
 
In  practice,  to  finally  provide  the  feedback  to  the  students  according  to  their  stated 
preferences  was  not  possible  because  of  Institutional  rules.  Immediately  after  the  test 
corresponding to the X%  of the final degree, the professors did communicate that the 
result of the test would not be revealed until the next test (or final exam). Therefore, the 
students had the option to decide in advance the information structure.  Students were 
asked to answer a small questionnaire were they had to state whether or not they wanted 
to learn privately the result of the actual test immediately before the next test. With this 
information, and as the setting required, the professor would reveal the scores accordingly. 
The students would not have the option of learning the scores weeks in advance of the 
time of the next test, which prevented strategic behavior when deciding whether to learn 
their  ability.  Therefore,  the  decision  only  takes  into  account  the  theoretical  channels 
exposed in section 1.3. In the next lecture, the professor apologized and communicated 
that the rules of the Institution with respect to the partial scores had to be applied (in 





general, students have the right to learn their scores weeks in advance the next test, for 
pedagogical reasons). Therefore, at the end the rules of the Institution were not modified, 
but the students stated their preference for knowing or not their true ability believing they 
had the option to decide, exactly the behavior I wanted to catch.  
 
   









The  data  collected  in  this  experiment  are  (1)  true  score  (proxy  for  ability),  (2)  binary 
observed final decision about learning or not the true ability parameter, (3) independent 
measure of “calibration-based”, “better than average” and “more accurate” overconfidence, 
(4)  risk  aversion  and  (5)  general  characteristics.  The  partial  and  final  grades  are  also 
available and will be used to control for “general quality of the student” for robustness 
checks. Notice, however, the information is useless to analyze the effect of information on 
performance because effort is not observed.  
 
I claim that the score students get in the tests is a proxy for ability. It is true that students 
will contaminate this measure of ability because they will study (or exert effort) to better 
perform. But they privately know if they studied or not and also the difficulty of the test 
already performed, therefore they would be able to privately extract a proxy of ability if they 
get information about the result. 
 
The final decision is labeled 1 if the student decides to see the results of the previous tests 
immediately before the next test (or final exam) and 0 otherwise.  
 
The General Questionnaire has three parts to measure (3), (4) and (5). The independent 
measure of calibrated-based overconfidence (CBO) and better-than-average (BTA) follows 
Deaves et al (2009). The measure more-accurate (MA) is ad-hoc. To get the CBO, general 
knowledge questions are provided where the student has to state, with 90% certainty, an 
interval for his answer. Overconfidence is then the proportion of questions for which the 
true answer falls outside the stated range. This method is known as  confidence-range 
judgments in psychology and it is a better alternative than two-choice questions judgments 
that are said to be a fertile ground for bias information gathering (Klayman et al, 2000). 
CBO  is  exactly  the  kind  of  overconfidence  measure  we  are  interested  in,  because  it 
compares the individual beliefs relative to himself. The measure of BTA is based on the 
answer to the question “Of the N (yourself included) students in this class, how many do 
you think will end up having a higher score than you in the test?” The measure of BTA 





corresponds to the deviation of the difference between the class‟ size N and the number 
the student gives, from the average size of the class. MA is 1 if the student answers YES 
to the question: “Do you think your answers to the knowledge questionnaire were more 
accurate  than  those  of  your  classmates?”  These  last  two  overconfidence  measures 
compare the individual with the rest of the class. It gives a relative-to-others measure of 
overconfidence  that  should  not  be  relevant  for  the  information  acquisition  decision 
analyzed here, because the tests in the sample are graded using absolute scale. If the 
scale were relative (to the average, to the best grade, etc.), BTA and MA instead of CBO 
should  drive  the  information  acquisition  decision  (see  Appendix  1.1  for  the  general 
questionnaire applied).  
 
The measure for risk aversion is constructed using the answer to the following question: 
“We  would  like  to  ask  you  a  hypothetical  question  that  you  should  answer  as  if  the 
situation were a real one. You are offered the opportunity of acquiring an asset permitting 
you, with the same probability, either to gain half million Chilean pesos (1000 US$ approx.) 
or to lose all the capital invested. What is the most that you would be prepared to pay for 
this asset?” Following Guiso and Paella (2005), we are able to classify people among risk 
averse, risk neutral and risk lovers. 
 
Finally, individual characteristics (age and gender) are also collected. 
 
The measure of overconfidence is crucial for the identification in this empirical research. 
Attempting  to  avoid  (or  at  least  diminish)  measurement  problems,  students  were 
encouraged to honestly answer the questionnaires. The official lecturer of each class was 
the one explaining the rules and asking the students to do their best at answering the 
questionnaires, also communicating the intention of using the information being collected 
for  academic  research  purposes.  The  high  competitiveness  of  students  in  the  sample 
(historically known in the Engineering Faculty as well as among students in Economics), it 
also  should  help  in  the  direction  of  diminishing  measurement  problems:  most  of  the 
students answered the questionnaires and the rate of explicit answers for all the questions 
was very high. As robust check to prevent measurement problems for overconfidence, a 
second questionnaire was applied to the classes under study. 
 







The experiment was applied to 282 undergraduate students during the Spring term 2009 
(September-December)  in  Santiago,  Chile.  Table  1.1  describes  basic  statistics  (see 
appendix 1.2 for detailed statistics by gender). The courses Chemistry, Economics and 
Statistics are compulsory courses in the Engineering Faculty of the University of Chile. 
Chemistry corresponds to first year and Economics and Statistics to the fourth year. This 
explains the difference in average age. Micro and Macro are compulsory courses of the 
career Economics in Universidad Diego Portales, second and third year. The Engineering 
Faculty historically has had a majority of men, which is reflected in the higher proportion 
with respect to the other courses. The students over the whole sample are extremely risk 
averse:  only  5  people  of  over  266  students  that  answered  the  risk  aversion  question 
reported  to  be  risk  neutral  and  there  were  no  risk  lovers.  Around  45%  of  the  sample 
reported to be willing to pay less than ten thousand Chilean pesos (equivalent to 2% of the 
lottery  prize).  Figure  1.3  shows  kernel  density  estimation  for  the  overall  absolute  risk 
aversion index.  
 






CBO BTA more accurate know
(years) (male=1) (risk averse>0) (overconfident>0) (better than avg>0) (yes=1) (want to know=1)
Chemistry mean 18.8 0.81 0.36 0.39 0.04 0.20 0.46
std.dev. 1.04 0.40 0.07 0.24 0.21 0.40 0.50
N 59 58 55 55 55 55 57
Statistics mean 22.0 0.71 0.32 0.53 0.08 0.30 0.49
std.dev. 1.02 0.46 0.11 0.23 0.20 0.46 0.50
N 65 65 62 65 64 64 65
Macro mean 21.2 0.64 0.37 0.52 0.19 0.31 0.70
std.dev. 2.61 0.49 0.08 0.24 0.18 0.47 0.47
N 36 36 33 33 31 32 33
Micro mean 19.3 0.53 0.39 0.38 0.07 0.23 0.74
std.dev. 1.12 0.50 0.04 0.25 0.33 0.43 0.44
N 43 43 37 37 31 31 43
Economics mean 21.1 0.80 0.33 0.51 0.17 0.42 0.96
std.dev. 0.88 0.40 0.09 0.22 0.18 0.50 0.20
N 79 79 79 79 78 78 75
Total mean 20.6 0.72 0.35 0.47 0.11 0.31 0.68
std.dev. 1.79 0.45 0.09 0.24 0.22 0.46 0.47
N 282 281 266 269 259 260 273





The measures of overconfidence are positive across courses, in line with the international 
evidence. Overconfidence is measured for additional students (528 students in parallel 
classes of Chemistry, University of Chile; 22 PhD researchers in Economics, course in 
Econometrics, European University Institute). Figure 1.4 presents kernel densities for the 
CBO  measures  across  courses.  All  of  them  are  located  towards  positive  values  with 
similar variance. Table 1.2 shows a mean comparison across samples. It seems that the 
international  evidence  supporting  high  degrees  of  overconfidence  is  confirmed:  the 
students  in  the  sample  sustain  overestimated  beliefs  about  their  precision.  It  is  also 
interesting to note the higher overconfidence levels among men compared to women in 
most of the samples.  
 
Table 1.2: CBO International Comparison 
 
 
The measures BTA (better than average) and MA (more accurate) show positive average 
values, i.e.  individuals have a tendency to think about themselves as better than their 
peers. The probability of believing the student answered the questionnaire more accurately 
than his classmates increases by 80% with BTA
6. These two variables capture the same 
relative-to-others effect. If we compare CBO with BTA and MA, even though all of them 
show positive average overconfidence, we observe the coefficient of correlation between 
CBO and BTA is 0.08, i.e. almost no correlation!  The theory behind this chapter does not 
make any prediction about how measures of confidence relative to your peers would affect 
your  information  acquisition  decisions.  As  previously  mentioned,  the  absolute  grading 
system  in  the  sample  makes  CBO  the  relevant  measure  of  overconfidence  for  the 
information  acquisition  decision.  Even  though  we  have  no  prediction  for  the  estimates 
                                                           
6 This number was obtained estimating a probit model where the dependant binary variable is MA (=1 if 
more accurate) and the independent variables are BTA, gender, age and risk aversion.  The marginal effect 
of BTA and gender are 0.8 and 0.3, respectively, both statistically significant different from zero at 1% 
confidence. The coefficients for age and risk aversion are not statistically significant different from zero. 
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CBO 0.49 0.53 0.52 0.39 0.51 0.49 0.473 0.68 0.47 0.460
female 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.40 0.56 0.48 0.450 0.70 0.440
men 0.50 0.54 0.54 0.38 0.50 0.49 0.480 0.67 0.470





using BTA and MA, we do guess that the impact on the decision of getting information 
about  your  ability  should  be  different  when  the  grading  scale  is  relative-to-others. 
Therefore, in the present study, the relevant effect to capture is the effect of CBO on the 
information acquisition decision; BTA and MA should have no effect.  
 
Figure 1.3: Kernel Density, Absolute 
Risk Aversion. 
Figure 1.4: Kernel Density, Calibrated 
Based Overconfidence (CBO) 
   
 
 
The variable “know” is 1 when the students answered affirmatively to learn the result of 
previous test before performing the next one. There is an important difference between the 
results from the first two courses in Table 1.1 (Chemistry and Statistics) and the last three 
(Micro,  Macro and Economics). The last group has a very high proportion of students 
preferring to know compared to the first group (80% versus 47%, respectively). The reason 
is the following. The experiment in Chemistry and Statistics was applied in the second test 
out of three. After the third test, they had to perform a final exam. The students were told 
that the scores of test 2 would not be revealed until test 3 had been taken. Therefore, 
students that declared to prefer to know the results of test 2 immediately before sitting test 
3 are the ones summarized here, corresponding to 46% and 49% of the classes. This is 
exactly  the  information  acquisition  decision  the  experiment  attempts  to  capture.  The 
experiments in Micro, Macro and Economics were applied to the second test out of two. 
After the second test, the students had to perform a final exam. The students were asked if 
they wanted to know the results of test 2 immediately before the final exam. However, the 
rules of the respective Institutions established that students with presentation-to-the-exam 
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questionnaire in Macro and Micro explicitly said that preferring to learn the results after the 
exam would also avoid knowing if the student was in the exempt category. Therefore, a 
bias towards “to know” is observed that would make spurious the estimation of the effect of 
overconfidence  on  information  acquisition  decision  for  this  sample.  In  the  case  of 
Economics, the alternative given to the students was a bit different: they had to decide if 
learning the result of test 2 (a) after the final exam or (b) two weeks in advance the sitting 
date of the final exam. In this case the information about the score would also affect their 
allocation of effort (or time to study) for the final exam. We observe, accordingly, 96% of 
the  students  preferring  to  know.  It  is  interesting  to  notice,  in  any  case,  that  the  4% 
preferring not to know is far to the right on the distribution of overconfidence (CBO of the 
students varying across 0.6 and 0.9, where 0<CBO<1 means overconfidence).      
 
Therefore, even though the data for Micro, Macro & Economics is still informative, caution 
has to be introduced when analyzing the results. The sample for Chemistry & Statistics is 
the most reliable and discussed in the next section.  
 
 
   







The hypothesis tested and confirmed is: “overconfident students decide more frequently 
not to get the information about their true ability”.  
 
Table  1.3  summarizes  the  OLS  (robust  standard  errors)  estimation  of  the  dependant 
variable  know  (=1  if  students  prefers  to  know)  on  overconfidence  CBO,  gender  and 
additional characteristics.  
 
Table 1.3: Information Acquisition OLS regressions (Overconfidence) 
 
 
The first sets of estimations are performed over the whole sample. The estimated impact 
of overconfidence is negative as theory predicts. However, it only becomes statistically 
significance  in  the  last  specification,  when  fixed  class  effects  are  included.  The  latter 
makes sense because we control for the bias towards “prefer to know” as discussed in 
section  1.5 for  the  courses  Micro,  Macro  and  Economics.  The  positively  bias  effect is 
captured in the dummies for each class and, as it can be seen, it was indeed what was 
making  spurious  the  estimated  coefficient  of  CBO.  Gender  (equals  1  for  male,  0  for 
female) has a negative statistically significant effect for the last two estimations for the 
whole sample: men are on average less willing to get feedback about ability. Separate 
regressions for the samples Statistics & Chemistry and Micro, Macro & Economics are 
then run.  
 
Dependant var. All Sample Statistics & Chemestry Micro, Macro & Economics
know=1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
CBO -0.151 -0.159 -0.158 -0.232 -0.333 -0.346 -0.365 -0.366 -0.071 -0.071 -0.072 -0.115
(Overconfidence) (1.29) (1.36) (1.35) (2.13)** (1.80)* (1.86)* (1.96)* (1.92)* (0.58) (0.57) (0.59) (0.95)
Gender -0.1 -0.101 -0.118 -0.103 -0.212 -0.203 -0.236 -0.203 0.026 0.027 0.029 -0.023
(male=1) (1.60) (1.61) (1.88)* (1.71)* (2.02)** (1.88)* (2.26)** (1.91)* (0.38) (0.38) (0.42) (0.35)












Constant 0.825 0.604 0.965 0.688 0.797 0.6 1.118 0.83 0.864 0.872 0.842 0.767
(11.94)*** (1.98)** (7.09)*** (7.82)*** (6.94)*** (1.14) (5.57)*** (6.59)*** (11.18)*** (3.09)*** (4.65)*** (7.56)***
Observations 254 254 251 254 116 116 113 116 138 138 138 138
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.21 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.07 0 0 0 0.12
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Absolute Risk 
Aversion





All the specifications for the sample of Statistics & Chemistry courses show the negative 
and statistically significant effect of overconfidence on the information acquisition decision. 
The  estimated  coefficient  is  robust  to  all  the  specifications.  Gender  (male=1)  is  again 
negative and statistically significant. The estimated coefficient for risk aversion, in line with 
the theory discussed in section 1.3, is also negative and statistically significant: the more 
risk averse the student, the less willing he is to learn his true ability.   
 
It is also interesting to notice that the estimated overconfidence distribution function for 
people that preferred “not to know” seems to be more concentrated to the right compared 
to  the  distribution  function  for  people  preferring  to  know  their  true  ability.  The  latter 
confirms  the  theory  discussed  in  section  1.3.  Kernel  estimations  for  the  sample  of 
Statistics  &  Chemistry  are  shown  in  figure  1.5.  The  similarity  with  the  theoretical 
distributions shown in figure 1.2 is revealing.    
 
Figure 1.5: Kernel Density, Calibrated Based Overconfidence (CBO).  
 
 
In the case of the estimations for Micro, Macro & Economics, even though the estimated 
coefficients for overconfidence are negative across specifications, they are not statistically 
different from zero, as anticipated. The confounding effect collected in the variable know 
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higher than a threshold, makes spurious the interpretation of the estimated coefficient for 
the effect of overconfidence on the information acquisition decision. In other words, the 
score  of  the  test  is  not  only  revealing  the  true  ability  to  the  student.  It  also  reveals 
information about the possibility of passing the class and avoiding the final exam. Finally, 
the gender effect is not statistically different from zero for this sample.  
 
Table 1.4 shows the equivalent regressions of table 1.3 but now controlling also for ability 
(the score they effectively got in the test they decided to know or not). The idea behind this 
is that ability should not be informative given that the students did not know the grade 
before taking the decision. However, for the last sample Macro & Economics
7, given the 
extra information contained in the score, we expect to capture the confounding effect to 
get  a  clean  estimated  coefficient  for  overconfidence
8.  As  can  be  seen,  the  estimated 
coefficient for ability is indeed positive and statistically significant, capturing the anticipated 
biased trough prefers to know. The cleaner estimated coefficients for overconfidence are 
negative as theory predicts and, even though the t-statistics are higher than before, they 
do not become significantly different from zero.  
 
Table 1.4: Information Acquisition OLS regressions, quality control (CBO) 
 
                                                           
7 The grades for the Micro class are not available for administrative reasons.  
8 Extra measures accounting for “quality of the student” were also used (final degree and presentation-to-
the-exam score). The results are qualitative and quantitative similar to those discussed here using ability.  
Dependant var. All Sample Statistics & Chemestry Macro & Economics
know=1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
CBO -0.178 -0.192 -0.19 -0.277 -0.304 -0.314 -0.344 -0.331 -0.169 -0.166 -0.171 -0.164
(Overconfidence) (1.36) (1.47) (1.45) (2.32)** (1.64) (1.68)* (1.84)* (1.72)* (1.25) (1.22) (1.25) (1.28)
Gender -0.163 -0.16 -0.19 -0.179 -0.21 -0.204 -0.235 -0.203 -0.081 -0.084 -0.079 -0.118
(male=1) (2.44)** (2.40)** (2.83)*** (2.81)*** (2.03)** (1.89)* (2.26)** (1.92)* (1.47) (1.48) (1.35) (1.76)*
Ability 0.002 0.006 0.006 -0.019 -0.056 -0.054 -0.044 -0.054 0.088 0.089 0.088 0.044
(0.06) (0.19) (0.20) (0.66) (1.34) (1.29) (1.03) (1.27) (2.89)*** (2.87)*** (2.88)*** (1.48)










Constant 0.874 0.389 1.056 0.85 1.037 0.897 1.297 1.054 0.63 0.515 0.613 0.684
(5.65)*** (1.05) (5.22)*** (5.65)*** (5.22)*** (1.53) (4.96)*** (5.26)*** (3.75)*** (1.59) (2.62)** (4.33)***
Observations 219 219 216 219 116 116 113 116 103 103 103 103
R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.26 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.2
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Absolute Risk 
Aversion





Table 1.5: Information Acquisition OLS regressions (Better Than Average) 
 
 
Table 1.6: Information Acquisition OLS regressions (More than Accurate) 
 
 
Finally, tables 1.5 and 1.6 summarize the results for the estimations using the measures of 
“overconfidence” BTA and MA instead of CBO. The results confirm the problem of these 
two  variables  in  properly  capturing  absolute  overconfidence  (or  with  respect  to  the 
individual himself). The similarity in the estimations is remarkable (i.e. BTA and MA seem 
to capture the same kind of variation for the sample): gender (male=1) has a negative and 
statistically significant impact on the decision of learning the true ability except for the last 
sample (last four columns). The effect of BTA and MA is not statistically different from zero 
Dependant var. All Sample Statistics & Chemestry Micro, Macro & Economics
know=1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
BTA 0.347 0.351 0.356 0.145 0.276 0.276 0.293 0.279 -0.05 -0.042 -0.05 -0.017
(better than average) (2.41)** (2.41)** (2.47)** (1.08) (1.23) (1.23) (1.30) (1.24) (0.35) (0.28) (0.35) (0.12)
Gender -0.12 -0.121 -0.138 -0.12 -0.228 -0.228 -0.245 -0.229 0.045 0.04 0.048 -0.016
(male=1) (1.88)* (1.89)* (2.15)** (1.95)* (2.20)** (2.14)** (2.34)** (2.19)** (0.63) (0.53) (0.64) (0.24)












Constant 0.729 0.427 0.866 0.573 0.643 0.632 0.917 0.64 0.83 0.709 0.808 0.718
(13.54)*** (1.36) (6.62)*** (7.65)*** (7.21)*** (1.21) (5.41)*** (6.69)*** (13.38)*** (2.71)*** (4.58)*** (7.64)***
Observations 244 244 241 244 115 115 112 115 129 129 129 129
R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Absolute Risk 
Aversion
Dependant var. All Sample Statistics & Chemestry Micro, Macro & Economics
know=1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
More accurate 0.062 0.058 0.057 -0.007 0.015 0.014 0.000 0.014 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.027
(equals 1 if yes) (0.92) (0.87) (0.85) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.00) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.44)
Gender -0.126 -0.126 -0.14 -0.114 -0.229 -0.228 -0.239 -0.228 0.034 0.031 0.037 -0.017
(male=1) (1.91)* (1.90)* (2.10)** (1.78)* (2.11)** (2.01)** (2.17)** (2.06)** (0.47) (0.42) (0.49) (0.25)












Constant 0.749 0.524 0.881 0.582 0.655 0.617 0.928 0.656 0.826 0.75 0.796 0.699
(14.28)*** (1.71)* (6.99)*** (7.76)*** (7.31)*** (1.15) (5.53)*** (6.88)*** (13.34)*** (2.86)*** (4.58)*** (7.84)***
Observations 245 245 242 245 115 115 112 115 130 130 130 130
R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.20 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Absolute Risk 
Aversion





for almost all the specifications and samples. For the separate regressions on the sample 
Statistics and Chemistry the coefficients are also not statistically different from zero and 
gender and risk aversion impact negatively the information acquisition decision with 5% 
and 10% interval confidence, respectively. 
 
If the decision about getting the information about true ability depends on things other than 
the believed value of self-esteem in the utility function, then the results could suffer from 
omitted variables. The experiment here isolates individuals from external motivation. There 
is  no  intervention  of  external  agents  forcing  students  to  get  the  information  (social 
pressure: “everybody did it”; dictator: father very authoritarian; peer effects: “all my friends 
did it”). If self-reputation matters in the decision making process, the signal you send about 
your ability to your future self will matter in today´s utility function. In this setting, true ability 
will be revealed sooner or later (i.e. the scores will be revealed at the end of the academic 
year in any case). Therefore, whatever the student type, self reputation should not be an 
issue when deciding whether to learn the true ability (it is just a matter of timing before the 
information is revealed). However, we cannot isolate individuals from external shocks that 
make them temporarily (or even permanently!) indifferent to everything, and therefore also 
to the decision of learning the true ability (the girlfriend just broke up with him; relative just 
had an accident, etc.). These shocks are expected to be random and captured in the error 
term. 
 
To check possible measurement error in the levels of overconfidence and other measured 
variables, a second questionnaire was applied to the courses Chemistry, Macro and Micro 
(see appendix 1.3). Even though beliefs could exhibit some dynamic over time, an issue 
discussed in the second chapter of this thesis, the short time between the application of 
questionnaires  should  allow  us  to  capture  the  same,  or  very  similar,  degree  of 
overconfidence for the same individual. The correlation coefficients between the values 
obtained for CBO are indeed significant and positive (0.50 and 0.46) for Chemistry and 
Micro. Also the correlation between the values obtained for BTA are positive (0.54 and 
0.46) and significant for the same courses. In the case of Macro, the results show no 
correlation to weaken the reliability of the measures for that specific sample.    
 





Information  on  overconfidence  and  other  characteristics  was  also  collected  for  473 
additional students, corresponding to five parallels Chemistry classes in the Engineering 
Faculty  of  the  University  of  Chile,  spring  term  2009.  Score  records  for  most  of  these 
classes,  in  addition  to  the  classes  in  the  experiment,  were  also  available.  The  scores 
students  get  in  their  respective  classes  are  a  mix  of  ability  and  effort,  impossible  to 
disentangle under this setting. Therefore, to look for the causal effect of overconfidence on 
performance would lead to spurious results. It is, in any case, interesting to note that there 
is no correlation between performance and overconfidence. The correlation coefficients 
between the CBO and the final score (the weighted sum of partial tests and final exam) for 
the 458 students in the final sample is statistically significant equal to 0.1. The correlation 
coefficients  between  the  CBO  and  the  presentation  score  (average  of  partial  tests)  is 
statistically significant and equal to 0.08.    
 
Summarizing,  the  empirical  results  support  the  hypothesis  that  overconfident  students 
decide more often not to learn their true ability. This evidence shows that information does 
not always seem to be valuable, as is assumed in classical decision theory. 
   







Behavioral  economic  theory  for  the  problem  of  information  acquisition  decisions  under 
uncertainty predicts that overconfident people with time inconsistent preferences would 
prefer more often not to get accurate information about their true ability, or the relevant 
uncertain fundamentals in their utility function. Based on the theoretical model of Bénabou 
and  Tirole  (2002),  a  field  experiment  in  the  area  of  education  was  designed  and 
implemented to test this hypothesis.  
 
The experiment was applied to 282 undergraduate students during the spring term 2009 in 
Santiago, Chile. The results confirm that the decision of learning the true ability depends 
negatively on the degree of overconfidence: the more overconfident the individual, the less 
frequently he prefers to know his true ability. The estimated distribution of overconfidence 
for  individuals  preferring  not  to  know  is  to  the  right  of  individuals  preferring  to  know, 
consistent with the theory discussed in section 1.3. 
 
Information  on  overconfidence  and  other  characteristics  was  also  collected  for  473 
additional students, corresponding to five parallel  chemistry classes in the Engineering 
Faculty  of  the  University  of  Chile,  Spring  term  2009.  Score  records  for  most  of  these 
classes, in addition to the classes in the experiment, were also available. No correlation 
was found between final performance and overconfidence.  
 
The  main  contribution  of  the  chapter  is  the  design  and  implementation  of  the  field 
experiment. Notice that it is not properly a field experiment in the classical sense because 
the experimenter does not introduce external random variation in the setting. The beauty 
of the setting relies on the simplicity: with no intervention in the formal structure of the 
courses that participated in this experience, we are able to collect the relevant information 
to test the overconfidence hypothesis. The setting can be easily applied and even adapted 
to many other environments where personal control problem matters. 
 
The  heterogeneity  in  overconfidence  of  human  beings  matters  for  the  information 
acquisition  decision.  Further  research  should  be  done  to  understand  the  effect  of  this 
heterogeneity  on  other  important  areas  of  economics  where  information  matters  for 
decision making.    





Appendix 1.1: General Questionnaire. 
 
This information will be used only for research purposes and under total confidentiality 
(neither the professor nor the teacher assistant will have access to it).  
 
Please try to answer as honestly as you can.  
 
ID number (or name if you do not remember): ___________________________ 
 
 




We would like to ask you a hypothetical question that you should answer as if the situation 
were a real one. You are offered the opportunity of acquiring an asset permitting you, with 
the  same  probability,  either  to  gain  500  thousands  Chilean  pesos  (approximately 
US$1000) or to lose all the capital invested. What is the most that you would be prepared 
to pay for this asset? 
 














We would like to assess your general knowledge, and how well you know how much you 
know.  For  the  following  series  of  questions  with  clear-cut  numerical  answers,  please 
provide 90% confidence intervals. Such an interval has a lower an upper bound such that 
you are 90% sure the correct answer lies in this interval. Note that if your intervals are too 
wide, the correct answer will fall in your interval more than 90% of the time, while, if you 
intervals are too narrow, the correct answer will fall in your intervals less than 90% of the 
time. 
 
Question  Lower bound  Upper bound 
World population growth between 1975 and 2005 (in 
percentage terms) 
   
Year in which Newton discovered universal gravitation     
Number of Nations in the OPEC (Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries) 
   
Number of overall medals that Greece won at the first 
Olympic Summer Games in 1896 
   
Year in which Bell patented the telephone     
Percentage of total area in world covered by water     
Height of Sears Tower in Chicago (in meters)     
Number  of  nations  in  NATO  (North  Atlantic  Treaty 
Organization) 
   
Age of sun in billions (10
9)  of years      
Number of bones in an average adult human skeleton     
 
Do  you  think  that  your  answers  were  more  accurate  than  your  colleagues  in  the 
Questionnaire you just answered? (Answer YES or NOT) 
_____________________________ 
 
Of the 56 (yourself included) students in this class, how many do you think will end up 
having a higher score than you in test you just performed? 
_____________________________ 















CBO BTA more accurate know
(years) (male=1) (risk averse>0) (overconfident>0) (better than avg>0) (yes=1) (want to know=1)
Chemistry mean 19.0 0.00 0.38 0.28 -0.06 0.00 0.55
std.dev. 0.77 0.00 0.02 0.30 0.20 0.00 0.52
N 11 11 10 10 10 10 11
Statistics mean 22.3 0.00 0.34 0.50 0.10 0.05 0.68
std.dev. 1.33 0.00 0.11 0.29 0.15 0.23 0.48
N 19 19 16 19 19 19 19
Macro mean 20.6 0.00 0.39 0.48 0.19 0.08 1.00
std.dev. 1.50 0.00 0.01 0.30 0.16 0.29 0.00
N 13 13 12 12 12 12 10
Micro mean 19.5 0.00 0.40 0.27 0.02 0.07 0.65
std.dev. 1.05 0.00 0.01 0.25 0.28 0.26 0.49
N 20 20 17 17 15 15 20
Economics mean 20.8 0.00 0.36 0.56 0.09 0.13 0.94
std.dev. 0.40 0.00 0.06 0.20 0.20 0.34 0.25
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Total mean 20.5 0.00 0.37 0.43 0.07 0.07 0.75
std.dev. 1.58 0.00 0.06 0.29 0.21 0.26 0.44




CBO BTA more accurate know
(years) (male=1) (risk averse>0) (overconfident>0) (better than avg>0) (yes=1) (want to know=1)
Chemistry mean 18.8 1.00 0.36 0.41 0.06 0.24 0.44
std.dev. 1.11 0.00 0.08 0.22 0.21 0.43 0.50
N 47 47 45 45 45 45 43
Statistics mean 21.9 1.00 0.32 0.54 0.07 0.40 0.41
std.dev. 0.86 0.00 0.11 0.20 0.22 0.50 0.50
N 46 46 46 46 45 45 46
Macro mean 21.6 1.00 0.36 0.54 0.20 0.45 0.55
std.dev. 3.04 0.00 0.09 0.20 0.20 0.51 0.51
N 23 23 21 21 19 20 22
Micro mean 19.2 1.00 0.38 0.48 0.11 0.38 0.81
std.dev. 1.19 0.00 0.06 0.21 0.38 0.50 0.40
N 23 23 20 20 16 16 21
Economics mean 21.1 1.00 0.32 0.50 0.19 0.50 0.97
std.dev. 0.96 0.00 0.09 0.22 0.17 0.50 0.18
N 63 63 63 63 62 62 58
Total mean 20.6 1.00 0.34 0.49 0.12 0.40 0.65
std.dev. 1.87 0.00 0.09 0.22 0.22 0.49 0.48
N 202 202 195 195 187 188 190





Appendix 1.3: Extra-Questionnaire (measurement validation). 
 
This information will be used only for research purposes and under total confidentiality 
(neither the professor nor the teacher assistant will have access to it).  
 
Please try to answer as honestly as you can.  
ID number (or name if you do not remember):_________________________________ 
 
Age: __________ years 
 
We would like to assess your general knowledge, and how well you know how much you 
know.  For  the  following  series  of  questions  with  clear-cut  numerical  answers,  please 
provide 90% confidence intervals. Such an interval has a lower an upper bound such that 
you are 90% sure the correct answer lies in this interval. Note that if your intervals are too 
wide, the correct answer will fall in your interval more than 90% of the time, while, if you 
intervals are too narrow, the correct answer will fall in your intervals less than 90% of the 
time. 
Question  Lower bound  Upper bound 
GDP  per  capita  in  Malaysia  in  2005  (in  US  dollar 
2004)  
   
Number of countries in the United Nations     
Year in which Mozart wrote his first symphony     
Gestation  (conception  to  birth)  period  of  an  Asian 
elephant (in days) 
   
Elevation (in meters above sea level) of Mt. Everest     
Number  of  babies  born  in  world  in  2007  (per  1000 
people) 
   
World  –wide  life  expectancy  at  birth  in  2000-05 
(years) 
   
Land  area  in  the  world  (in  millions  of  square 
kilometers) 
   
Greatest depth (in meters) of the Pacific Ocean     
Number of calories in 100gr. potato     
 
Do  you  think  that  your  answers  were  more  accurate  than  your  colleagues  in  the 
Questionnaire you just answered? (Answer YES or NOT) 
_____________________________ 
 
Of the 56 (yourself included) students in this class, how many do you think will end up 
having a higher score than you in the test you just performed? 
_____________________________
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The main purpose of this chapter is to answer what explains the observed dynamic of 
beliefs when individuals face exogenous big events. Looking at data from Eurobarometer 
and focusing on the beliefs about the possible benefits related to the introduction of the 
single currency in the  Euro Zone (1999 and 2002), a striking feature is observed: the 
aggregate  support for the Euro increases before the adoption  and declines  right  after, 
slowly reverting to the norm. This chapter aims to find an explanation of this dynamic, 
trying to disentangle the main forces behind it.  
 
The  single  currency  was  introduced  in  non-physical  form  (traveler‟s  checks,  electronic 
transfers, banking, etc.) at midnight on 1
st January 1999, when the national currencies of 
participating  countries  (the  Euro  zone)  ceased  to  exist  independently,  given  that  their 
exchange rates were locked at fixed rates against each other, effectively making them 
mere  subdivisions  of  the  Euro.  The  notes  and  coins  for  the  old  currencies,  however, 
continued to be used as legal tender until new notes and coins were introduced on 1
st 
January 2002.  
 
Figure 2.1 shows the aggregate dynamic of beliefs for the European Union (EU) where a 
gradual  improvement  (or  decline  in  the  share  of  population  against  the  Euro)  and  the 
posterior boosting are observed in both the relevant dates, the beginnings of 1999 and 
2002. This pattern replicates in most of the countries of the EU, with more or less intensity 
consistent to the final adoption of the single currency (see appendix 2.1). In the example 
here
9, the support during the implementation dates increases by around 10 percentage 
                                                           
9  The  countries  considered  in  this  study  are  all  the  states  adopting  the  Euro  between  1999  and  2002 
(Austria,  Belgium,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  Netherlands,  Portugal, 





points with respect to the  year before, equivalent to  30 million people  becoming more 
optimistic with respect to the benefits of the Euro.  
 
Figure 2.1: Percentage of population against 
the introduction of the Euro, EU. 
 
 
Source: Eurobarometer.   
 
To understand the dynamic of beliefs is important to realize that beliefs not only trigger 
actions at an individual level, as discussed in the first chapter of this thesis, but also at the 
collective level. In the case of individual actions, for example, if the relevant individuals are 
consumers, their beliefs about certain available or promised goods would determine how 
much  they  spend.  At  the  collective  level,  governments  or  societies  try  to  implement 
policies that directly and strongly affect the population. The final implementation is not 
sustainable  if  the  citizens  do  not  believe  in  the  future  benefit  of  the  policy  and  fail  to 
support it. Therefore, there exists room for sellers (politicians) to influence the beliefs of 
consumers (citizens) to obtain the profits of selling the product (being elected).  
 
Glaeser (2004) discusses a theoretical model to explain  why  individuals would sustain 
false beliefs even in the presence of accurate information. Inspired in this discussion, the 
economic  model  used  to  understand  the  dynamic  of  beliefs  requires  a  demand  side 
(consumers or citizens who form beliefs that trigger actions) and a supply side (actors who 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Spain), plus Denmark, Sweden and United Kingdom, countries within the European Union that did not adopt 















































































































could benefit from consumers‟ decisions). The key characteristic required by this model is 
that individuals are subjected to influence by the interested actors and individuals update 
their beliefs with the arrival of new information sets. Boosting beliefs in the presence of big 
events under this framework is the result of the interaction between (a) individuals that 
have  preferences  for  self-serving  beliefs  (they  get  direct  benefits  from  believing  and 
convincing others) and that face imperfect recall (constraints to remember the past and/or 
to correct errors), and (b) actors such that friends, politicians and media that obtain net 
benefits from manipulating individuals beliefs and when the big event or policy is already in 
place, revert back to the norm (given the cost of manipulation). Therefore, all the optimism 
(or  false  beliefs,  under  the  Glaeser  framework)  can  suddenly  jump  down  when  the 
information set is updated and the influences are gone.  
 
Specifically, I look at the dynamics of people‟s beliefs relative to the introduction of the 
single  currency  in  Europe,  using  the  data  sets  of  Eurobarometer.  The  Standard 
Eurobarometer surveys are conducted on behalf of the European Commission at least 
twice a year in all member states of the European Union. Since the early seventies they 
have provided regular information on social and political attitudes of the European public. 
Each Eurobarometer consists of personal interviews to approximately 1000 individuals per 
country and provides representative weighting factors to properly compare countries over 
time.  
 
The  results  confirm  the  theoretical  intuition  with  respect  to  the  influence  of  variables 
related to supply and demand side of belief formation, under the identification assumption 
about  the  exogeneity  of  these  variables.  The  demand  side  of  the  formation  of  beliefs 
shows  that:  to  sustain  political  discussion,  persuade  friends,  to  have  optimistic 
expectations for the next year, to be pro-European and to be satisfied with your life are 
associated with a decrease in the probability of being against the Euro. In the case of the 
supply side of formation of beliefs, we observe the following: to have knowledge about 
European institutions, to frequently access media (TV, radio and newspapers) and to trust 
national and European institutions are associated with a  decrease  in the probability of 
being against the single currency. 
 





The main result supports the existence of a boosting in beliefs during both the dates of the 
introduction  of  the  Euro.  After  the  non-physical  introduction  in  1999,  the  probability  of 
being against the Euro increases by 10 percentage points. There is no evidence, however, 
of a „post‟ improvement in people‟s beliefs, consistent with the slow citizens‟ realization of 
the application of the policy. In the case of the 2002 introduction of the single currency, the 
probability  of  being  against  the  Euro  decreased  by  8  percentage  points  in  the 
neighborhood of the implementation date and increased by 2-5 percentage points right 
after it.  
 
There  is  empirical  evidence  of  the  enforced  role  of  self-serving  beliefs  during  the 
implementation dates with respect to the period immediately before, reflected in the higher 
impact on the probability of being against the Euro of variables like optimistic expectations 
for the next year, higher degrees of life satisfaction and active political discussion. The 
most relevant effect after the physical introduction of the Euro in 2002 is the reduction of 
the relevance, in decreasing the probability of being against the Euro, of knowing about 
European institutions, consistent with the hypothesis of less information being supplied by 
European and national institutions once the policy is in place. It is also interesting the 
increased  relevance  of  trusting  European  Central  Bank  and  European  Parliament  in 
reducing the probability of being against the Euro after the introduction in 2002. This could 
explain why beliefs after the introduction of the Euro were not as pessimistic as before. 
The role of European institutions as a new source of Euro credibility, especially after the 
physical introduction, could be driving this result.  
 
It is important to notice that the main weakness of this chapter relies on the exogeneity 
assumption  that  makes  the  identification  possible.  I  argue  against  the  endogeneity 
problem  of  variables  included  as  supply  and  demand  forces  of  belief  formation  when 
presenting the data. However, the necessary precaution interpreting the causal effect of 
the results is recommended.  
 
This  chapter  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2.2  discusses  the  theoretical  framework 
relevant to explain the dynamic of beliefs. Section 2.3 describes the empirical strategy, 
showing  the  data  and  the  econometric  setting.  Section  2.4  presents  the  main  results. 
Section 2.5 concludes.  





2.2. Literature review 
 
The  process  of  belief  formation  is  the  key  element  of  this  study.  I  am  interested  in 
empirically  analyzing  its  evolution  in  the  presence  of  exogenous  events. The  literature 
described  in this  section  could  be  divided  in  three  parts.  Firstly,  different  beliefs  imply 
different aggregate equilibria and this is empirically shown by Bénabou and Tirole (2006). 
Second, that in the presence of exogenous events individuals beliefs change. Di Tella et al 
(2007) explores a natural experiment in Argentina, providing support for the hypothesis of 
change  in  individual  beliefs  after  facing  exogenous  event.  Third,  a  framework  to 
understand belief formation and evolution is needed. This will be based on the discussion 
for the ingredients for a model of false beliefs of Glaser (2004).   
 
Bénabou and Tirole (2006) develops a theoretical framework to explain why most of the 
people need to believe in a just world (you get what you deserve, effort pays, etc.). It is 
argued  that  differences  in  the  valuation  of  these  beliefs  across  countries  and  their 
prevalence could explain important international divergences in aggregate macroeconomic 
variables. The theoretical model analyzed refers to an optimal tax level to be decided by a 
community  based  on  general  beliefs.  Divergent  measures  of  beliefs  can  then  explain 
governments  with  different  degrees  of  power.  The  authors  explain  several  macro 
differences between Europe and US, in line with belief divergences. 
 
Di Tella, Galiani and Schargrosky (2007) provides empirical evidence of changes in beliefs 
and  discusses  the  possible  mechanisms.  The  paper  studies  the  formation  of  beliefs 
exploiting  a  rare  natural  experiment  in  Argentina,  where  some  households  of  a  very 
homogeneous community obtained property rights on the land they lived, the selection 
being mainly exogenous. A significant difference is found in the beliefs held by squatters 
with and without legal titles. This empirical finding is connected to my research supporting 
the idea that “big events” (or strong shocks, such as the giving of property rights) can have 
an effect on beliefs. The main advantage of Di Tella, Galiani and Schargrosky (2007) is the 
presence  of  exogenous  variation  across  squatters  to  measure  the  effective  change  in 
beliefs. 
 





Gleaser (2004) discusses an economic model of false beliefs and their implications. Even 
though the  paper attempts to explain the maintenance over  time of determined “false” 
beliefs, the theoretical framework is useful for understanding the mechanisms behind the 
dynamic of beliefs analyzed in this chapter. 
 
The economic model used to understand the dynamic of beliefs requires a demand side 
(consumers or citizens who form beliefs that trigger actions) and a supply side (actors who 
could benefit from consumers or citizens‟ decisions). The key characteristic of the model is 
that consumers are subject to influence by the interested actors. Individuals also update 
their beliefs with the arrival of new information sets.  Boosting beliefs in the presence of big 
events under this framework is the result of the interaction between (a) individuals that 
have  preferences for  self-serving  beliefs  (they  get  direct  benefits from  being  optimistic 
today, from convincing others to believe what they do and from overvaluing the goodness 
of the past) and that they face imperfect recall (constraints to remember the past and/or to 
correct  errors)  and  (b)  actors  such  that  friends,  politicians  and  media  that  obtain  net 
benefits from manipulating individuals beliefs and, when the big event or policy is already 
in place, revert back to the norm (given the cost of manipulation). Therefore, optimism 
levels suddenly jumps down when the information set is updated and external influences 
are gone. 
 
This is a novel way of looking at the importance of beliefs for aggregate results and the 
linkage to my research is strong in the sense that the introduction of the Euro could have 
not  been  sustained  without  the  citizens‟  support
10.  In  what  follows  I  will  refer  to  the 
literature relevant for both sides of the formation of beliefs. 
 
Demand side or “Motivated beliefs”: the individuals 
 
Experiments performed in sociology and political science
11 shows that individuals tend to 
sustained false consciousness even though they get periodical information that show them 
                                                           
10 For example, the introduction of the European Union Constitution broke down mainly because of the 
opposition of the citizens in France and Sweden despite the initial agreement of the authorities in each 
country.  
11 Bénabou and Tirole (2006) discusses this issue in detail. 





how wrong they are. The question is why. The beliefs under this paradigm are chosen and 
valued by the individuals. Most of the existing literature about beliefs in my opinion relies 
on  this.  Bénabou  and  Tirole  (2001)  takes  a  pioneering  approach  at  exploring  the 
mechanisms  for  the  formation  of  beliefs.  In  trying  to  put  together  many  observational 
findings  in  psychology  and  looking  at  their  main  economic  implications,  an  analytical 
framework is developed in order to better explain individual behavior. The paper is able to 
give  formal  content  to  individuals  traits  (such  that  self-confidence,  intrinsic  motivation, 
dependence or autonomy and power of will) as well as to cognitive processes (such as 
wishful thinking or selective memory, self-monitoring and the setting of personal rules) and 
departs  from  the  typical  ultra-rational  economic  agent  allowing  for  imperfect  self-
knowledge, imperfect willpower and imperfect recall.  
 
Individuals could demand a certain type of beliefs for several reasons. Bénabou and Tirole 
(2002) opens a new perspective when looking at dynamic games where the players are 
the agent in the present and the same agent in the future. Self-signaling becomes relevant 
in the sense that what I believe today (about myself or about more general issues) could 
affect either my actions or beliefs in the future, and vice versa (reputation matters). It is 
here that the literature pays strong attention to explaining human behavior, i.e. modeling 
how the beliefs individuals sustain about themselves can affect their behavior. The latter is 
not attempting to explain the result of specific collective choices; however how the authors 
analyze the formation of beliefs in this literature becomes a relevant tool for my research. 
Under this idea, thinking about the introduction of the Euro, people do not want to believe 
the implementation of this policy is going to be terrible for them. Individuals assign more 
than realistic advantages to the effects of this specific policy, valuing at the present this 
overillusion. This is one branch of the demand side of self serving beliefs formation and 
when individuals perceive the implementation of the policy and actually realize the true 
effects,  the  consequent  disillusion  should  be  reflected  in  less  optimistic  beliefs.  Self-
serving beliefs are also related in the literature to the recognition of imperfect recall and 
the tendency of individuals to better recall good past experiences over bad ones. In the 
case analyzed in this chapter, self-serving beliefs from imperfect recall would refer to how 
important  collective  experiences  introducing  policies  in  the  European  Union  could  be 
inputs for the formation of beliefs of successive policies.  
 





Another  important  branch  of  self-serving  beliefs  refers  to  social  signaling.  On  the  one 
hand, people get benefit either by making other people to believe what they do, and also 
from what other people think about them (I like when other people like how I am or how I 
behave). On the other hand, Battaglini, Bénabou and Tirole (2005) looks at the effect of 
peer groups and its influence on individuals‟ behavior. The idea is that individuals benefit 
by  believing  the  same  as  peers  they  admire,  trust  or  associate  as  being  nearer  to 
themselves.  
 
Supply side of formation of beliefs: the interested actors 
 
The information available is an important input for the beliefs formation process. Moreover, 
if  agents  rationally  update  their  beliefs,  the  observed  boosting  could  have  been  the 
consequence  of  sudden  jumps  in  the  availability  of  information  during  the  period. 
Therefore,  given  individuals  hold  Bayesian  mechanisms  to  update  their  beliefs,  they 
updated  their  priors  accordingly.    Also,  the  information  available  could  have  been 
manipulated by interested media actors. For example, sensationalist newspapers or TV 
programs  could  get  direct  benefits  manipulating  information  (higher  profits  for  higher 
contingent sales, more announcers, etc.).  
 
Indoctrination has been another mechanism widely discussed in the literature. It refers to 
how the influence of your parents  and/or any other kind of authority could shape your 
beliefs about yourself and then, about your actions.  Bénabou and Tirole (2003) introduces 
the idea of external and internal motivation when people perform certain tasks. The paper 
models a game where an agent with imperfect self-knowledge has to choose the level of 
effort to exert and an informed principal (for example, a parent) who chooses an incentive 
structure for the agent. Therefore, what the principal believes about the agent becomes 
relevant  for  the  decision  making  process  of  the  agent  and  indeed,  the  principal  could 
manipulate  the  information  given  to  the  agent  to  get  the  effort  that  maximizes  the 
principal‟s utility. This mechanism could have been relevant for the boosting in beliefs here 
analyzed. When politicians have a target to be achieved, say the effective introduction of 
the Euro, they could manipulate the beliefs of citizens for their interests. However, once 
the target is reached they revert back to the norm, as do people‟s beliefs. 
 





Friends, workmates or relatives can also be relevant influences for the agent‟s formation of 
beliefs, in the sense that they are also agents that benefit by convincing others (in this 
case, the individual forming beliefs) about their own beliefs.  
 
Given the data set available, the main purpose of this chapter is to test the relevance of 
the channels, discussed above, for boosting beliefs related to the introduction the single 
currency in the Europe. The observed aggregated boosting (by country and for the Euro 
Zone  as  a  whole)  is  the  starting  point  here.  The  challenge  is  to  test the  dynamics  of 
individual beliefs and the main channels for beliefs‟ formation.  





2.3. Empirical Strategy 
 
The main purpose of the empirical part of this chapter is to test the existence of a boosting 
in individuals‟ beliefs when individuals face an exogenous big event. As mentioned in the 
section 2.2, individuals form beliefs influenced by demand (intrinsic motivation) and supply 
(interested actors) forces. This section presents the data and the econometric setting of 




Monitoring  public  opinion  in  the  European  Union  is  the  mission  of  the  Standard 
Eurobarometer surveys conducted on behalf of the European Commission, at least two 
times a year in all member states of the European Union. Since the early Seventies, they 
have provided regular information on social and political attitudes of the European public. 
Since the Nineties the Eurobarometer program has been complemented by the small scale 
Flash Eurobarometer on specific affairs and by the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer 
series (at a later date replaced by the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer).  
 
The  Standard  Eurobarometer  survey  series  is  a  unique  program  of  cross-national  and 
cross-temporal comparative social research.  Since the early  Seventies, representative 
national samples in all of the European Union, formerly European Community, member 
states  have  been  simultaneously  interviewed  in  each  Spring  and  Autumn.  The 
Eurobarometer series is designed to provide regular monitoring of the social and political 
attitudes of the European Union public through specific trend questions. The data received 
from the principal investigator is checked, corrected and formatted to archival standards, 
since the beginning of the series, by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social 
Research (ICPSR), recently in cooperation with the Zentralarchiv (ZA) and intermittently 
with  the  Swedish  Social  Science  Data  Service  (SSD).  The  data  is  comprehensively 
documented  in  machine  readable  codebooks  in  English,  including  the  unweighted, 
absolute and relative frequency counts for each country.  
 





I organize the data available focusing on the two relevant dates for the event Introduction 
of  the Euro: the non-physical form of the single currency (traveler‟s checks, electronic 
transfers,  banking,  etc.)  at  midnight  on  1
st  January  1999  and  the  replacement  of  the 
domestic notes and coins on 1
st January 2002.  
 
After  the  inspection  of  the  available  data,  the  selection  of  variables  explaining  beliefs 
relative  to  the  introduction  of  the  Euro  is  summarized  in  table  2.1,  where  the  original 
survey  question  and  the  name  and  label  of  the  variable  are  shown
12.  The  variables 
selected to be on the demand side of the formation of beliefs are the ones related to 
expectation for the next year (explife, expeco, expfin, expunemp, expjob), life satisfaction 
(satis), European identification (identity), how proud you feel of your nationality (pride), 
degree  of  political  discussion  (poldis)  and  persuading  friends  (persuade)  when  talking 
about political issues. As mentioned in section 2.2, the demand side of the formation of 
beliefs refers to the individual personal motivation to believe in something. If individuals 
are  optimistic  today  they  would  tend  to  be  optimistic  also  about  other  issues,  as  the 
introduction of the Euro. This effect can be caught by the variable life satisfaction. Another 
important channel of self-serving beliefs is that related to self-signaling. People need to 
give good signals to future realizations of themselves. Therefore, if they are optimistic with 
respect to the future on several topics, this should also be reflected in beliefs about the 
Euro and the variables related to expectations for the next year attempt to catch this effect. 
If the individual gets direct utility from feeling European and consequently, believing that 
the Euro introduction would help in that direction, the variable related to identity would 
reflect that. On the other hand, if they see the introduction of the Euro as a threat for their 
nationalism, the variable pride would have an opposite effect. Under the same logic, if 
individuals benefit in some sense from holding political discussions and convincing friends 
about political issues, this positive effect on the probability of supporting the introduction of 
the Euro would be captured by the variables poldis and persuade. It should be noted that 
no variables reflecting imperfect recall were found given the data available. 
   
                                                           
12 See appendix 2.2 for a graphical aggregate evolution of these variables over time. 





Table 2.1: The relevant variables 
Question  Name of the variable  (label values) 
Dependent variable identifying beliefs 
Is the respondent 'for' or 'against' a common European currency (single 
currency) replacing the national currencies in all EC / EU member states? 
euro  
(1 against; 0 in favour) 
Explanatory variables: Demand side of the formation of beliefs 
Expectations:  What  are  your  expectations  for  the  next  12  months  to 
come? Will be better, worse or the same, when it comes to (a) your life in 
general,  (b)  the  economic  situation  of  your  country,  (c)  the  financial 
situation of your household, (d) the employment situation in your country, 
and (e) your personal job situation.  
explife, expeco, expfin, expunemp, expjob 
(1 “better”, 2 “worse”, 3 “same”) 
Life satisfaction: On the whole, are you satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very 
satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?  
satis 
(1 “very”, 2 “fairly”, 3 “not very” 4 “not at all”) 
In the near future, do you see yourself as (a) national (b) national and 
European (c) European and national (d) European only 
identity  
(1 “national”, 2 “national+ european”, 3 “european+ 
national” 4 “european”)  
Would you say you are very proud, quite proud, not very proud, not at all 
proud, to be “nationality”? 
Pride 
(1 “very”, 2 “quite”, 3 “not very” 4 “not at all”) 
Political discussion: When you get together with friends, would you say 
you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or never? 
Poldis 
(1 “frequently”, 2 “occasionally”, 3 “never”) 
Persuade  friends:  When  you  hold  strong  opinion,  do  you  ever  find 
yourself persuading your friends, relatives or fellow workers to share your 
views? If so, does it happen often, time to time, rarely or never?  
persuade 
(1  “often”,  2  “from  time  to  time”,  3  “rarely”  4 
“never”) 
Explanatory variables: Supply side of formation of beliefs 
How much do you feel you know about the European Union, its policies, 
its institutions? 
Knowledge 
(scale for 1 “knowing nothing”  to 11 “knowing a 
great deal”) 
About how often do you (a) watch news on TV (b) read about current 
politics  in  daily  newspapers  (c)  listen to  the  broadcasts  on  the  radio? 
Every day, several times a week, once or twice a week, less often or 
never.  
newstv, newspaper, newsradio 
(1 “everyday”, 2 “several times a week”, 3 “once or 
twice”, 4 “less often”, 5 “never”) 
Trust: Do you tend to trust or tend not to trust (a) the press (b) the radio 
(c) television, and (d) political parties. 
trustpress, trusttv, trustradio, trustpol 
(1 “tend to trust”, 2 “tend not to trust”, 3 “do not 
know”) 
Trust institutions: Do you tend to trust or tend not to trust (a) European 
Commission, (b) European Parliament, (c) European Central Bank 
trustec, trustep, trustecb 
(1 “tend to trust”, 2 “tend not to trust”, 3 “do not 
know”) 
 
The supply side of the formation of beliefs refers to interested actors that influence the 
beliefs  of  individuals.  The  relevant  variables  identified  here  are  related  mainly  to  the 
interaction between the individual and the information he gets. The variable knowledge 
measures how much they know about the European Institutions (one of them, for example, 
the Euro), and the effects of knowing more should be consistent with supporting the single 
currency. It is assumed that the information related to the Euro comes from interested 
actors  (European  institutions,  national  governments,  etc.)  and,  consequently,  the  more 
pro-Euro the information, the more the individuals‟ knowledge. Under the same logic and 
by  assuming  interested  actors  also  use  the  media  to  communicate  their  pro-Euro 
information, the frequency  with  which  individuals  access news in general is caught  by 





newstv,  newspaper  and  newsradio.  How  much  they  trust  the  media  is  reflected  in 
trustpress,  trusttv,  trustradio.  Looking  at  the  influence  of  political  actors  and  European 
institutions, the variables under interest are trustpol, trustec, trustep and trustecb. 
 
The  crucial  assumption  that  will  make  identification  possible  is  the  exogeneity  of  all 
variables in supply and demand sides of the formation of beliefs. In the case of demand 
side of the formation of beliefs variables,  the assumption  could be problematic for the 
variables related to expectation for the next year. As mentioned before, these variables 
attempt to catch the signaling effect to future realizations of the individual and it is difficult 
to argue against some correlation. The same happens in the case of the variables related 
to trust in the supply side of formation of beliefs, where trusting individuals could indeed be 
biased  to  trust  institutions  as  a  whole  also.  Therefore,  precaution  has  to  underlie  the 
interpretation of results in the specifications that include these variables.  
 
Table 2.2: Summary of variables and availability over time. 
 
 
The period under study covers the years 1997 to 2003. The harmonization of a data set 
including the trend over time of the relevant variables was rigorously done and details are 
shown in appendix 2.3. Table 2.2 shows the summary of variables and the availability over 
time.  As  it  can  be  seen,  there  is  a  tradeoff  between  the  number  of  observations  (i.e. 
Name of 
variable
1997.4 1997.11 1998.5 1998.11 1999.4 1999.11 2000.5 2000.12 2001.5 2001.11 2002.5 2002.11 2003.4 2003.11
explife x x x x x x x x x
expeco x x x x x x x
expfin x x x x x x x
expunemp x x x x x x x
expjob x x x x x x x
satis x x x x x x x x x x
identity x x x x x x x x x x x
pride x x x x x x x
poldis x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
persuade x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
knowledge x x x x x x x x x x x x x
newstv x x x x x x x x x x
newspaper x x x x x x x x x x
newsradio x x x x x x x x x x
trstpress x x x x x x x x
trustradio x x x x x x x x
trsuttv x x x x x x x x
trsutpol x x x x x x x x
trustep x x x x x x x x x x
trsutec x x x x x x x x x x
trustecb x x x x x x x x x x
Supply side of formation of beliefs
Demand side of formation of beliefs





number of surveys where the variables are available) and the number of covariates. The 
specifications discussed later take into account the time/variable availability. 
 
The  set  of  individual  characteristics,  available  for  the  whole  period  under  study, 
corresponds  to  gender,  age,  education,  marital  status,  if  the  individual  is  head  of  the 
household and country of residence. Summary statistics for the whole sample are shown 
in Table 2.3 (see appendix 2.4 for statistics by country).  
 
Table 2.3: Summary statistics, European Union (Eurobarometer). 
 
 
   
education age  gender head of household
date  (age when finishing studies) (years) (1 male, 2 female) (1 yes, 2 no) 
excludes people still studying
1997.04 mean 17.66 43.74 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 4.62 17.81 0.50 0.50
1997.11 mean 17.59 43.75 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 4.62 17.96 0.50 0.50
1998.05 mean 17.64 43.84 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 4.57 17.91 0.50 0.50
1998.11 mean 17.67 44.67 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 4.77 18.31 0.50 0.50
1999.04 mean 17.61 44.70 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 4.59 18.31 0.50 0.50
1999.11 mean 17.62 44.65 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 4.60 18.30 0.50 0.50
2000.05 mean 17.69 44.68 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 4.64 18.26 0.50 0.50
2000.12 mean 17.82 44.82 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 4.76 18.34 0.50 0.50
2001.05 mean 17.77 44.73 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 4.62 18.28 0.50 0.50
2001.11 mean 17.92 44.70 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 4.66 18.22 0.50 0.50
2002.05 mean 17.87 44.78 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 4.64 18.37 0.50 0.50
2002.11 mean 17.77 44.69 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 4.37 18.29 0.50 0.50
2003.04 mean 17.97 45.30 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 4.81 18.43 0.50 0.50
2003.11 mean 17.99 45.26 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 4.73 18.35 0.50 0.50
Total 17.76 44.60 1.52 1.52
4.65 18.23 0.50 0.50







The available data are cross-sectional sets of individuals. In a first step, and given the 
richness of the data, a test is performed for a non linear model with a binary dependent 
variable representing beliefs in the relevant period of time t. Here, the boosting in beliefs is 
not  being  tested,  the  data  is  merely  being  examined,  by  relevant  period,  in  order  to 
understand the within relevance of “demand” and “supply” forces behind the formation of 
beliefs concerning the benefits of the introduction of Euro. This is summarized by Equation 
(1): 
 
    t X X X t X X X y E s s d d s d          0 , , , /     (1) 
 
  E  refers to the conditional expectation of  y  (a binary variable vector defining beliefs for 
individual  i=1  to N  in period  t). The  big events for the introduction of the Euro in this 
research  are  two:  the  non-physical  form  of  the  single  currency  (traveler‟s  checks, 
electronic transfers, banking, etc.) at midnight on 1 January 1999 and the replacement of 
the domestic notes and coins on 1 January 2002. The period t is then defined with respect 
to the implementation of the relevant big event being t=before, during, after the relevant 
date.  In  the  case  of  the  non-physical  introduction  of  the  euro  in  1999,  given  data 
availability,  before  corresponds  to  the  period from  April  1997  to  May  1998,  during  the 
period November 1998 to April 1999 and after the period November 1999 to December 
2000. In the case of the physical introduction of the euro in 2002, before corresponds to 
the  period  May  2000  to  May  2001;  during  November  2001  to  May  2002  and  after  
November 2002 to December 2003.  
 
     is  a  standard-normal  distribution  function,  d X   corresponds  to  set  of  variables 
identifying the demand side of the formation of beliefs,  s X  to the supply side and  X  to a 
set of individual characteristics (where country fix effects are included). It is assumed all 
the variables contained in  d X ,  s X  and  X  are exogenous regressors.  
 





Probit regressions for model (1) are performed using appropriate weighting factors and 
country fixed effects. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is 
against  the  introduction  of  the  Euro  and  0  if  in  favor.  The  covariates  included  in  the 
matrices  d X  and  s X are all discrete dummy variables. Therefore, the appropriate marginal 
effect I am interested in, or how the probability of being against the introduction of the Euro 
changes with the covariate  s d k X x k k , ,    (demand and supply forces) has the form: 
 
 
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          (2) 
 
where   ˆ ‟s correspond to the probit estimated coefficients,  k X  to the sample weighted 
averaged covariates and X  to the sample weighted averaged individual characteristics.  
 
In a second step, I will test the existence of a boosting in beliefs before and after the 
introduction of the Euro, for the two relevant dates in this study: non-physical introduction 
in  1999  and  physical  introduction  in  2002.    Equation  (3)  summarizes  the  setting. 
Comparing with equation (1), three new terms are introduced. D is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if we are during the big event.   D X s  and  D Xd  are included to capture the interaction 
effect between the dummy variable indicating the big event and the “supply” and “demand” 
variables for the formation of beliefs.  
 
    t D X D X D X X X t D X X X y E s sD d dD s s d d s d / , , , , / 0                      (3) 
 
The sample is now organized by pairs of contiguous periods in order to get the impact on 
the probability of being against the Euro before and after the implementation of the policy, 
with respect to the period of implementation (during). Therefore, period t is now defined as 
t=before-during, after-during. In the case of the non-physical introduction of the euro in 
1999, before-during corresponds to April 1997 to April 1999; after-during corresponds to 
November 1998 until December 2000. In the case of the physical introduction of the Euro 





in 2002, before-during corresponds to May 2000 until May 2002; after-during to November 
2001 until December 2003.  
 
There are two sets of relevant results to test the boosting in beliefs before and/or after the 
big event: the marginal effect for during (the dummy D) and the marginal effects of the 
interaction terms XdD and XsD in equation 3. The explicit formula for the marginal effect of 
introducing the Euro is then: 
 
 
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  (4) 
 
Remember, I am interested in knowing if some of the covariates in  d X  and  s X had a 
significant  marginal  change  explaining  the  probability  of  being  against  the  Euro  with 
respect to during. Therefore, the marginal effects for the interaction terms are calculated
13. 
The interaction marginal effect will be given by: 
 
 
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therefore, 
                                                           
13 The computation of interaction effects and standard errors in logit and probit models has been widely 
discussed since Norton, Wang and Ai (2004). The appropriate calculations are not automatically done in 
Stata for non linear models with interaction terms. The explicit programs are available from the author. 
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The first term in curly brackets corresponds to the marginal effect of the variable xk (for 
example, identity=1 if the individual “sees himself as European in the near future” against 
identity=0 if not) on the probability of being against the Euro when D=1 (i.e. during the big 
event).  The  second  term  in  curly  brackets  corresponds  to  the  marginal  effect  of  the 
variable xk on the probability of being against the Euro when D=0 (i.e. before or after the 
big event, when applicable). Therefore, to assess the impact of the interaction terms on 
the probability of being against the Euro we have to be careful with the sign of each of 
these terms separately. For example, if the impact of identity=1 on the probability of being 
against the Euro is negative and is more important during (D=1) the big event than before 
(D=0), equation (5) would be negative (the first curly bracket is more negative than the 
second one).  
 
The marginal effects summarized in (2) will be obtained for three different settings, given 
the two relevant dates for the big event “introduction of the Euro” and the availability of the 
explanatory variables over time. Remember the main attempt of doing this is to explore the 
within effect of covariates on the probability of being against the introduction of the Euro. 
Most of the discrete explanatory variables measure some degree of intensity (for example, 
for the variable “how often you watch TV”, the possible answers are “everyday”, “several 
times a week”, “once or twice”, “less often” or “never”). We want to see if the probability of 
being  against  the  Euro  is  increasing/decreasing/invariant  with  respect  to  the  intensity 
measured by the explanatory variables. See appendix 2.5 for the details of the estimated 
equations. 
 
In order to calculate equations (4) and (5), selected reduced forms for both dates of the 
introduction of the Euro are estimated. Covariates are redefined as binary variables, losing 
the within variability, in order to simplify the programming equation (5). Table 2.4 shows 





the  redefinition  of  the  relevant  variables.  See  appendix  2.6  for  details  of  the  reduced 
estimated equations.  
 
Table 2.4: Covariates label redefinition for reduced forms equations 
  Redefined label 
Explanatory variables: Demand side of the formation of beliefs 
explife, expeco, expfin, 
expunemp, expjob 
1 “better or same”, 0 “worse” 
identity   1 “national+ European or European+ national or European”;  
0 “only national” 
poldis  1 “frequently or occasionally”, 0 “never” 
persuade  1 “often or from time to time”, 0 “rarely or never” 
Explanatory variables: Supply side of the formation of beliefs 
knowledge  1 “block 4 to 11-knowing a great deal”,  0 “block 1-knowing 
nothing to block 3”  
newstv, newspaper, 
newsradio 
1 “everyday or several, once, twice times a week or less often”, 
0 “never” 
trustec, trustep, trustecb  1 “tend to trust”, 2 “tend not to trust”, 0 “do not know” 
 






Marginal effects by sample: before, during, after the “big event” 
 
First, I will show and discuss the results for the marginal estimated effects in equation (2) 
for each of the specifications summarized in appendix 2.5. Notice that the regressions are 
performed  by  period  and  the  idea  is  to  have  a  preliminary  taste  of  the  impact  of  the 
covariates on the probability of being against the introduction of the Euro. Tables 2.5, 2.6 
and 2.7 show the results for the non-physical Euro introduction in 1999. Tables 2.8, 2.9 
and 2.10 show the results for the one in 2002. 
 
The different specifications for each period (1999full, 199full2a and 1999full2b) take into 
account  the  time/variable  availability  explained  in  section  2.3.  See  appendix  2.5  for  a 
detailed summary of variables and the period of availability for each of the specifications. 
 
Table 2.5: Marginal probit effects equation (2), non-physical Euro introduction 1999 (*). 
 
(*) See appendix 2.7 for details.  
 
Looking at table 2.5, the first relevant fact is that the sign for the covariates related to the 
supply  and  demand  sides  of  the formation  of beliefs  are  negative,  consistent  with  the 
economic  intuition:  the  probability  of  being  against  the  Euro  decreases  with  variables 
reflecting self-serving beliefs (demand side) and the influence of interested actors (supply 
side). Separate tables showing the detailed results for all the variables in each side of 
Period
Equation name 1999full 1999full2a 1999full2b 1999full 1999full2a 1999full2b 1999full 1999full2a 1999full2b
Explanatory variables
Demand side of the formation of beliefs: X D negative negative negative negative negative negative negative negative negative
(a)** (a)** (a)** (a)** (a)** (a)** (a)** (a)** (a)**
Supply side of the formation of beliefs: X S negative negative negative negative negative negative negative negative negative
(a)** (a)** (a)** (a)** (a)** (a)** (a)** (a)** (a)**
Idiosyncratic characteristics: X
Country fix effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
(b)** (b)** (b)** (b)** (b)** (b)** (b)** (b)** (b)**
Gender==male -0.078 -0.085 -0.065 -0.065 -0.044 -0.044 -0.079 -0.065 -0.065
(12.54)** (6.89)** (6.02)** (9.38)** (4.14)** (4.52)** (12.90)** (7.72)** (10.09)**
Marital status==with couple -0.020 -0.025 -0.009 -0.022 -0.023 -0.017 -0.019 -0.029 -0.013
(3.37)** (2.11)* (0.89) (3.34)** (2.21)* (1.77) (3.22)** (3.62)** (2.09)*
Head of  household==yes 0.009 0.008 -0.007 0.010 0.000 0.008 0.017 0.013 0.016
(1.35) (0.64) (0.64) (1.37) (0.01) (0.81) (2.62)** (1.42) (2.32)*
Education -0.009 -0.007 -0.002 -0.008 -0.005 -0.002 -0.01 -0.006 -0.004
(13.70)** (5.35)** (1.99)* (10.99)** (4.87)** (2.51)* (15.31)** (6.99)** (6.12)**
Age 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001
(5.03)** (0.47) (0.67) (4.77)** (1.59) (0.43) (10.41)** (5.17)** (5.30)**
Observations 41703 11064 13315 27792 11391 13671 42440 22883 41015
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
(a) The detailed coefficients and z-statistic values are shown separately in tables 2.6 and 2.7.
(b) See annex 2.7 for detailed z-statistic values.
Before (April 1997-May 1998) During (Nov 1998-April 1999) After (Nov 1999-Dec 2000)





influence will follow, to explore the within variation of intensity on the probability of being 
against the Euro.  
 
The marginal effects of the individual characteristics show that men are, on average, 5-8% 
less likely to be against the Euro than women across specifications; more education has 
practically no effect: it tends to decrease the probability of being against the Euro by less 
than 1%. The same happens with the effect of age. There is some evidence showing that 
people in couples tend to be 2% less against the Euro than people without a partner and 
that heads of households are on average 1-2% more against the single currency. The 
country fixed effects that I will discuss here are applicable to almost every regression in 
what follows
14. All the coefficients are calculated with respect to the United Kingdom, a 
country  very  much  against  the  introduction  of  the  Euro.  The  marginal  effects  are 
statistically significant for almost every country, Italy being the most pro-Euro country (with 
a negative marginal effect of 30-40%) followed by Spain, Portugal and Ireland. Sweden 
and  Denmark  are  not  very  different  than  UK  and  the  country  with  the  less  negative 
marginal fixed effect is Germany (around -10%).   
 
Table 2.6 shows the marginal effects on the probability of being against the Euro for the 
variables associated with the demand side of the formation of beliefs. If we look at the first 
specification (1999full) before the big event 1999, the marginal effect of political discussion 
on the probability of being against the Euro becomes more negative when it is done more 
frequently. This pattern is also observed during and after the big event. The impact is very 
low  in  any  case,  around  2-5%  with  respect  to  no  sustained  political  discussion  at  all. 
Persuade friends also has a negative effect (~2-3%) on the probability of being against the 
Euro across relevant periods. The role of optimistic expectations impacts negatively and 
increasingly  in  module  on  the  probability  of  being  against  the  single  currency.  For 
example, the effect of the discrete variable related to expectation for the next year about 
the economy in your country is based on the excluded category “I expect it to be worse”. If 
the person thinks the economy will behave “the same” instead of “worse”, the probability 
diminishes by 9%; if “better”, the probability of being against the Euro decreases additional 
5 percentage points. Finally, the variable reflecting the European identity feeling of the 
                                                           
14 For detailed coefficients look at the respective appendix indicated in the bottom of each table.  





citizens has a negative impact, around 20%, diminishing the probability of being against 
the single currency (the excluded category is “only national”). The impact seems to be 
invariant to the intensity of the feeling.  
 
Table 2.6: Marginal probit effects equation (2), Demand Side of the formation of Beliefs 
(XD), non-physical Euro introduction 1999 (*). 
 
 
Table 2.7 shows the marginal effects on the probability of being against the Euro for the 
variables associated with the supply side of the formation of beliefs. As can be seen, they 
also have a negative effect on the probability of being against the Euro when significant. 
The high frequency exposure to newspapers (“everyday”) has a negative impact on the 
probability of being against the Euro, varying from 5 to 8% across specifications. There is 
also some evidence of the pro-Euro effect of high frequency exposure to TV and radio 
(between 2 and 9%). Remember the excluded category is “never”. The variable reflecting 
the knowledge citizens have about European institutions has a negative marginal effect 
and increasing in module for most of the specifications, especially the ones for after the big 
Period
Equation name 1999full 1999full2a 1999full2b 1999full 1999full2a 1999full2b 1999full 1999full2a 1999full2b
Explanatory variables
Demand side of the formation of beliefs: X D
Political discussion==occasionally -0.025 -0.024 0.025 -0.046 -0.041 -0.024 -0.048 -0.022 -0.001
(3.51)** (1.67) (2.03)* (5.77)** (3.25)** (2.08)* (7.09)** (2.35)* (0.07)
Political discussion==frequently -0.048 -0.043 0.033 -0.054 -0.036 -0.005 -0.064 -0.013 0.011
(4.72)** (2.09)* (1.77) (4.82)** (2.08)* (0.33) (6.36)** (0.90) (0.97)
Persuade friends==rarely -0.028 -0.003 -0.025 -0.028 -0.013 -0.020 -0.025 -0.015 -0.005
(3.36)** (0.20) (1.82) (3.01)** (0.91) (1.52) (3.18)** (1.40) (0.57)
Persuade friends==from time to time -0.034 -0.007 -0.014 -0.037 -0.023 -0.006 -0.058 -0.038 -0.030
(4.32)** (0.46) (1.01) (4.14)** (1.71) (0.45) (7.54)** (3.55)** (3.77)**
Persuade friends==often -0.024 -0.009 -0.005 -0.024 0.022 0.010 -0.040 -0.026 -0.018
(2.31)* (0.43) (0.27) (2.03)* (1.18) (0.56) (3.87)** (1.86) (1.67)
Expectation for the next year
Life in general==same -0.053 -0.057 -0.069
(2.54)* (2.93)** (4.02)**
Life in general==better -0.077 -0.063 -0.092
(3.36)** (3.09)** (5.05)**
Economy in your country==same -0.085 -0.049 -0.061
(5.43)** (3.77)** (5.56)**
Economy in your country==better -0.143 -0.094 -0.098
(7.78)** (5.83)** (7.61)**
Financial situation household==same 0.003 -0.072 -0.044
(0.18) (4.29)** (3.11)**
Financial situation household==better 0.012 -0.076 -0.012
(0.54) (4.02)** (0.73)
Unemloyment in your country==same -0.04 -0.013 -0.021
(2.54)* (0.97) (1.94)
Unemloyment in your country==better -0.086 -0.044 -0.079
(4.70)** (2.82)** (6.41)**
Personal job situation==same -0.025 -0.043 -0.039
(1.13) (2.15)* (2.25)*
Personal job situation==better -0.022 -0.036 -0.032
(0.88) (1.58) (1.69)
Identity==(nationality) and european -0.216 -0.241 -0.256
(21.87)** (26.40)** (43.06)**
Identity==european and (nationality) -0.229 -0.219 -0.251
(12.95)** (14.62)** (23.38)**
Identity==european only -0.213 -0.188 -0.237
(10.27)** (10.12)** (17.52)**
Observations 41703 11064 13315 27792 11391 13671 42440 22883 41015
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Before (April 1997-May 1998) During (Nov 1998-April 1999) After (Nov 1999-Dec 2000)





event:  the  more  you  know  about  European  institutions,  the  less  you  are  against  the 
introduction of the Euro.    
 
Table 2.7: Marginal probit effects equation (2), Supply side of the formation of Beliefs (XS), 
non-physical Euro introduction 1999 (*). 
 
 
Looking at table 2.8, we observe very similar behavior for the repeated variables that were 
discussed for the non-physical introduction of the Euro. For the variables on the demand 
and supply sides of the formation of beliefs, we observe negative and significant impact on 
the probability of being against the Euro, as before. Separate tables for each side of the 
formation of beliefs are displayed later to explore the within variation of intensity on the 
probability of being against the Euro.  There is evidence of 6-8% lower likelihood of men to 
be against the Euro across specifications. People in couples are 2% more probably pro-
Period
Equation name 1999full 1999full2a 1999full2b 1999full 1999full2a 1999full2b 1999full 1999full2a 1999full2b
Explanatory variables
Supply side of the formation of beliefs: X S
News TV==less often -0.004 -0.087 -0.018 0.030 -0.019 0.003 -0.024 -0.005 -0.009
(0.14) (1.47) (0.33) (0.88) (0.35) (0.07) (0.86) (0.11) (0.32)
News TV==once or twice a week -0.029 -0.049 -0.054 -0.042 -0.047 -0.014 -0.022 -0.015 0.000
(1.07) (0.90) (1.13) (1.38) (0.96) (0.34) (0.84) (0.41) (0.01)
News TV==several times a week -0.038 -0.04 -0.078 -0.041 -0.032 -0.005 -0.048 -0.025 -0.018
(1.46) (0.78) (1.73) (1.41) (0.66) (0.14) (1.99)* (0.71) (0.69)
News TV==everyday -0.064 -0.047 -0.095 -0.058 -0.048 -0.027 -0.055 -0.036 -0.02
(2.47)* (0.92) (1.99)* (1.91) (0.97) (0.74) (2.27)* (1.02) (0.77)
Newspaper==less often -0.020 0.027 -0.020 -0.021 -0.035 -0.031 -0.031 0.000 -0.013
(1.67) (1.08) (0.92) (1.64) (1.79) (1.75) (2.77)** (0.02) (1.08)
Newspaper==once or twice a week -0.009 0.013 0.008 -0.030 -0.033 -0.041 -0.046 -0.023 -0.020
(0.77) (0.53) (0.39) (2.36)* (1.68) (2.33)* (4.16)** (1.43) (1.72)
Newspaper==several times a week -0.028 0.009 -0.002 -0.029 -0.016 -0.028 -0.051 -0.008 -0.019
(2.39)* (0.36) (0.11) (2.35)* (0.83) (1.60) (4.64)** (0.52) (1.64)
Newspaper==everyday -0.061 -0.015 -0.056 -0.061 -0.052 -0.05 -0.087 -0.038 -0.05
(5.62)** (0.65) (2.86)** (5.30)** (2.89)** (3.05)** (8.50)** (2.59)** (4.56)**
News Radio==less often -0.022 -0.002 -0.022 -0.040 -0.011 -0.009 -0.023 -0.006 -0.015
(1.94) (0.07) (1.11) (3.31)** (0.56) (0.50) (2.11)* (0.38) (1.30)
News Radio==once or twice a week -0.015 -0.019 0.005 -0.007 0.014 0.008 -0.039 -0.031 -0.024
(1.15) (0.73) (0.24) (0.54) (0.69) (0.44) (3.30)** (1.93) (1.97)*
News Radio==several times a week -0.019 0.008 -0.018 -0.018 -0.004 0.002 -0.024 -0.012 -0.009
(1.65) (0.35) (0.92) (1.47) (0.20) (0.12) (2.26)* (0.82) (0.81)
News Radio==everyday -0.024 0.004 -0.029 -0.042 -0.024 -0.017 -0.033 -0.013 -0.022
(2.39)* (0.19) (1.64) (3.86)** (1.41) (1.12) (3.44)** (0.98) (2.14)*
Knowledge about the EU, its policies and its institutions
knowledge==box 2 -0.019 -0.056 -0.046 -0.019 -0.060 -0.037
(0.75) (2.73)** (2.18)* (0.99) (3.36)** (2.87)**
knowledge==box 3 -0.016 -0.067 -0.077 -0.054 -0.097 -0.083
(0.68) (3.37)** (3.92)** (3.07)** (5.88)** (6.82)**
knowledge==box 4 -0.041 -0.070 -0.088 -0.054 -0.128 -0.104
(1.72) (3.45)** (4.42)** (2.99)** (7.84)** (8.49)**
knowledge==box 5 -0.078 -0.090 -0.112 -0.070 -0.153 -0.128
(3.37)** (4.48)** (5.70)** (3.86)** (9.52)** (10.67)**
knowledge==box 6 -0.124 -0.091 -0.136 -0.101 -0.178 -0.141
(4.92)** (4.18)** (6.69)** (5.27)** (10.71)** (11.04)**
knowledge==box 7 -0.165 -0.115 -0.123 -0.084 -0.193 -0.159
(6.04)** (4.89)** (5.52)** (3.97)** (11.26)** (11.98)**
knowledge==box 8 -0.146 -0.092 -0.142 -0.109 -0.206 -0.176
(4.45)** (3.26)** (5.66)** (4.63)** (10.79)** (11.84)**
knowledge==box 9 -0.119 -0.086 -0.122 -0.055 -0.218 -0.186
(2.27)* (1.99)* (3.03)** (1.28) (7.44)** (8.40)**
knowledge==know a great deal -0.097 -0.015 -0.174 -0.109 -0.194 -0.153
(1.56) (0.26) (2.97)** (2.35)* (5.80)** (5.93)**
Observations 41703 11064 13315 27792 11391 13671 42440 22883 41015
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Before (April 1997-May 1998) During (Nov 1998-April 1999) After (Nov 1999-Dec 2000)





Euro  than  people  without  a  partner,  when  significant.  Educations  has  statistically 
significant negative effect of the probability of being against the Euro, but very low, smaller 
than 1% across specifications. Finally, the age of the individual seems to have no effect on 
the probability of being against the Euro.  
 
Table 2.8: Marginal probit effects equation (2), physical Euro introduction 2002 (*). 
 
(*) See appendix 2.8 for details.  
 
Table 2.9 shows the marginal probit impact of variables associated to the supply side of 
the formation of beliefs on the probability of being against the Euro. The role of political 
discussion is negative and increasing in the frequency (the excluded category is “never”), 
diminishing by 2-3% the probability of being against the Euro when people hold political 
discussions “occasionally” and decreasing an extra 2 percentage points when they do it 
“frequently”. The role of persuade friends is not robust across specification, even though it 
is negative and around 2% when significant. European identity decreases the probability 
by 20% (excluded category “only national”) and optimistic expectations for the next year 
also impact negatively, around 4-8%. Life satisfaction was a new variable available for the 
second big event (physical introduction of the single currency) and its impact ranges from 
a 8% to 12% decrease in the probability of being against when the intensity increases from 
“fairly satisfied” to “very satisfied”, respectively (excluded category “not satisfied”).  
 
   
Period
Equation name 2002full 2002full2a 2002full2b 2002full 2002full2a 2002full2b 2002full 2002full2a 2002full2b
Explanatory variables
Demand side of the formation of beliefs: X D negative negative negative negative negative negative negative negative negative
(a)** (a)** (a)** (a)** (a)** (a)** (a)** (a)** (a)**
Supply side of the formation of beliefs: X S negative negative negative negative negative negative negative negative negative
(a)** (a)** (a)** (a)** (a)** (a)** (a)** (a)** (a)**
Idiosyncratic characteristics: X
Country fix effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
(b)** (b)** (b)** (b)** (b)** (b)** (b)** (b)** (b)**
Gender==male -0.070 -0.075 -0.064 -0.065 -0.059 -0.061 -0.058 -0.067 -0.058
(11.11)** (5.92)** (4.67)** (9.81)** (8.00)** (5.09)** (10.66)** (6.07)** (4.83)**
Marital status==with couple -0.016 -0.021 -0.029 -0.012 -0.001 0.004 -0.023 -0.009 -0.016
(2.60)** (1.73) (2.21)* (1.83) (0.20) (0.32) (4.39)** (0.84) (1.37)
Head of  household==yes 0.013 0.031 0.016 -0.001 -0.011 -0.022 0.009 0.013 0.000
(1.85) (2.23)* (1.06) (0.17) (1.37) (1.68) (1.55) (1.06) (0.01)
Education -0.007 -0.005 -0.004 -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006
(10.91)** (3.54)** (2.89)** (9.10)** (5.40)** (3.55)** (13.08)** (5.97)** (4.96)**
Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
(6.69)** (2.39)* (1.81) (5.35)** (1.04) (0.59) (7.02)** (1.76) (1.55)
Observations 41848 11250 9422 28046 22774 9462 43302 11582 9700
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
(a) The detailed coefficients and z-statistic values are shown separately in tables 2.9 and 2.10.
(b) See annex 2.8 for detailed z-statistic values.
Before (May 2000-May 2001) During (Nov 2001-Nov 2002) After (Nov 2002-Dec 2003)





Table 2.9: Marginal probit effects equation (2), Demand side of the formation of Beliefs, 
physical Euro introduction 2002 (*). 
 
 
For  the  variables  on  the  supply  side  of  the  formation  of  beliefs,  measures  of  trust  in 
national and European institutions were included in place of the variables associated with 
press  exposure,  which  are  no  longer  available  for  this  period.  The  impact  of  these 
variables is high and consistent with the intuition (missing category “I do not know”). If 
people  have  a  tendency  “not  to  trust”  European  institutions  (European  Parliament, 
Commission and Central Bank) the effect on the probability of being against the Euro is 
positive, around 8%. If people tend “to trust” the institutions, the probability decreases by 
7-10%.  To  trust  political  parties  also  has  a  negative  effect  on  the  probability  of  being 
Period
Equation name 2002full 2002full2a 2002full2b 2002full 2002full2a 2002full2b 2002full 2002full2a 2002full2b
Explanatory variables
Demand side of the formation of beliefs: X D
Political discussion==occasionally -0.019 -0.025 -0.025 -0.026 -0.011 -0.030 -0.036 -0.008 0.003
(2.72)** (1.74) (1.60) (3.35)** (1.30) (2.25)* (5.55)** (0.64) (0.19)
Political discussion==frequently -0.059 -0.053 -0.056 -0.044 -0.025 -0.057 -0.054 -0.022 -0.017
(5.56)** (2.59)** (2.55)* (4.06)** (2.10)* (3.01)** (6.08)** (1.21) (0.88)
Persuade friends==rarely -0.017 -0.013 -0.017 0.002 0.012 -0.001 -0.008 -0.037 -0.029
(2.01)* (0.74) (0.90) (0.25) (1.16) (0.09) (1.14) (2.49)* (1.80)
Persuade friends==from time to time -0.032 -0.020 -0.014 -0.016 -0.002 -0.012 -0.015 -0.016 -0.014
(3.97)** (1.20) (0.78) (1.87) (0.17) (0.80) (2.13)* (1.10) (0.87)
Persuade friends==often -0.016 -0.030 -0.030 -0.008 0.004 -0.035 -0.009 -0.016 -0.021
(1.47) (1.40) (1.27) (0.74) (0.32) (1.80) (0.99) (0.85) (1.02)
Life satisfaction==not very satisfied -0.044 -0.048 -0.011 -0.019 -0.036 -0.030
(1.22) (1.23) (0.54) (0.55) (1.26) (0.95)
Life satisfaction==fairly satisfied -0.069 -0.031 -0.091 -0.077 -0.108 -0.088
(1.99)* (0.80) (4.48)** (2.20)* (3.80)** (2.80)**
Life satisfaction==very satisfied -0.071 -0.035 -0.107 -0.105 -0.126 -0.103
(1.99)* (0.87) (5.49)** (3.10)** (4.51)** (3.27)**
Identity==(nationality) and european -0.248 -0.256 -0.190 -0.172 -0.176 -0.181
(20.95)** (19.93)** (26.80)** (15.14)** (16.24)** (15.45)**
Identity==european and (nationality) -0.234 -0.236 -0.193 -0.198 -0.221 -0.234
(10.05)** (9.49)** (16.19)** (9.68)** (11.43)** (11.61)**
Identity==european only -0.217 -0.205 -0.186 -0.177 -0.159 -0.166
(7.23)** (6.18)** (11.91)** (6.80)** (5.87)** (5.91)**
National pride==not very proud 0.004 0.016 -0.027 -0.013 0.016 0.015
(0.10) (0.35) (1.13) (0.32) (0.41) (0.36)
National pride==fairly proud 0.007 0.030 -0.053 -0.003 -0.002 0.003
(0.18) (0.72) (2.34)* (0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
National pride==very proud 0.026 0.047 -0.027 0.028 0.019 0.019
(0.69) (1.10) (1.20) (0.75) (0.52) (0.50)
Expectation for the next year
Life in general==same -0.019 -0.041 -0.030
(0.71) (1.89) (1.52)
Life in general==better -0.063 -0.055 -0.020
(2.18)* (2.33)* (0.90)
Economy in your country==same -0.012 -0.010 -0.050
(0.70) (0.72) (3.49)**
Economy in your country==better -0.045 -0.038 -0.079
(2.11)* (1.88) (4.03)**
Financial situation household==same -0.048 -0.056 -0.004
(2.08)* (2.90)** (0.24)
Financial situation household==better -0.008 -0.054 0.012
(0.30) (2.39)* (0.57)
Unemloyment in your country==same -0.033 0.020 -0.009
(1.83) (1.42) (0.64)
Unemloyment in your country==better -0.066 -0.006 -0.003
(3.16)** (0.29) (0.15)
Personal job situation==same -0.067 -0.029 -0.012
(2.43)* (1.26) (0.57)
Personal job situation==better -0.054 -0.019 0.008
(1.80) (0.72) (0.31)
Observations 41848 11250 9422 28046 22774 9462 43302 11582 9700
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Before (May 2000-May 2001) During (Nov 2001-Nov 2002) After (Nov 2002-Dec 2003)





against  the  Euro,  but  lower  (~4-8%).  Finally,  as  before,  the  impact  of  the  knowledge 
citizens  have  about  European  institutions  has  an  increasingly  negative  effect  on  the 
probability of being against the Euro.   
 
Table 2.10: Marginal probit effects equation (2), Supply side of the formation of Beliefs, 
physical Euro introduction 2002 (*). 
 
 
Overall,  these  results  support  the  theoretical  framework  discussed,  in  the  sense  that 
individuals  hold  self-serving  beliefs  and  that  there  is  some  degree  of 
political/institutional/media manipulation.  
 
Notice that by simple inspection, differences in the magnitude of the coefficients for the 
same covariate are observed across periods (before, during, after). In what follows we 
check if there is a significant change in the marginal effects on the probability of being 
against the Euro of demand and supply side variables before and after the big events. 
Period
Equation name 2002full 2002full2a 2002full2b 2002full 2002full2a 2002full2b 2002full 2002full2a 2002full2b
Explanatory variables
Supply side of the formation of beliefs: X S
Knowledge about the EU, its policies and its institutions
knowledge==box 2 -0.043 -0.076 -0.074 -0.053 -0.028 -0.092 -0.050 -0.034 -0.034
(3.34)** (2.62)** (2.26)* (4.04)** (1.81) (3.48)** (4.55)** (1.39) (1.22)
knowledge==box 3 -0.082 -0.055 -0.072 -0.098 -0.070 -0.095 -0.071 -0.056 -0.070
(6.86)** (2.00)* (2.35)* (8.10)** (4.97)** (3.81)** (6.90)** (2.45)* (2.73)**
knowledge==box 4 -0.088 -0.069 -0.076 -0.102 -0.067 -0.111 -0.091 -0.083 -0.089
(7.25)** (2.54)* (2.46)* (8.38)** (4.76)** (4.53)** (8.77)** (3.59)** (3.50)**
knowledge==box 5 -0.123 -0.086 -0.086 -0.128 -0.083 -0.122 -0.089 -0.065 -0.067
(10.41)** (3.21)** (2.84)** (10.76)** (5.97)** (4.99)** (8.62)** (2.77)** (2.58)**
knowledge==box 6 -0.136 -0.110 -0.116 -0.136 -0.090 -0.145 -0.102 -0.084 -0.086
(10.67)** (3.89)** (3.69)** (10.79)** (6.07)** (5.80)** (9.34)** (3.43)** (3.18)**
knowledge==box 7 -0.160 -0.103 -0.118 -0.141 -0.082 -0.137 -0.102 -0.047 -0.049
(11.92)** (3.45)** (3.59)** (10.65)** (5.13)** (5.29)** (8.74)** (1.78) (1.66)
knowledge==box 8 -0.179 -0.171 -0.177 -0.140 -0.070 -0.115 -0.100 -0.061 -0.050
(11.94)** (5.45)** (5.20)** (9.19)** (3.80)** (3.77)** (7.43)** (1.98)* (1.49)
knowledge==box 9 -0.178 -0.170 -0.185 -0.131 -0.080 -0.138 -0.091 -0.032 -0.020
(7.54)** (3.50)** (3.62)** (5.62)** (2.75)** (3.01)** (4.25)** (0.71) (0.42)
knowledge==know a great deal -0.151 -0.092 -0.107 -0.169 -0.132 -0.151 -0.051 0.044 0.023
(5.67)** (1.70) (1.89) (6.03)** (3.63)** (2.48)* (2.00)* (0.85) (0.41)
Trust in National and International Institutions
European Parliament==tend to trust -0.075 -0.041 -0.012 -0.069 -0.068 -0.062 -0.090 -0.066 -0.100
(6.13)** (1.57) (0.42) (5.31)** (4.42)** (2.45)* (8.56)** (2.98)** (4.10)**
European Parliament==tend not to trust 0.092 0.109 0.140 0.061 0.045 0.064 0.068 0.095 0.052
(6.50)** (3.78)** (4.27)** (3.95)** (2.54)* (2.18)* (5.32)** (3.75)** (1.87)
European Comision==tend to trust -0.076 -0.079 -0.089 -0.060 -0.042 -0.049 -0.065 -0.070 -0.029
(6.51)** (3.35)** (3.33)** (4.87)** (2.96)** (2.11)* (6.61)** (3.42)** (1.31)
European Comision==tend not to trust 0.041 0.026 0.001 0.068 0.055 0.056 0.044 0.039 0.071
(3.14)** (1.02) (0.02) (4.65)** (3.34)** (2.11)* (3.67)** (1.68) (2.79)**
European Central Bank==tend to trust -0.103 -0.083 -0.080 -0.069 -0.059 -0.080 -0.092 -0.098 -0.092
(11.67)** (4.42)** (3.83)** (7.17)** (5.25)** (4.32)** (12.17)** (6.30)** (5.37)**
European Central Bank==tend not to trust 0.084 0.049 0.042 0.084 0.079 0.070 0.084 0.069 0.076
(8.11)** (2.34)* (1.83) (7.12)** (5.94)** (3.26)** (9.03)** (3.78)** (3.80)**
Press==tend to trust 0.003 -0.003 -0.021 -0.021 -0.014 -0.005
(0.21) (0.16) (2.49)* (1.57) (1.11) (0.33)
Radio==tend to trust -0.036 -0.025 0.017 0.035 0.011 0.002
(1.83) (1.16) (1.62) (2.03)* (0.73) (0.12)
TV==tend to trust 0.031 0.025 0.023 0.015 0.015 0.016
(1.69) (1.23) (2.34)* (0.91) (1.07) (1.05)
Political parties==tend to trust -0.080 -0.067 -0.040 -0.050 -0.034 -0.018
(5.53)** (4.26)** (4.91)** (3.85)** (2.60)** (1.22)
Observations 41848 11250 9422 28046 22774 9462 43302 11582 9700
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Before (May 2000-May 2001) During (Nov 2001-Nov 2002) After (Nov 2002-Dec 2003)





Marginal interaction effects, reduced forms 
 
I will show and discuss the results for the marginal and interaction estimated effects in 
equations (4) and (5) for each of the reduced form specifications summarized in appendix 
2.6. As a measure of caution, I re-estimated equation (2) for these reduced forms to be 
able  to  contrast  these  more  rough  results  with  the  ones  gotten  before.  By  simple 
inspection the results for the reduced form equations are consistent with the respective 
previous equations: both sets of variables associated with the demand and supply sides of 
the formation of beliefs have a statistically significant effect, reducing the probability of 
being against the Euro. This is shown in tables 2.11 and 2.12, along with the interaction 
marginal effect, for the non-physical Euro introduction in 1999 and tables 2.13 and 2.14 
show the same effects for the physical introduction of the single currency in 2002. 
 
Looking at tables 2.11 and 2.12 (for the big event in 1999) we observe that the boosting in 
beliefs seems to be relevant only when we observe the sample after-during. There is a 
significant effect of 9-10 percentage points in the probability of being against the Euro after 
the non-physical introduction of the single currency
15. However, there is no marginal effect 
significantly  different  from  zero  if  we  compare  the  belief  during  the  non-physical 
introduction  of  the  single  currency  with  the  period  immediately  before.  One  possible 
explanation could be that people were not really aware of the change and they only start 
realizing  the  non-physical  introduction  later,  consistent  with  the  later  change  in  beliefs 
trough being more against the introduction of the Euro.  
 
The interaction marginal effects for the 1999 introduction are not significantly different from 
zero in most of cases, i.e. the demand and supply side variables do not have a different 
effect with respect to influence before and after the big event. In the case of the sample 
before-during in table 2.12, the exception is the marginal effect of the interaction between 
political  discussion  (the  demand  side  of  formation  of  beliefs)  and  the  big  event:  the 
influence of political discussion in decreasing the probability of being against the Euro was 
more important during the introduction of the single currency (3 percentage points smaller 
before the big event). The last is consistent with stronger self-serving beliefs in the sense 
                                                           
15 The estimated marginal effect for Big Event in table 2.11 is significant at 10% confidence interval, equal to 
-8.6%.  





of the benefits of convincing others about the goodness of the Euro, especially close to the 
date of implementation. 
 
For the reduced forms in table 2.11, when variables related to expectation for the next year 
are  included,  the  marginal  effect  of  the  interaction  between  the  financial  situation  of 
household and the big event becomes significant: the influence of optimistic expectation of 
the financial situation for the next year in decreasing the probability of being against the 
Euro was 9 percentage points more important during the introduction of the Euro than 
before. These two variables correspond to the demand side of the formation of beliefs. 
Therefore, self-serving beliefs seem to be demanded more by individuals closer to the 
date of implementation.  
 
In the case of the sample after-during for the 1999 introduction, the marginal effect of the 
interaction  of  persuade  friends  and  knowledge  with  the  big  event  is  positive  for  both 
specifications  in  tables  2.11  and  2.12,  meaning  that  the  importance  in  reducing  the 
probability of being against the Euro was higher after the big event (4 and 5 percentage 
points higher, respectively). In the first case, self serving beliefs seem to prevail after the 
non-physical introduction of the Euro (I keep persuading friends). In the second case, the 
supply  of  information  “you  like  the  Euro”  coming  from  European  institutions,  which  is 
expected to be captured by the variable knowledge, was sustained or even increased after 
the non-physical introduction. One plausible explanation would be the need to prepare the 
population for the coming physical introduction of the single currency in 2002.    
 
   





Table 2.11: Reduced forms, interaction effect (5) non-physical Euro intro 1999a (*). 
 
(*) See appendix 2.9 for details.  
   






Big event=during -0.017 -0.086
(0.20) (1.17)
Demand side of the formation of beliefs: X D
Political discussion=yes -0.034 -0.054 -0.038 -0.037 -0.039
(2.55)* (4.50)** (4.25)** (2.93)** (4.47)**
Persuade Friends=yes -0.017 -0.014 -0.032 -0.013 -0.032
(1.47) (1.37) (4.14)** (1.25) (4.39)**
Expectation for the next year
Life in general==same or better -0.058 -0.064 -0.079 -0.053 -0.075
(2.80)** (3.20)** (4.49)** (2.71)** (4.41)**
Economy in your country==same or better -0.107 -0.066 -0.078 -0.099 -0.075
(7.06)** (5.10)** (7.20)** (6.93)** (7.15)**
Financial situation household==same or better 0.002 -0.081 -0.043 0.003 -0.04
(0.10) (4.68)** (3.00)** (0.18) (2.93)**
Unemployment in your country==same or better -0.064 -0.029 -0.046 -0.053 -0.041
(4.25)** (2.27)* (4.30)** (3.85)** (4.03)**
Personal job situation==same or better -0.024 -0.04 -0.038 -0.026 -0.035
(1.09) (1.94) (2.19)* (1.28) (2.09)*
Supply side of the formation of beliefs: X S
News TV=yes -0.044 -0.042 -0.042 -0.043 -0.04
(0.85) (0.75) (1.19) (0.89) (1.18)
Newspaper=yes 0.004 -0.048 -0.031 0.001 -0.028
(0.18) (2.88)** (2.35)* (0.04) (2.19)*
News Radio=yes -0.005 -0.018 -0.021 -0.010 -0.026
(0.26) (1.15) (1.72) (0.54) (2.22)*
Knowledge EU (policy, institutions) -0.083 -0.074 -0.112 -0.079 -0.113

























Country fix effects yes yes yes yes yes
(a)** (a)** (a)** (a)** (a)**
Gender==male -0.098 -0.05 -0.075 -0.075 -0.066
(8.06)** (4.72)** (8.98)** (9.04)** (10.07)**
Marital status==with couple -0.026 -0.025 -0.031 -0.026 -0.029
(2.21)* (2.45)* (3.92)** (3.28)** (4.57)**
Head of  household==yes 0.009 0.001 0.013 0.004 0.009
(0.68) (0.11) (1.39) (0.49) (1.21)
Education -0.008 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
(6.50)** (5.57)** (8.62)** (8.61)** (10.40)**
Age 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.84) (1.31) (4.65)** (0.41) (4.58)**
Observations 11064 11391 22883 22455 34274
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%





Table 2.12: Reduced forms, interaction effect (5) non-physical Euro intro 1999b (*). 
 
(*) See appendix 2.10 for details.  
 
For the physical introduction of the Euro in 2002 (tables 2.13 and 2.14) we observe a 
significant drop in the probability of being against the Euro during the introductory period 
with  respect  to  before  (around  8  percentage  points).  The  expected  reversion  in  this 
support after the event, even though statistically significant, is low at around 4 percentage 






Big event=during -0.057 -0.111
(0.95) (2.38)*
Demand side of the formation of beliefs: X D
Political discussion=yes 0.009 -0.033 -0.01 0.005 -0.011
(0.81) (3.01)** (1.52) (0.44) (1.70)
Persuade Friends=yes 0.003 0.006 -0.028 0.004 -0.029
(0.26) (0.69) (4.79)** (0.43) (5.07)**
Identity pro european -0.238 -0.265 -0.277 -0.226 -0.27
(24.51)** (28.70)** (47.20)** (24.58)** (47.68)**
Supply side of the formation of beliefs: X S
News TV=yes -0.099 -0.018 -0.022 -0.097 -0.022
(2.01)* (0.47) (0.86) (2.02)* (0.88)
Newspaper=yes -0.033 -0.048 -0.036 -0.029 -0.033
(1.80) (3.18)** (3.66)** (1.68) (3.47)**
News Radio=yes -0.03 -0.013 -0.022 -0.026 -0.024
(1.78) (0.92) (2.37)* (1.62) (2.59)**
Knowledge EU (policy, institutions) -0.044 -0.048 -0.09 -0.044 -0.09

















Country fix effects yes yes yes yes yes
(a)** (a)** (a)** (a)** (a)**
Gender==male -0.072 -0.049 -0.073 -0.06 -0.067
(6.75)** (5.00)** (11.49)** (8.30)** (12.51)**
Marital status==with couple -0.014 -0.019 -0.016 -0.017 -0.016
(1.39) (2.05)* (2.56)* (2.47)* (3.18)**
Head of  household==yes -0.005 0.009 0.016 0.002 0.014
(0.39) (0.82) (2.30)* (0.24) (2.41)*
Education -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005
(2.44)* (3.10)** (7.60)** (3.93)** (8.29)**
Age -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
(2.36)* (0.38) (3.94)** (1.91) (3.25)**
Observations 13315 13671 41015 26986 54686
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%





points, meaning that people seem to be not as disillusioned as they were after the non-
physical introduction. 
 
Table 2.13: Reduced forms, interaction effect (5) physical Euro intro 2002a (*). 
 
(*) See appendix 2.11 for details.  
 
   






Big event==during -0.079 -0.021
(6.89)** (2.04)*
Demand side of the formation of beliefs: X D
Political discussion=yes -0.036 -0.038 -0.047 -0.031 -0.047
(5.29)** (5.19)** (7.60)** (4.88)** (7.84)**
Persuade Friends=yes -0.027 -0.02 -0.011 -0.025 -0.005
(4.44)** (3.15)** (2.19)* (4.43)** (1.04)
Supply side of the formation of beliefs: X S
Knowledge EU (policy, institutions) -0.078 -0.071 -0.048 -0.073 -0.05
(12.14)** (10.27)** (8.52)** (12.04)** (8.92)**
Trust in National and International Institutions
European Parliament==tend to trust -0.079 -0.075 -0.094 -0.078 -0.087
(6.50)** (5.75)** (8.91)** (6.74)** (8.40)**
European Parliament==tend not to trust 0.092 0.059 0.065 0.086 0.07
(6.49)** (3.78)** (5.14)** (6.38)** (5.60)**
European Comision==tend to trust -0.08 -0.064 -0.068 -0.077 -0.071
(6.85)** (5.19)** (6.84)** (6.97)** (7.31)**
European Comision==tend not to trust 0.036 0.065 0.042 0.036 0.035
(2.72)** (4.41)** (3.52)** (2.90)** (2.98)**
European Central Bank==tend to trust -0.108 -0.073 -0.093 -0.098 -0.095
(12.27)** (7.56)** (12.35)** (11.85)** (12.81)**
European Central Bank==tend not to trust 0.081 0.081 0.084 0.078 0.081








trust european parliament*during 0.007 0.008
(0.41) (0.48)
not to trust european parliament*during -0.028 -0.019
(1.27) (0.91)
trust european comission*during 0.018 0.015
(1.09) (0.96)
not to trust european comission*during 0.027 0.004
(1.32) (2.01)
trust ECB*during 0.02 0.028
(1.60) (2.42)*
not to trust ECB*during -0.001 0.002
(0.08) (0.14)
Idiosincratic characteristics: X
Country fix effects yes yes yes yes yes
(a)** (a)** (a)** (a)** (a)**
Gender==male -0.078 -0.069 -0.06 -0.075 -0.064
(12.35)** (10.49)** (11.12)** (16.19)** (15.24)**
Marital status==with couple -0.017 -0.012 -0.024 -0.015 -0.02
(2.78)** (1.92) (4.55)** (3.40)** (4.82)**
Head of  household==yes 0.011 -0.002 0.009 0.006 0.005
(1.59) (0.27) (1.47) (1.15) (0.99)
Education -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
(12.45)** (9.85)** (13.80)** (15.99)** (16.61)**
Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(6.33)** (5.30)** (7.24)** (8.24)** (8.93)**
Observations 41848 28046 43302 69894 71348
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%





Table 2.14: Reduced forms, interaction effect (5) physical euro intro 2002b (*). 
 
(*) The estimated marginal effect for the idiosyncratic characteristic are not showed for better edition. See appendix 2.12 for 
details.  






Big event==during -0.083 -0.047
(2.76)** (1.71)
Demand side of the formation of beliefs: X D
Political discussion=yes -0.035 -0.017 -0.022 -0.025 -0.026
(2.49)* (2.08)* (1.77) (2.05)* (2.29)*
Persuade Friends=yes -0.022 -0.009 0.007 -0.021 0.018
(1.85) (1.30) (0.64) (2.05)* (1.83)
Identity pro european -0.26 -0.217 -0.197 -0.233 -0.182
(22.15)** (30.60)** (18.42)** (22.51)** (18.58)**
National Pride 0.013 -0.014 -0.003 0.008 0.005
(0.72) (1.23) (0.14) (0.53) (0.33)
Life satisfaction -0.033 -0.09 -0.084 -0.032 -0.1
(1.99)* (9.03)** (6.15)** (2.24)* (7.81)**
Supply side of the formation of beliefs: X S
Knowledge EU (policy, institutions) -0.046 -0.04 -0.032 -0.041 -0.029
(3.48)** (5.20)** (2.78)** (3.50)** (2.73)**
Trust in National and International Institutions
European Parliament==tend to trust -0.044 -0.074 -0.07 -0.04 -0.046
(1.70) (4.84)** (3.18)** (1.74) (2.26)*
European Parliament==tend not to trust 0.11 0.042 0.092 0.098 0.104
(3.80)** (2.35)* (3.63)** (3.79)** (4.32)**
European Comision==tend to trust -0.082 -0.044 -0.072 -0.078 -0.077
(3.49)** (3.09)** (3.55)** (3.76)** (4.05)**
European Comision==tend not to trust 0.022 0.055 0.04 0.016 0.013
(0.87) (3.34)** (1.72) (0.69) (0.62)
European Central Bank==tend to trust -0.086 -0.06 -0.098 -0.071 -0.1
(4.60)** (5.35)** (6.25)** (4.27)** (6.90)**
European Central Bank==tend not to trust 0.048 0.078 0.072 0.048 0.059
(2.28)* (5.86)** (3.92)** (2.52)* (3.48)**
Press==tend to trust 0.001 -0.022 -0.015 -0.001 -0.015
(0.06) (2.52)* (1.20) (0.10) (1.29)
Radio==tend to trust -0.037 0.016 0.01 -0.032 0.004
(1.89) (1.52) (0.63) (1.83) (0.31)
TV==tend to trust 0.036 0.026 0.017 0.035 0.002
(1.95) (2.65)** (1.22) (2.17)* (0.14)
Political parties==tend to trust -0.082 -0.041 -0.033 -0.071 -0.032














trust european parliament*during -0.030 -0.030
(1.01) (1.15)
not to trust european parliament*during -0.065 -0.071
(1.90) (2.24)*
trust european comission*during 0.044 0.042
(1.64) (1.74)
not to trust european comission*during 0.040 0.051
(1.27) (1.76)
trust ECB*during 0.014 0.050
(0.67) (2.71)**
not to trust ECB*during 0.024 0.019
(0.93) (0.84)
trust press*during -0.020 -0.003
(1.21) (0.22)
trust radio*during 0.052 0.012
(2.31)** (0.67)
trust TV*duirng -0.012 0.034
(0.59) (2.01)*
trust political parties*during 0.038 -0.009
(2.41)** (0.62)
Observations 11250 22774 11582 34024 34356
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%





The interaction marginal effects for the 2002 introduction are not significantly different from 
zero in most cases in the sample before-during. When demand side variables (European 
identity  and  life  satisfaction)  and  supply  side  of  formation  of  beliefs  (trust  in  national 
institutions:  trust  TV,  radio,  newspapers,  political  parties)  are  included  (table  2.14)  we 
observe that the interactions of identity, trust-radio and trust-political-parties with the big 
event are more relevant in decreasing the probability of being against the Euro before the 
introduction  of  the  single  currency  (4,  5  and  4  percentage  points  more  negative, 
respectively).  Once  the  Euro  is  in  place,  most  probably  all  the  influence  of  “feeling 
European” and the information pro-Euro loses importance given the practical problems 
associated with the physical introduction. In the case of life satisfaction, the marginal effect 
before the introduction of the single currency in decreasing the probability of being against 
the Euro is 6 percentage points smaller than during the big event, consistent with self-
serving beliefs in the neighborhood of the implementation.  
 
In the case of the sample after-during for the 2002 introduction of the single currency, the 
marginal effect of the interaction of persuade friends and knowledge with the big event is 
negative, meaning that the importance of reducing the probability of being against the Euro 
is smaller after the big event (3 and 2 percentage points smaller, respectively). The latter is 
consistent with the already observed before-during reduction in the information coming 
from  European  institutions  to  convince  people  about  the  benefits  of  the  Euro.  This 
decreasing influence seems to be even less important after the big event: when the policy 
was  already  in  place,  the  need  to  get  citizens‟  support  was  no  longer  a  priority.  The 
marginal  effect  of the  interaction  between  trust-ECB  and  the  big  event  is  positive  and 
equal  to  0.028  in  table  2.13  and  0.05  in  table  2.14,  i.e.  3  percentage  points  and  5 
percentage points more important in reducing the probability of being against the single 
currency after the big event. The relevance of the ECB is indeed crucial after the physical 
introduction of the Euro. It is logical to think then that the more the ECB is trusted, the 
more individuals support the Euro. For the reduced form in table 2.14, the interaction of 
not-to-trust European Parliament with the big event also becomes significant: not to trust 
the European Parliament has a positive effect on the probability of being against the Euro 
and this effect is 7 percentage points higher after the big event. The role of European 
institutions after the physical introduction of the Euro indeed became more relevant  to 
support the Euro. Finally, trust TV increases the probability of being against the Euro and 





this effect decreases after the physical introduction of the Euro. Again, the latter could be 
an indication of the reduction of “propaganda” used to get support for the single currency 
policy after the implementation of the Euro. 
 
To summarize, in this section the main hypothesis of this chapter has been tested.  
 
First, the influence on beliefs about the introduction of the Euro is indeed sensitive to 
variables coming from both the demand and supply sides of the formation of beliefs. The 
demand side of the formation of beliefs shows that: political discussion, persuade friends, 
optimistic expectations for the next year, pro-European identity and being satisfied with 
your life decrease the probability of being against the Euro. In the case of the supply side 
of  formation  of  beliefs,  we  observe  the  following:  to  have  knowledge  about  European 
institutions, to frequently access media (TV, radio and newspapers) and to trust national 
and European institutions decrease the probability of being against the introduction of the 
single currency.    
 
Second, there is evidence of an improvement in Euro support in the neighborhood of the 
introduction of the single currency that declines once the policy was in place. After the 
non-physical introduction of the Euro in 1999, the probability of being against the Euro 
increased 8 percentage points. There is no evidence of a pre-jump down through more 
optimistic beliefs. A possible explanation is people started realizing the implementation of 
the policy very slowly and, when the policy was in place, the boosting through pessimistic 
beliefs was observed. In the case of the physical introduction in 2002, the probability of 
being against the Euro decreased by 10 percentage points during the implementation and 
increased by 2-5 percentage points right after it.  
 
With respect to the change in the supply and demand influences, there is evidence of 
more intense self-serving beliefs in the neighborhood of the implementation dates with 
respect  to  the  period  before.  This  is  reflected  in  the  higher  impact  of  variables  like 
optimistic  expectations for  the  next  year,  higher  degrees  of  life  satisfaction  and  active 
political discussion. When we look at the effects after the implementation of the policy, the 
main result is the reduction of the relevance of knowing about European institutions after 
the physical introduction of the Euro in 2002, consistent with the intuition of less adoption 





information  coming  from  European  and  national  institutions.  It  is  also  interesting  the 
increased relevance of trusting the European Central Bank and European Parliament in 
reducing the probability of being against the Euro after the introduction in 2002. The last 
could explain why the beliefs after the introduction of the Euro were not as pessimistic as 
before. The efforts to maintain stability of the Euro could be what matters more in getting 
citizens to support the single currency.  





2.5. Conclusions  
 
The main hypothesis in this chapter refers to a boosting in beliefs when individuals face 
exogenous big events. There are evident jumps in beliefs during the relevant dates for the 
introduction of the Euro. The challenge was to propose a mechanism for beliefs formation, 
to disentangle the effects and to test their relevance on the probability of being against the 
Euro.  Further,  to  measure  the  magnitude  of  the  boosting  in  beliefs  pre  and  post 
implementation dates.  
 
To  understand  the  dynamic  of  beliefs  we  identify  two  channels  relevant  for  beliefs 
formation: the demand side of the formation of beliefs (consumers or citizens who form 
beliefs that trigger actions) and a supply side (actors who could benefit from consumers‟ 
decisions).  The  key  characteristic  of  the  model  is  that  consumers  are  subjected  the 
influence of interested actors. Individuals also update their beliefs with the arrival of new 
information sets.  Boosting in beliefs in the presence of big events under this framework is 
the result of the interaction between (a) individuals that have preferences for self-serving 
beliefs  (getting  direct  benefits  from  believing  and  convincing  others)  and  that  face 
imperfect recall (constrains to remember the past and/or to correct errors), and (b) actors 
such  that friends,  politicians  and  media  that  net  benefits from  manipulating  individuals 
beliefs and when the big event or policy is already in place, revert back to the norm (given 
a  cost  of  manipulation).  Therefore,  all  the  optimism  gathered  by  the  individuals  could 
suddenly jump down when the information set is updated and the influences are gone.  
 
Variables for the demand and supply sides of the formation of beliefs were selected and 
harmonized over time given the data available. The empirical strategy makes it possible to 
test their relevance (magnitude, sign and significance) and also to measure the correct pre 
and post boosting in beliefs.  
 
The main results can be divided into three parts. First, the influence on beliefs about the 
introduction of the Euro is indeed sensitive to variables coming from both demand and 
supply sides of the formation of beliefs. Second, an improvement and posterior boosting in 
beliefs effectively occurred when the single currency was introduced in the Euro zone. The 





dynamic is more explicit after the non-physical introduction of the Euro (the probability of 
being against the Euro increases 10 percentage points with respect to the implementation 
date) and before the 2002 physical introduction (the probability of being against the single 
currency was 8 percentage points higher before the implementation date). Finally, with 
respect  to  the  change  in  the  supply  and  demand  influences  on  beliefs  before  the  big 
events, there is a tendency to sustain more self-serving beliefs in the neighborhood of the 
implementation  dates.  After  the  implementation  of  the  policy,  the  main  result  shows  a 
reduction  of  the  relevance  of  knowing  about  European  institutions  after  the  physical 
introduction of the Euro in 2002, consistent with less adoption information coming from 
European and national institutions. Results also interestingly demonstrate the increased 
role of European institutions in reducing the probability of being against the Euro after the 
introduction in 2002. The latter could explain why beliefs after the introduction of the Euro 
were not as pessimistic as before. The effort to maintain the credibility of the Euro could be 
what matters more nowadays in getting citizens‟ support for the single currency.  
 
The results here show  the relative importance of internal and external sources for the 
formation  of  beliefs.  In  terms  of  policy  implications,  analysis  of  this  kind  could  bring 
important  insights  about  more  effective  information  strategies  for  specific  policy 
implementation within the European Union. In the case of this study, it seems that the 
most important forces positively correlated to Euro support are the European identity of 
individuals  and  the  credibility  of  European  Institutions.  Especially  given  the  recent 
circumstances caused by the financial crisis and the weaknesses of the Euro after the 
Greek debt crisis, it would be relevant to reinforce these two sources. Most of the efforts, 
from  my  point  of  view,  have  been  focused  on  the  credibility  of  European  institutions. 
However,  pro-European  individuals‟  preferences  have  weakened  since  the  crisis, 
threatening the support for the Euro. Strategies to enhance this feeling among European 
citizens would be indeed quite effective in the long-run.        
 
 
   





Appendix  2.1:  Attitude  towards  the Common  European  Currency  by 
country 
 
France  Belgium  Holland  Germany 
       
Italy  Luxembourg  Denmark  Ireland 
       
United Kingdom  Greece  Spain  Portugal 
       
Finland  Sweden  Austria   







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 2.2: Relevant variables, trend over time  
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euro introduction not at all satiesfied





Appendix 2.3: Data Homologation process 
 
This appendix gives detailed information about the data homologation process. First, the 
relevant  data  sets  for  the  period  under  study  are  described.  Then,  the  information  is 
organized  by  question  and  specifies  the  new  name  of  the  homologated  variable  (in 
brackets), the availability over time and the exact variable number in each survey. The 
starting point for the compilation was the work done by Meinhard Moschner from GESIS 
(http://www.gesis.org/en/eurobarometer/data-access/). 
 
Sample of relevant surveys 
 
ZA Study Number   Eurobarometer   Fieldwork Month   Fieldwork Year  
2936   47.1  3-4   1997  
2959   48  10-11   1997  
3052   49   4-5   1998  
3085   50.0   10-11   1998  
3171   51.0   3-4   1999  
3204   52.0   10-11   1999  
3296   53   4-5   2000  
3387   54.1   11-12   2000  
3507   55.1   4-5   2001  
3627   56.2   10-11   2001  
3639   57.1   3-5   2002  
3693   58.1   10-11   2002  
3904   59.1   3-4   2003  
3938   60.1   10-11   2003  
 
 
Generation of important variables 
 
 
gen eb="eb49"   Name of the respective survey 
gen za=3052    Number of the respective ZA file 
gen date=1998.5   Date, using the last month of the respective survey as reference 
 
   
Granados Zambrano, Paulina (2011), Understanding Individuals’ Beliefs 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/25622Name of the country (united Germany and UK) (country) 
 
ZA  Study 





Number   Variable Name  
2936   47.1  3-4   1997     V13 
2959   48  10-11   1997     V13 
3052   49   4-5   1998     V13 
3085   50.0   10-11   1998     V13 
3171   51.0   3-4   1999     V13 
3204   52.0   10-11   1999     V13 
3296   53   4-5   2000     V13 
3387   54.1   11-12   2000     V13 
3507   55.1   4-5   2001     V12 
3627   56.2   10-11   2001     V12 
3639   57.1   3-5   2002     V12 
3693   58.1   10-11   2002     V12 
3904   59.1   3-4   2003     pais  (generated  in 
program) 
3938   60.1   10-11   2003     V12 
 










Number   Variable Name  
2936   47.1  3-4   1997     V14 
2959   48  10-11   1997     V14 
3052   49   4-5   1998     V14 
3085   50.0   10-11   1998     V14 
3171   51.0   3-4   1999     V14 
3204   52.0   10-11   1999     V14 
3296   53   4-5   2000     V14 
3387   54.1   11-12   2000     V14 
3507   55.1   4-5   2001     V13 
3627   56.2   10-11   2001     V13 
3639   57.1   3-5   2002     V13 
3693   58.1   10-11   2002     V13 
3904   59.1   3-4   2003     W14 
3938   60.1   10-11   2003     V13 
 





Political Discussion (poldis) 
 
When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, 
occasionally, or never?  
   ZA  Study 







Name (1)  
2936   47.1  3-4   1997   Q2  V37 
2959   48  10-11   1997   Q2  V37 
3052   49   4-5   1998   Q.2   V39  
3085   50.0   10-11   1998   Q.3   V73  
3171   51.0   3-4   1999   Q.2   V38 
3204   52.0   10-11   1999   Q.5   V79 
3296   53   4-5   2000   Q.2   V38 
3387   54.1   11-12   2000   Q.2   V39 
3507   55.1   4-5   2001   Q.5   V69 
3627   56.2   10-11   2001   Q.2   V38 
3639   57.1   3-5   2002   Q.2   V38 
3693   58.1   10-11   2002   Q.2   V38 
3904   59.1   3-4   2003   Q.2   q2 
3938   60.1   10-11   2003   Q.2   V36 
 
(1) Please notice, that the variable names refer to the final ICPSR/ZA codebook editions, if 
available.   
  
 
   





Persuade Friends (persuade) 
 
When  you  hold  a  strong  opinion,  do  you  ever  find  yourself  persuading  your  friends, 
relatives, or fellow workers to share your views? If so, does this happen ... often, from time 
to time, rarely, never?  
   
ZA  Study 
Number   Eurobarometer  Fieldwork 
Month   Fieldwork Year  Question 
Number  
Variable 
Name (1)  
2936   47.1  3-4   1997   Q3  V38 
2959   48  10-11   1997   Q3  V38 
3052   49   4-5   1998   Q.3   V40  
3085   50.0   10-11   1998   Q.4     V74  
3171   51.0   3-4   1999   Q.3     V39 
3204   52.0   10-11   1999   Q.6     V80 
3296   53   4-5   2000   Q.3     V39 
3387   54.1   11-12   2000   Q.3     V40 
3507   55.1   4-5   2001   Q.6     V70 
3627   56.2   10-11   2001   Q.3     V39 
3639   57.1   3-5   2002   Q.3     V39 
3693   58.1   10-11   2002   Q.3     V39 
3904   59.1   3-4   2003   Q.3     q3 
3938   60.1   10-11   2003   Q.3     V37 
 
(1) Please notice, that the variable names refer to the final ICPSR/ZA codebook editions, if 
available.   
   





Life Satisfaction (satis) 
 
On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied 
with the life you lead? 
ZA  Study 
Number   Eurobarometer  Fieldwork 
Month   Fieldwork Year  Question 
Number  
Variable 
Name (1)  
2936   47.1  3-4   1997   Q36  V247 
2959   48  10-11   1997      
3052   49   4-5   1998   Q.5   V42  
3204   52.0   10-11   1999   Q.7   V81   
3205   52.1   11-12   1999   Q.13_1 (6)       
3296   53   4-5   2000   Q.4 (5)   V40   
3387   54.1   11-12   2000   Q.4   V41 
3507   55.1   4-5   2001   Q.7 (5)   V71 
3626   56.1   9-10   2001   Q.46 (9)       
3627   56.2   10-11   2001   Q.4     V40 
3639   57.1   3-5   2002   Q.4     V40 
3640   57.2   4-6   2002   Q.4_1 (6)      V40 
3938   60.1   10-11   2003   Q.4     V38 
 
(1) Please notice, that the variable names refer to the final ICPSR/ZA codebook editions, if 
available.   
 (5) Follow up questions: 
 
"If you compare your present situation with five years ago, would you say it has improved, 
stayed about the same or got worse?" and "in the course of the next five years, do you 
expect your personal situation to improve, to stay about the same or to get worse?"   
(6)  Different  answer  scale  and  additional  items:  Please  tell  me  whether  you  are  very 
satisfied, fairly satisfied, neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, not very satisfied or not at all 
satisfied with each of the following? 1. Your Life in general; 2. ...  
 (9) Modified question/item wording and additional items: Would you say you are satisfied, 
fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the following things? 1. With the 
life  you  lead;   2.  ...   Please  notice,  that  Eurobarometer  44.3OVR  includes  an 
UNEMPLOYED OVeRsample.   
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Expectations for the next Year (exp*) 
 
Eurobarometer 44 ff. (1995-     ):  
What are your expectations for the year to come (the next twelve months): will (...) be 
better, worse or the same, when it comes to ... ? 
... your life in general explife 
... the economic situation in (our country)  expeco 
... the financial situation of your household expfin 
...  the  employment  situation  in  (our  country)  expunemp    notice  the  wording,  in 
za3085 the question is about UNEMPLOYMENT 
... your personal job situation expjob 
better   




ZA  Study 







Name (1)  
2936   47.1  3-4   1997      
2959   48  10-11   1997   Q4a-e  V39-v43 
3085   50.0   10-11   1998   Q.5a-e   V75-V79  
3204   52.0   10-11   1999   Q.8a-e   V82-v86   
3205   52.1   11-12   1999   Q.14b_1 (2)      
3387   54.1   11-12   2000   Q.5a-e    V42-v46 
3507   55.1   11-12   2000  
Q.9 
(personal 
situation,  five 
years)  
 V73  
3627   56.2   10-11   2001   Q.5a-e     V41-v45 
3639   57.1   3-5   2002  
Q.6 
(personal 
situation,  five 
years) 
V42 
3640   57.2   4-6   2002   Q.5_1 (2)      
3693   58.1   10-11   2002   Q.5    V41-v45 
3938   60.1   10-11   2003   Q.5    V39-v43 
(1) Please notice, that the variable names refer to the final ICPSR/ZA codebook editions, if 
available.  
(2) Different question wording and context: And, in two years time, do you think you will 
be more satisfied, less satisfied or as satisfied as you are today with ...? 1. Your life in 
general    
  
© GESIS Meinhard Moschner 29.08.2007  





Trust in National and International Institutions (trust*) 
 
Eurobarometer 48 ff.:  
I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. 
For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust 
it. 
The press  trustpress 
The Radio trustradio 
Television trusttv 
The Justice (the (national) legal) system  
The police  
The army  
The church (56.2 ff.: The religious institutions)  
Trade unions  
Political parties trustpol 
The Civil service (not in 60.1 and later)  
Big companies (not in 66.1)  
The (national) government (not in 54.1) trustgov 
The national Parliament (use proper name)  
The European Union (not in 54.1) trusteu 
The United Nations  
Non-Governmental Organizations (or NGOs) (not in 59.1 and later)  
Charitable (51 ff.: or voluntary) organizations (not in 66.1)  
The educational system (only 54.1 and 57.1)  
Consumer Associations (66.1 NEW)  
The Council of your city/village (only 66.3)  
 









Number   Variable Name (1)  
2936   47.1  3-4   1997      
2959   48  10-11   1997   Q6a-q  V46-v48, v54,v57,v59 
2936   47.1  3-4   1997      
2959   48  10-11   1997   Q4a-e  V39-v43 
3086   50.1   11-12   1998   Q.59a-d(5)      
3171   51.0   3-4   1999   Q.6a-q   v44-46, v52, v55, v57 
3387   54.1   11-12   2000   Q.59   V316-v318, v319   
3507   55.1   4-5   2001   Q.10   V74-v76, v82,v85,v87   
3627   56.2   10-11   2001   Q.34   V176-v178, 
v184,v187,v189 
3639   57.1   3-5   2002   Q.8   V53-v55, v61,v64,v66   
3904   59.1   3-4   2003   Q.4   Q401-q403, 
q409,q411,q413 
3938   60.1   10-11   2003   Q.6    V44-v46, v52, v54, v56 





Attitudes towards the membership in the European Community (European Union) 
(good thing, bad thing…) (membership) 
ZA  Study 







Name (1)  
2936   47.1  3-4   1997   Q15  V116 
2959   48  10-11   1997   Q13  V99 
3052   49   4-5   1998   Q.15  V121 
3085   50.0   10-11   1998   Q.14  V130 
3171   51.0   3-4   1999   Q.10  V104 
3204   52.0   10-11   1999   Q.20  v465 
3296   53   4-5   2000   Q.12  V55 
3387   54.1   11-12   2000   Q.17  V94 
3507   55.1   4-5   2001   Q17  V146 
3627   56.2   10-11   2001   Q.18  V93 
3639   57.1   3-5   2002   Q.13  V112 
3693   58.1   10-11   2002   Q.12  V92 
3904   59.1   3-4   2003   Q.9     q9 
3938   60.1   10-11   2003   Q.7     V59 
 
The feeling that one's country has benefited from being a member of the European 
Community (European Union) (benefit) 
ZA  Study 







Name (1)  
2936   47.1  3-4   1997   Q16  V117 
2959   48  10-11   1997   Q14  V100 
3052   49   4-5   1998   Q.16  V122 
3085   50.0   10-11   1998   Q.15  V131 
3171   51.0   3-4   1999   Q.11  V105 
3204   52.0   10-11   1999   Q.21  V466 
3296   53   4-5   2000   Q.13  V56 
3387   54.1   11-12   2000   Q.18  V95 
3507   55.1   4-5   2001   Q18  V147 
3627   56.2   10-11   2001   Q.19  V94 
3639   57.1   3-5   2002   Q.14  V113 
3693   58.1   10-11   2002   Q.13  V93 
3904   59.1   3-4   2003   Q.10     q10 
3938   60.1   10-11   2003   Q.8     V60 





Using this scale (1 know nothing to 10 a great deal), how much do you feel you 
know about the European Union, its policies, its institutions? (knowledge) 
 
ZA  Study 







Name (1)  
2936   47.1  3-4   1997      
2959   48  10-11   1997   Q7  V63 
3052   49   4-5   1998   Q.7  V45 
3085   50.0   10-11   1998   Q.6  V80 
3171   51.0   3-4   1999   Q.4  V40 
3204   52.0   10-11   1999   Q.17  V433 
3296   53   4-5   2000   Q.9  V50 
3387   54.1   11-12   2000   Q.14  V62 
3507   55.1   4-5   2001   Q.15  V133 
3627   56.2   10-11   2001   Q.14  V58 
3639   57.1   3-5   2002   Q.10  V78 
3693   58.1   10-11   2002   Q.9  V58 
3904   59.1   3-4   2003   Q.7    q7  
3938   60.1   10-11   2003   Q.15   V89   
 
 





Trust in European Institutions (trust*) 
 
Eurobarometer 51.0 ff.  
 
Follow-up question to 'awareness' and 'perceived importance' of these institutions:  
Have you ever heard of (European Institutions)? ... and for each of them, please tell me if 
you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it.  
The national Parliament (only up to 45)  
The (national) government (only up to 45)  
The European Parliament  trustep 
The European Commission trustec 
The Council of Ministers of the European Union  
The European Court of Justice  (41.1, 51 ff.)  
The European Ombudsman (51 ff.)  
The European Central Bank (51 ff.)  trustecb 
The European Court of Auditors (51 ff)  
The Committee of the Regions of the European Union (51 ff.)  
The Social and Economic Committee of the European Union (51 ff.)  
The Convention on the future of the European Union (57.1 to 59.1)  
   
ZA  Study 





Number   Variable Name (1)  
2936   47.1  3-4   1997      
2959   48  10-11   1997      
3171   51.0   3-4   1999   Q.16c     V132,v133,v137 
3204   52.0   10-11   1999   Q.28 (4)   V489,v490,v494   
3296   53   3-4   2000   Q.27   V140,v141,v145   
3387   54.1   11-12   2000   Q.26   V119,v120,v124 
3507   55.1   4-5   2001   Q.24   v169,v170,v174 
3627   56.2   10-11   2001   Q.26   v117,v118,v122  
3639   57.1   3-5   2002   Q.21   V152,v153,v157   
3693   58.1   10-11   2002   Q.21   V121,v122,v126   
3904   59.1   3-4   2003   Q.17    q1701,q1702,q170
6  
3938   60.1   10-11   2003   Q.22   V143,v144,v148   
 
(1) Please notice that the variable names refer to the final ICPSR/ZA codebook editions, if 
available.  
(4) Followed by the additional question: And, for each of them, please tell me if you are 
tending to put more trust or tending to put less trust in?  
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Attitude towards the Common European Currency (euro) 
 
Is  the  respondent  'for'  or  'against'  a  common  European  currency  (single  currency) 
replacing the national currencies in all EC / EU member states  
Please see notes for exact question wording. 
   ZA  Study 







Name (1)  
2936   47.1  3-4   1997   Q22_1(10)  V151 
2959   48  10-11   1997   Q25_1(10)  V188 
3052   49   4-5   1998   Q.25_1 (10)   V157  
3085   50.0   10-11   1998   Q.35_1 (10)   V204  
3171   51.0   3-4   1999   Q.20_1 (10)   V169   
3204   52.0   10-11   1999   Q.33_1 (10)     V510 
3296   53   4-5   2000   Q.32_1 (10)     V153 
3387   54.1   11-12   2000   Q.29_1 (10)   V130   
3507   55.1   4-5   2001   Q.28_1 (10)   V181   
3627   56.2   10-11   2001   Q.31_1 (10)   V155   
3639   57.1    3-5   2002   Q.25_1 (10)   V191   
3693   58.1   10-11   2002   Q26  V162 
3903   59.0    1-2   2003   Q.2_1 A (10)   Q201a   
3904   59.1   3-4   2003   Q.23_1 (10)   Q2301   
3938   60.1   10-11   2003   Q.29_1 (10)     V214  
   
   
(1) Please notice, that the variable names refer to the final ICPSR/ZA codebook editions, if 
available. Otherwise future changes of variable names (in parenthesis) are possible.  
 (10) (EB38.0/38.1/39.0: "Irrespective of other details of the Maastricht Treaty ...) "What is 
your opinion on each of the following proposals (statements)? Please tell me for each 
proposal,  whether  you  are  for  it  or  against  it:  There  should  (EB49  ff.:  has  to)  be  (a 
European Monetary Union with) one single currency (the EURO) (replacing (by 1999) the 
(NATIONAL CURRENCY) and all other national currencies of the Member States of the 
European Community (European Union))."  
(16) Different question wording and answer scale: "Are you for or against the European 
Union having one European currency in all member states, including (OUR COUNTRY) 
once we have joined? That is, replacing the (NAME OF NATIONAL CURRENCY) by the 
European currency, the Euro ? Are you... ? 4  - very much for; 3 - somewhat for; 2 - 
somewhat against; 1 - very much against  
(17)  "What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each 
statement whether you are for or against it. A European Monetary Union with one single 
currency, the EURO 





National Identity - European Identity (7) - World Identity (identity) 
 
Eurobarometer 37 ff., CCEB:  
In the near future do you see yourself as ... ?  
(NATIONALITY) only   
(NATIONALITY) and European   
European and (NATIONALITY)   
European only  
ZA  Study 






Variable  Name 
(1)  
2936   47.1  3-4   1997   Q19  V120 
2959   48  10-11   1997      
3052   49   3-4   1998   Q.17     V123  
3085   50.0   10-11   1998   Q.22     V140  
3204   52.0   10-11   1999   Q.9     V87 
3296   53   4-5   2000   Q.28     V149 
3387   54.1   11-12   2000   Q.23 (3)     V100 
3627   56.2   10-11   2001   Q.6 (3)     V46 
3639   57.1   3-5   2002   Q.27 (3)     V213 
3693   58.1   10-11   2002   Q.32     V214 
3904   59.1   3-4   2003   Q.12     q12 
3938   60.1   10-11   2003   Q.43     V448 
 
(1) Please notice, that the variable names refer to the final ICPSR/ZA codebook editions, if 
available.   
(3) In addition and starting with Eurobarometer 54 a new question is introduced asking if 
the  respondent  is  "very  proud,  fairly  proud,  not  very  proud,  or  not  at  all  proud  to  be 
European" (see "national pride").  
(7) Another question on European Identity has been asked in the Flash-Eurobarometer 
series in the context of the EURO introduction: "Since using the EURO, do you personally 
feel a little more European Than before, a little less European than before or would you 
say that your feeling of being European has not changed?" (Flash Eurobarometer 139, 
153, 165, 175, 193).        
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National Pride (pride) 
 
Would you say that you are very proud, quite proud, not very proud, or not at all proud to 
be (nationality (3))? 
New follow up question added starting with Eurobarometer 54 / CCEB:  
And would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud to be 
European?(4) 
   
ZA  Study 







Name (1)  
2936   47.1  3-4   1997   Q40  V254 
2959   48  10-11   1997      
3204   52.0   10-11   1999   Q.10   V88 
3296   53   4-5   2000   Q.29     V150 
3387   54.1   11-12   2000   Q.6 / Q.7     V47 
3627   56.2   10-11   2001   Q.7 / Q.8     V47 
3639   57.1   3-5   2002   Q.28     V214 
3938   60.1   10-11   2003   Q.44 / Q.45     V449 
 
(1) Please notice, that the variable names refer to the final ICPSR/ZA codebook editions, if 
available.   
(3) Starting with Eurobarometer 53 referring to the nationality as specified in Q.1 ("What is 
your nationality"?).  
(4)  "European  pride"  has  been  asked  for  the  first  time  in  the  framework  of  Flash 
Eurobarometer 47: Q.3 "In fact, all citizens of the European Union member states are 
"European citizens". Are you personally proud or not to be a European citizen?". 
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1) News in television, papers and radio in general: 
(About how often) do you ... 
 
a) watch the news on television? (newstv) 
Everyday  
Several times a week  
Once or twice a week  
Less often  
Never  
 
   ZA  Study 







Name (1)  
2936   47.1  3-4   1997   Q5a  V41 
2959   48  10-11   1997   Q10a  V92 
3052   49   4-5   1998   Q.13a     V106  
3085   50.0   10-11   1998   Q.7a     V81  
3171   51.0   3-4   1999   Q.5a     V41 
3204   52.0   10-11   1999   Q.13a     V91 
3296   53   4-5   2000   Q.8a     V47 
3387   54.1   11-12   2000   Q.11a     V55 
3507   55.1   4-5   2001   Q.11a     V91 
3627   56.2   10-11   2001   Q.11a     V51 
   
b) ... read about current politics in daily (news)papers? (newspaper) 
 
ZA  Study 







Name (1)  
2936   47.1  3-4   1997   Q5b  V42 
2959   48  10-11   1997   Q10b  V93 
3052   49   4-5   1998   Q.13b     V107  
3085   50.0   10-11   1998   Q.7b     V82  
3171   51.0   3-4   1999   Q.5b     V42 
3204   52.0   10-11   1999   Q.13b     V92 
3296   53   4-5   2000   Q.8b     V48 
3387   54.1   11-12   2000   Q.11b     V56 
3507   55.1   4-5   2001   Q.11b     V92 
3627   56.2   10-11   2001   Q.11b     V52 
   
   





c) ... listen to news broadcasts on the radio? (newsradio) 
Everyday  
Several times a week  
Once or twice a week  
Less often  
Never  
 
ZA  Study 
Number   Eurobarometer  Fieldwork 
Month   Fieldwork Year  Question 
Number  
Variable 
Name (1)  
2936   47.1  3-4   1997   Q5c  V43 
2959   48  10-11   1997   Q10c  V94 
3052   49   4-5   1998   Q.13c     V108  
3085   50.0   10-11   1998   Q.7c     V83  
3171   51.0   3-4   1999   Q.5c     V43 
3204   52.0   10-11   1999   Q.13c     V93 
3296   53   4-5   2000   Q.8c     V49 
3387   54.1   11-12   2000   Q.11c     V57 
3507   55.1   4-5   2001   Q.11c     V93 
3627   56.2   10-11   2001   Q.11c     V53 
  






Political left 1 right 10 (pol) 
ZA  Study 







Name (1)  
2936   47.1  3-4   1997   D1  v440 
2959   48  10-11   1997   D1  v962 
3052   49   4-5   1998   D.1  v551 
3085   50.0   10-11   1998   D.1  v360 
3171   51.0   3-4   1999   D.1  v433 
3204   52.0   10-11   1999   D.1  v780 
3296   53   4-5   2000   D.1  v571 
3387   54.1   11-12   2000   D.1  v327 
3507   55.1   4-5   2001   D.1  v352 
3627   56.2   10-11   2001   D.1  v385 
3639   57.1   3-5   2002   D.1  v369 
3693   58.1   10-11   2002   D.1  v413 
3904   59.1   3-4   2003   D.1   d1r 
3938   60.1   10-11   2003   D.1    v591 
 
Marital status (marital) 
ZA  Study 
Number   Eurobarometer   Fieldwork 
Month   Fieldwork Year  Question 
Number  
Variable 
Name (1)  
2936   47.1  3-4   1997   D7  v444 
2959   48  10-11   1997   D7  v966 
3052   49   4-5   1998   D7  v571 
3085   50.0   10-11   1998   D7  v363 
3171   51.0   3-4   1999   D7  v453 
3204   52.0   10-11   1999   D7  v800 
3296   53   4-5   2000   D7  v591 
3387   54.1   11-12   2000   D7  v347 
3507   55.1   4-5   2001   D7  v355 
3627   56.2   10-11   2001   D7  v388 
3639   57.1   3-5   2002   D7  v372 
3693   58.1   10-11   2002   D7  v416 
3904   59.1   3-4   2003   D.7   d7 
3938   60.1   10-11   2003   D.7    v594 





Age when finishing studies (agestudy) 
ZA  Study 







Name (1)  
2936   47.1  3-4   1997   D8  v445 
2959   48  10-11   1997   D8  v967 
3052   49   4-5   1998   D8  v572 
3085   50.0   10-11   1998   D8  v364 
3171   51.0   3-4   1999   D8  v454 
3204   52.0   10-11   1999   D8  v801 
3296   53   4-5   2000   D8  v592 
3387   54.1   11-12   2000   D8  v348 
3507   55.1   4-5   2001   D8  v356 
3627   56.2   10-11   2001   D8  v389 
3639   57.1   3-5   2002   D8  v373 
3693   58.1   10-11   2002   D8  v417 
3904   59.1   3-4   2003   D.8   d8 
3938   60.1   10-11   2003   D.8   v595 
 
Gender (gender) 
ZA  Study 







Name (1)  
2936   47.1  3-4   1997   D10  v447 
2959   48  10-11   1997   D10  v969 
3052   49   4-5   1998   D10  v574 
3085   50.0   10-11   1998   D10  v366 
3171   51.0   3-4   1999   D10  v456 
3204   52.0   10-11   1999   D10  v803 
3296   53   4-5   2000   D10  v594 
3387   54.1   11-12   2000   D10  v350 
3507   55.1   4-5   2001   D10  v358 
3627   56.2   10-11   2001   D10  v391 
3639   57.1   3-5   2002   D10  v375 
3693   58.1   10-11   2002   D10  v419   
3904   59.1   3-4   2003   D.10   d10  
3938   60.1   10-11   2003   D.10   v597 
 






ZA  Study 







Name (1)  
2936   47.1  3-4   1997   D11  v448 
2959   48  10-11   1997   D11  v970 
3052   49   4-5   1998   D11  v575 
3085   50.0   10-11   1998   D11  v367 
3171   51.0   3-4   1999   D11  v457 
3204   52.0   10-11   1999   D11  v804 
3296   53   4-5   2000   D11  v595   
3387   54.1   11-12   2000   D11  v351 
3507   55.1   4-5   2001   D11  v359 
3627   56.2   10-11   2001   D11  NO 
3639   57.1   3-5   2002   D11  v376 
3693   58.1   10-11   2002   D11  v420 
3904   59.1   3-4   2003   D.11    d11 
3938   60.1   10-11   2003   D.11   v598 
 
Occupation of the respondent (ocup) 
 
ZA  Study 







Name (1)  
2936   47.1  3-4   1997   D15a  v455 
2959   48  10-11   1997   D15a  v975 
3052   49   4-5   1998   D15a  v580 
3085   50.0   10-11   1998   D15a  v372 
3171   51.0   3-4   1999   D15a  v462 
3204   52.0   10-11   1999   D15a  v809   
3296   53   4-5   2000   D15a  v600 
3387   54.1   11-12   2000   D15a  v356   
3507   55.1   4-5   2001   D15a  v362 
3627   56.2   10-11   2001   D15a  v393 
3639   57.1   3-5   2002   D15a  v379 
3693   58.1   10-11   2002   D15a  v423 
3904   59.1   3-4   2003   D.15   d15ar 
3938   60.1   10-11   2003   D.15   v601 





Head of household (head) 
ZA  Study 







Name (1)  
2936   47.1  3-4   1997   D19b  v459 
2959   48  10-11   1997   D19b  v978 
3052   49   4-5   1998   D19b  v583 
3085   50.0   10-11   1998   D19b  v375 
3171   51.0   3-4   1999   D19b  v465 
3204   52.0   10-11   1999   D19b  v812 
3296   53   4-5   2000   D19b  v603   
3387   54.1   11-12   2000   D19b  v359 
3507   55.1   4-5   2001   D19  v364 
3627   56.2   10-11   2001   D19  v395 
3639   57.1   3-5   2002   D19  v381 
3693   58.1   10-11   2002   D19  v425   
3904   59.1   3-4   2003   D.19   d19 
3938   60.1   10-11   2003   D.19    v603 
 
Occupation of head (ocuphead) 
ZA  Study 







Name (1)  
2936   47.1  3-4   1997   D21a  v460 
2959   48  10-11   1997   D21a  v979 
3052   49   4-5   1998   D21a  v584 
3085   50.0   10-11   1998   D21a  v376 
3171   51.0   3-4   1999   D21a  v466 
3204   52.0   10-11   1999   D21a  v813 
3296   53   4-5   2000   D21a  v604 
3387   54.1   11-12   2000   D21a  v360 
3507   55.1   4-5   2001   D21a  v365 
3627   56.2   10-11   2001   D21a  v396 
3639   57.1   3-5   2002   D21a  v382 
3693   58.1   10-11   2002   D21a  v426 
3904   59.1   3-4   2003   D.21   d21ar 
3938   60.1   10-11   2003   D.21    v604 
 





Rural Urban area (rural) 
ZA  Study 







Name (1)  
2936   47.1  3-4   1997   D25  v462 
2959   48  10-11   1997   NO   
3052   49   4-5   1998   NO   
3085   50.0   10-11   1998   D25  v378 
3171   51.0   3-4   1999   NO  NO 
3204   52.0   10-11   1999   NO  NO 
3296   53   4-5   2000   NO  NO 
3387   54.1   11-12   2000   NO  NO 
3507   55.1   4-5   2001   NO  NO 
3627   56.2   10-11   2001   D25  v398 
3639   57.1   3-5   2002   D25  v384 
3693   58.1   10-11   2002   D25  v428   
3904   59.1   3-4   2003   D.25     d25 
3938   60.1   10-11   2003   D.25   v606 
 
Income, recoded by quartiles (income) 
ZA  Study 







Name (1)  
2936   47.1  3-4   1997   D29  v465 
2959   48  10-11   1997   D29  v982 
3052   49   4-5   1998   D29  v604 
3085   50.0   10-11   1998   D29  v399 
3171   51.0   3-4   1999   D29  v486 
3204   52.0   10-11   1999   D29  v833   
3296   53   4-5   2000   D29  v624 
3387   54.1   11-12   2000   D29  v380 
3507   55.1   4-5   2001   D29  v386   
3627   56.2   10-11   2001   D29  v417 
3639   57.1   3-5   2002   D29  v403 
3693   58.1   10-11   2002   D29  v447 
3904   59.1   3-4   2003   D.29  d29_c   
3938   60.1   10-11   2003   D.29  v625 
 





Appendix 2.4: Summary statistics by country 




   
date france belgium holand germany italy luxembour denmark ireland united ki greece spain portugal finland sweden austria Total
1997.04 mean 17.88 17.89 18.94 17.87 16.83 18.06 21.38 17.06 17.02 16.31 15.68 13.46 19.95 19.51 17.57 17.66
std.dev. 3.47 3.31 4.45 4.00 4.88 3.51 5.19 2.84 3.20 4.60 4.47 5.15 5.50 5.49 3.27 4.62
1997.11 mean 18.05 18.11 18.55 17.73 16.73 17.92 21.41 16.68 16.96 16.10 15.65 13.43 19.83 19.89 17.51 17.59
std.dev. 3.61 3.37 4.09 3.95 4.62 3.23 5.22 2.56 3.64 4.92 4.78 4.68 5.52 5.56 3.13 4.62
1998.05 mean 17.94 18.17 18.59 17.70 17.11 17.77 21.25 16.91 17.04 16.11 15.90 13.63 19.86 19.59 17.57 17.64
std.dev. 3.57 3.35 4.47 3.96 4.92 3.54 4.87 2.83 3.74 4.58 4.70 4.72 5.43 5.33 3.02 4.57
1998.11 mean 17.84 18.25 18.66 17.71 16.78 18.10 21.50 17.19 16.81 16.26 15.74 13.27 20.22 19.94 17.56 17.67
std.dev. 3.65 3.66 4.46 3.84 5.03 4.46 5.41 3.28 3.77 4.73 4.72 4.53 5.63 5.52 3.29 4.77
1999.04 mean 17.98 18.05 18.59 17.67 16.85 18.09 21.29 16.87 16.74 16.11 15.78 13.57 19.98 19.97 17.47 17.61
std.dev. 3.40 3.20 4.15 3.81 4.96 3.48 5.35 2.44 3.25 4.79 4.61 4.84 5.47 5.63 3.21 4.59
1999.11 mean 17.76 18.26 18.44 17.65 17.12 18.45 21.51 16.80 16.31 16.19 15.96 13.47 19.99 20.26 17.34 17.62
std.dev. 3.34 3.48 4.17 3.76 4.89 4.07 5.27 2.67 2.74 4.53 4.78 4.68 5.35 5.80 3.17 4.60
2000.05 mean 17.98 18.14 18.28 17.74 17.35 17.93 21.93 16.97 16.60 16.01 15.78 13.48 20.28 20.23 17.48 17.69
std.dev. 3.37 3.17 4.10 4.10 5.00 3.42 5.32 2.45 2.80 4.36 4.66 4.82 5.50 5.93 3.21 4.64
2000.12 mean 17.96 18.14 19.21 17.86 17.20 18.19 21.81 17.00 16.70 16.67 15.92 13.65 20.02 20.56 17.41 17.82
std.dev. 3.58 3.31 4.85 4.01 4.76 4.13 5.33 2.87 3.08 5.19 4.65 4.73 5.48 5.96 3.17 4.76
2001.05 mean 18.25 18.05 19.02 17.79 16.98 18.10 21.96 16.97 16.53 16.47 15.85 13.55 19.83 20.58 17.48 17.77
std.dev. 3.45 3.12 4.56 3.88 4.63 3.92 5.46 2.71 2.45 4.97 4.46 4.74 5.20 5.79 3.17 4.62
2001.11 mean 18.41 18.27 18.66 17.72 16.90 19.01 22.18 17.29 16.66 16.94 15.97 13.91 20.21 20.68 17.41 17.92
std.dev. 3.56 3.18 4.21 3.75 4.48 3.98 5.28 2.88 3.02 4.90 4.35 4.83 5.54 6.23 3.13 4.66
2002.05 mean 18.03 18.00 18.86 17.86 17.41 18.19 21.78 17.41 16.82 16.68 15.85 13.60 19.83 20.88 17.65 17.87
std.dev. 3.24 3.10 4.06 3.96 4.86 3.97 5.43 2.58 3.04 4.77 4.45 4.42 5.18 6.49 3.32 4.64
2002.11 mean 18.06 17.93 18.69 17.81 17.07 18.36 21.54 17.59 16.75 16.40 16.05 13.70 19.57 20.48 17.47 17.77
std.dev. 3.28 3.15 4.11 3.69 4.84 3.77 4.71 2.69 2.83 4.78 4.74 4.55 4.53 4.99 3.27 4.37
2003.04 mean 18.35 18.13 18.85 17.80 17.05 17.71 21.94 17.47 17.14 16.46 16.46 13.43 20.41 21.63 17.62 17.97
std.dev. 3.89 3.20 3.99 3.64 5.02 4.72 5.82 2.94 3.83 4.82 4.83 4.41 5.10 6.38 3.32 4.81
2003.11 mean 18.50 18.34 18.96 17.67 17.23 18.13 22.22 17.44 17.09 17.09 16.19 13.39 19.90 21.64 17.34 17.99
std.dev. 3.56 3.44 4.10 3.80 4.70 4.30 5.65 2.54 3.24 4.86 4.56 4.39 5.07 6.52 3.37 4.73
Total mean 18.08 18.12 18.74 17.76 17.04 18.14 21.70 17.12 16.80 16.41 15.91 13.54 19.99 20.41 17.49 17.76
std.dev. 3.51 3.29 4.28 3.87 4.83 3.92 5.32 2.76 3.22 4.78 4.63 4.68 5.33 5.87 3.22 4.65
date france belgium holand germany italy luxembour denmark ireland united ki greece spain portugal finland sweden austria Total
1997.04 mean 42.96 44.41 42.60 44.64 43.96 43.36 44.11 41.59 43.83 43.72 42.67 43.46 44.29 45.69 43.73 43.74
std.dev. 17.17 17.80 16.87 17.53 17.91 18.27 18.09 18.14 17.39 16.76 18.12 18.72 17.94 18.62 17.96 17.81
1997.11 mean 42.84 44.68 42.61 44.45 43.94 43.37 44.04 41.53 44.22 43.68 42.74 43.30 44.27 45.69 43.92 43.75
std.dev. 17.31 18.37 17.56 17.55 17.99 18.15 17.98 18.34 17.90 17.34 18.02 18.64 17.87 18.33 18.28 17.96
1998.05 mean 43.25 44.65 43.26 44.90 44.02 43.45 43.63 41.41 43.95 43.84 42.76 43.66 44.13 45.71 43.78 43.84
std.dev. 18.08 18.29 17.94 17.85 17.98 17.05 17.61 18.22 17.34 17.56 18.01 18.44 17.51 18.49 17.84 17.91
1998.11 mean 44.27 45.21 43.66 45.55 45.00 45.94 45.07 42.85 45.06 44.15 43.51 43.52 44.91 46.07 44.71 44.67
std.dev. 18.34 18.47 17.55 17.78 18.26 18.57 18.12 19.00 18.79 17.78 18.63 18.35 18.06 18.60 18.59 18.31
1999.04 mean 44.19 45.29 44.06 45.53 45.09 45.81 45.23 43.09 44.99 44.37 43.48 43.55 45.13 45.53 44.68 44.70
std.dev. 18.05 18.56 17.80 18.06 18.08 18.64 18.38 19.18 18.71 17.91 18.51 18.57 18.09 17.56 18.53 18.31
1999.11 mean 44.12 45.42 43.73 45.54 45.12 45.53 45.01 43.46 44.07 44.11 43.67 43.54 45.01 46.26 44.74 44.65
std.dev. 18.05 18.68 17.58 17.94 18.04 18.01 18.23 19.41 19.09 17.54 18.28 18.42 17.84 18.77 18.36 18.30
2000.05 mean 43.95 45.23 43.84 45.68 44.68 45.71 44.93 42.96 45.08 44.31 43.57 43.52 44.96 46.31 44.76 44.68
std.dev. 17.78 18.73 17.78 17.96 18.25 18.26 18.20 19.05 18.64 17.54 18.42 18.28 18.04 18.31 18.54 18.26
2000.12 mean 44.38 45.36 44.00 45.78 45.11 46.46 45.15 42.92 45.18 44.83 43.34 43.81 44.79 46.11 44.66 44.82
std.dev. 18.53 18.66 17.45 18.08 18.38 19.33 18.39 18.90 18.64 18.30 18.22 18.59 17.88 17.91 17.99 18.34
2001.05 mean 44.06 45.22 44.02 45.79 44.86 45.34 45.13 43.13 44.91 44.50 43.58 43.92 45.05 46.11 44.27 44.73
std.dev. 17.97 18.58 17.64 17.89 17.81 17.74 18.27 18.68 18.68 18.37 18.98 18.75 17.94 18.40 18.35 18.28
2001.11 mean 43.77 45.26 43.40 45.75 45.37 44.72 45.44 42.82 44.57 44.55 43.46 44.21 45.05 46.55 44.57 44.70
std.dev. 18.04 18.80 17.62 18.07 18.25 17.52 17.79 18.75 17.74 18.31 18.65 18.83 17.97 18.63 18.00 18.22
2002.05 mean 43.54 45.12 43.56 46.07 45.03 46.01 45.26 43.08 45.01 44.58 43.41 43.73 44.94 46.54 44.96 44.78
std.dev. 17.95 18.64 17.61 18.01 18.29 18.28 18.69 18.77 18.64 18.01 18.60 19.05 17.57 18.89 18.34 18.37
2002.11 mean 43.86 45.36 43.64 45.65 44.94 45.22 45.30 42.66 44.78 44.78 43.47 43.67 44.94 46.57 44.72 44.69
std.dev. 17.86 18.68 17.96 17.89 18.17 17.71 18.62 18.19 18.34 18.71 18.78 18.91 17.67 18.69 18.06 18.29
2003.04 mean 45.52 46.14 44.52 46.19 46.27 44.85 45.86 41.49 45.47 44.89 44.37 44.87 45.71 46.79 45.29 45.30
std.dev. 19.24 18.83 17.69 17.98 18.56 17.77 18.40 18.09 18.42 18.46 18.54 18.77 18.14 18.85 18.36 18.43
2003.11 mean 45.20 46.06 44.41 46.37 46.23 44.87 45.84 41.46 45.28 45.01 44.41 44.78 45.66 46.62 45.40 45.26
std.dev. 18.47 18.73 17.38 18.31 18.24 17.79 18.51 17.86 18.18 18.76 18.48 18.84 18.21 18.61 18.27 18.35
Total mean 44.00 45.25 43.67 45.57 44.98 45.05 45.00 42.45 44.74 44.38 43.46 43.82 44.92 46.18 44.59 44.60
std.dev. 18.08 18.56 17.60 17.93 18.16 18.10 18.24 18.62 18.33 17.96 18.44 18.65 17.91 18.47 18.25 18.23






Gender (1 male, 2 female) 
 
Head of the household (1 yes, 2 no) 
 
 
date france belgium holand germany italy luxembour denmark ireland united ki greece spain portugal finland sweden austria Total
1997.04 mean 1.51 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.53 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
1997.11 mean 1.51 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.53 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
1998.05 mean 1.51 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.53 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
1998.11 mean 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
1999.04 mean 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
1999.11 mean 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
2000.05 mean 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.53 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
2000.12 mean 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.53 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
2001.05 mean 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
2001.11 mean 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.53 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
2002.05 mean 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
2002.11 mean 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.53 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
2003.04 mean 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.51 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
2003.11 mean 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.51 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Total mean 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
date france belgium holand germany italy luxembour denmark ireland united ki greece spain portugal finland sweden austria Total
1997.04 mean 1.51 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.53 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
1997.11 mean 1.51 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.53 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
1998.05 mean 1.51 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.53 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
1998.11 mean 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
1999.04 mean 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
1999.11 mean 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
2000.05 mean 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.53 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
2000.12 mean 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.53 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
2001.05 mean 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
2001.11 mean 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.53 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
2002.05 mean 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
2002.11 mean 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.53 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.53 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
2003.04 mean 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.51 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
2003.11 mean 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.51 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Total mean 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.52 1.52
std.dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50





Appendix 2.5: Estimated equations. 





Xd Xs before during after
1999full poldis newstv 1997.04 1998.11 1999.11
persuade newspaper 1997.11 1999.04 2000.05
newsradio 1998.05 2000.12













Xd Xs before during after
2002full poldis knowledge 2000.05 2001.11 2002.11
persuade trustec 2000.12 2002.05 2003.04
trustep 2001.05 2003.11
trustecb
























Appendix 2.6: Estimated equations, reduced forms. 
 




Xd Xs interaction terms before during after
interaction1999a poldis newstv poldis-during 1997.11 1998.11 1999.11






interaction1999b poldis newstv poldis-during 1998.05 1998.11 1999.11
persuade newspaper persuade-during 2000.05
identity newsradio indentity-during 2000.12
knowledge news*-during
knowledge-during
interaction2002a poldis knowledge poldis-during 2000.05 2001.11 2002.11
persuade trustec persuade-during 2000.12 2002.05 2003.04
trustep knowledge-during 2001.05 2003.11
trustecb trust*-during
interaction2002b poldis knowledge poldis-during 2000.12 2001.11 2003.11













Appendix 2.7: dprobit 1999 
 
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9
'fullantes' 'full2a antes' 'full2bantes' 'fulldurante' 'full2adurante' 'full2bdurante' 'fulldespues' 'full2adespues' 'full2bdespues'
poldis==occasionally -0.025 -0.024 0.025 -0.046 -0.041 -0.024 -0.048 -0.022 -0.001
(3.51)** (1.67) (2.03)* (5.77)** (3.25)** (2.08)* (7.09)** (2.35)* (0.07)
poldis==frequently -0.048 -0.043 0.033 -0.054 -0.036 -0.005 -0.064 -0.013 0.011
(4.72)** (2.09)* (1.77) (4.82)** (2.08)* (0.33) (6.36)** (0.90) (0.97)
persuade==rarely -0.028 -0.003 -0.025 -0.028 -0.013 -0.02 -0.025 -0.015 -0.005
(3.36)** (0.20) (1.82) (3.01)** (0.91) (1.52) (3.18)** (1.40) (0.57)
persuade==from time to time -0.034 -0.007 -0.014 -0.037 -0.023 -0.006 -0.058 -0.038 -0.03
(4.32)** (0.46) (1.01) (4.14)** (1.71) (0.45) (7.54)** (3.55)** (3.77)**
persuade==often -0.024 -0.009 -0.005 -0.024 0.022 0.01 -0.04 -0.026 -0.018
(2.31)* (0.43) (0.27) (2.03)* (1.18) (0.56) (3.87)** (1.86) (1.67)
newstv==less often -0.004 -0.087 -0.018 0.03 -0.019 0.003 -0.024 -0.005 -0.009
(0.14) (1.47) (0.33) (0.88) (0.35) (0.07) (0.86) (0.11) (0.32)
newstv==once or twice a week -0.029 -0.049 -0.054 -0.042 -0.047 -0.014 -0.022 -0.015 0
(1.07) (0.90) (1.13) (1.38) (0.96) (0.34) (0.84) (0.41) (0.01)
newstv==several times a week -0.038 -0.04 -0.078 -0.041 -0.032 -0.005 -0.048 -0.025 -0.018
(1.46) (0.78) (1.73) (1.41) (0.66) (0.14) (1.99)* (0.71) (0.69)
newstv==everyday -0.064 -0.047 -0.095 -0.058 -0.048 -0.027 -0.055 -0.036 -0.02
(2.47)* (0.92) (1.99)* (1.91) (0.97) (0.74) (2.27)* (1.02) (0.77)
newspaper==less often -0.02 0.027 -0.02 -0.021 -0.035 -0.031 -0.031 0 -0.013
(1.67) (1.08) (0.92) (1.64) (1.79) (1.75) (2.77)** (0.02) (1.08)
newspaper==once or twice a week -0.009 0.013 0.008 -0.03 -0.033 -0.041 -0.046 -0.023 -0.02
(0.77) (0.53) (0.39) (2.36)* (1.68) (2.33)* (4.16)** (1.43) (1.72)
newspaper==several times a week -0.028 0.009 -0.002 -0.029 -0.016 -0.028 -0.051 -0.008 -0.019
(2.39)* (0.36) (0.11) (2.35)* (0.83) (1.60) (4.64)** (0.52) (1.64)
newspaper==everyday -0.061 -0.015 -0.056 -0.061 -0.052 -0.05 -0.087 -0.038 -0.05
(5.62)** (0.65) (2.86)** (5.30)** (2.89)** (3.05)** (8.50)** (2.59)** (4.56)**
newsradio==less often -0.022 -0.002 -0.022 -0.04 -0.011 -0.009 -0.023 -0.006 -0.015
(1.94) (0.07) (1.11) (3.31)** (0.56) (0.50) (2.11)* (0.38) (1.30)
newsradio==once or twice a week -0.015 -0.019 0.005 -0.007 0.014 0.008 -0.039 -0.031 -0.024
(1.15) (0.73) (0.24) (0.54) (0.69) (0.44) (3.30)** (1.93) (1.97)*
newsradio==several times a week -0.019 0.008 -0.018 -0.018 -0.004 0.002 -0.024 -0.012 -0.009
(1.65) (0.35) (0.92) (1.47) (0.20) (0.12) (2.26)* (0.82) (0.81)
newsradio==everyday -0.024 0.004 -0.029 -0.042 -0.024 -0.017 -0.033 -0.013 -0.022
(2.39)* (0.19) (1.64) (3.86)** (1.41) (1.12) (3.44)** (0.98) (2.14)*
gender==male -0.078 -0.085 -0.065 -0.065 -0.044 -0.044 -0.079 -0.065 -0.065
(12.54)** (6.89)** (6.02)** (9.38)** (4.14)** (4.52)** (12.90)** (7.72)** (10.09)**
couple==with couple -0.02 -0.025 -0.009 -0.022 -0.023 -0.017 -0.019 -0.029 -0.013
(3.37)** (2.11)* (0.89) (3.34)** (2.21)* (1.77) (3.22)** (3.62)** (2.09)*
head==yes 0.009 0.008 -0.007 0.01 0 0.008 0.017 0.013 0.016
(1.35) (0.64) (0.64) (1.37) (0.01) (0.81) (2.62)** (1.42) (2.32)*
edu -0.009 -0.007 -0.002 -0.008 -0.005 -0.002 -0.01 -0.006 -0.004
(13.70)** (5.35)** (1.99)* (10.99)** (4.87)** (2.51)* (15.31)** (6.99)** (6.12)**
age 0.001 0 0 0.001 0.001 0 0.002 0.001 0.001
(5.03)** (0.47) (0.67) (4.77)** (1.59) (0.43) (10.41)** (5.17)** (5.30)**
country==france -0.269 -0.293 -0.216 -0.244 -0.208 -0.192 -0.302 -0.269 -0.254
(21.15)** (11.53)** (10.90)** (21.42)** (11.26)** (11.40)** (28.67)** (17.75)** (21.96)**
country==belgium -0.278 -0.313 -0.226 -0.266 -0.233 -0.22 -0.344 -0.324 -0.319
(22.37)** (12.61)** (11.98)** (25.22)** (13.62)** (14.25)** (36.23)** (23.91)** (31.25)**
country==holand -0.232 -0.212 -0.226 -0.241 -0.213 -0.206 -0.297 -0.283 -0.275
(17.81)** (7.84)** (11.62)** (20.88)** (11.78)** (12.89)** (26.67)** (18.27)** (23.40)**
country==germany -0.109 -0.178 -0.109 -0.167 -0.088 -0.096 -0.226 -0.219 -0.187
(8.22)** (6.51)** (5.23)** (13.46)** (4.13)** (5.26)** (19.87)** (13.62)** (15.48)**
country==italy -0.398 -0.426 -0.311 -0.307 -0.282 -0.264 -0.37 -0.347 -0.341
(36.15)** (19.46)** (17.95)** (30.96)** (17.52)** (17.90)** (39.80)** (26.23)** (33.25)**
country==luxembourg -0.305 -0.325 -0.248 -0.276 -0.234 -0.21 -0.334 -0.32 -0.291
(21.77)** (11.54)** (11.13)** (22.61)** (12.00)** (10.85)** (28.57)** (19.94)** (21.34)**
country==denmark 0.044 0.069 0.095 -0.01 0.065 0.057 -0.101 -0.081 -0.079
(2.89)** (2.26)* (3.66)** (0.62) (2.61)** (2.54)* (7.32)** (4.22)** (5.53)**
country==ireland -0.344 -0.354 -0.279 -0.28 -0.24 -0.245 -0.342 -0.329 -0.33
(29.05)** (14.61)** (15.42)** (25.95)** (13.05)** (16.20)** (33.16)** (23.08)** (31.12)**
country==greece -0.324 -0.341 -0.274 -0.253 -0.24 -0.22 -0.344 -0.337 -0.329
(26.36)** (13.75)** (15.08)** (22.22)** (13.88)** (14.01)** (33.79)** (24.06)** (31.29)**
country==spain -0.338 -0.346 -0.269 -0.28 -0.239 -0.229 -0.351 -0.323 -0.312
(28.56)** (14.53)** (14.74)** (27.35)** (13.96)** (14.87)** (36.85)** (23.64)** (28.90)**
country==portugal -0.279 -0.298 -0.231 -0.247 -0.209 -0.211 -0.335 -0.311 -0.312
(20.67)** (10.81)** (11.14)** (21.20)** (10.65)** (12.88)** (32.55)** (20.67)** (28.12)**
country==finland -0.029 0.041 -0.112 -0.147 -0.081 -0.121 -0.153 -0.104 -0.153
(1.98)* (1.41) (5.16)** (11.10)** (3.67)** (6.55)** (12.00)** (5.74)** (11.74)**
country==sweden -0.013 0.009 0.006 -0.034 0.03 -0.02 -0.064 -0.019 -0.075
(0.89) (0.30) (0.27) (2.14)* (1.21) (0.94) (4.30)** (0.91) (5.00)**
country==austria -0.172 -0.218 -0.169 -0.178 -0.137 -0.136 -0.241 -0.231 -0.216
(12.53)** (8.00)** (7.81)** (13.71)** (6.48)** (7.25)** (20.39)** (13.94)** (17.09)**
knowledge==box 2 -0.019 -0.056 -0.046 -0.019 -0.06 -0.037
(0.75) (2.73)** (2.18)* (0.99) (3.36)** (2.87)**
knowledge==box 3 -0.016 -0.067 -0.077 -0.054 -0.097 -0.083
(0.68) (3.37)** (3.92)** (3.07)** (5.88)** (6.82)**
knowledge==box 4 -0.041 -0.07 -0.088 -0.054 -0.128 -0.104
(1.72) (3.45)** (4.42)** (2.99)** (7.84)** (8.49)**
knowledge==box 5 -0.078 -0.09 -0.112 -0.07 -0.153 -0.128
(3.37)** (4.48)** (5.70)** (3.86)** (9.52)** (10.67)**
knowledge==box 6 -0.124 -0.091 -0.136 -0.101 -0.178 -0.141
(4.92)** (4.18)** (6.69)** (5.27)** (10.71)** (11.04)**
knowledge==box 7 -0.165 -0.115 -0.123 -0.084 -0.193 -0.159
(6.04)** (4.89)** (5.52)** (3.97)** (11.26)** (11.98)**
knowledge==box 8 -0.146 -0.092 -0.142 -0.109 -0.206 -0.176
(4.45)** (3.26)** (5.66)** (4.63)** (10.79)** (11.84)**
knowledge==box 9 -0.119 -0.086 -0.122 -0.055 -0.218 -0.186
(2.27)* (1.99)* (3.03)** (1.28) (7.44)** (8.40)**
knowledge==know a great deal -0.097 -0.015 -0.174 -0.109 -0.194 -0.153
(1.56) (0.26) (2.97)** (2.35)* (5.80)** (5.93)**
explife==same -0.053 -0.057 -0.069
(2.54)* (2.93)** (4.02)**
explife==better -0.077 -0.063 -0.092
(3.36)** (3.09)** (5.05)**
expeco==same -0.085 -0.049 -0.061
(5.43)** (3.77)** (5.56)**
expeco==better -0.143 -0.094 -0.098
(7.78)** (5.83)** (7.61)**
expfin==same 0.003 -0.072 -0.044
(0.18) (4.29)** (3.11)**
expfin==better 0.012 -0.076 -0.012
(0.54) (4.02)** (0.73)
expunemp==same -0.04 -0.013 -0.021
(2.54)* (0.97) (1.94)
expunemp==better -0.086 -0.044 -0.079
(4.70)** (2.82)** (6.41)**
expjob==same -0.025 -0.043 -0.039
(1.13) (2.15)* (2.25)*
expjob==better -0.022 -0.036 -0.032
(0.88) (1.58) (1.69)
identity==(nationality) and european -0.216 -0.241 -0.256
(21.87)** (26.40)** (43.06)**
identity==european and (nationality) -0.229 -0.219 -0.251
(12.95)** (14.62)** (23.38)**
identity==european only -0.213 -0.188 -0.237
(10.27)** (10.12)** (17.52)**
Observations 41703 11064 13315 27792 11391 13671 42440 22883 41015
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%





Appendix 2.8: dprobit 2002 
 
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 -8 -9
'fullantes' 'full2aantes' 'full2bantes' 'fulldurante' 'full2adurante' 'full2ddurante' 'fulldespues' 'full2adespues' 'full2bdespues'
poldis==occasionally -0.019 -0.025 -0.025 -0.026 -0.011 -0.03 -0.036 -0.008 0.003
(2.72)** (1.74) (1.60) (3.35)** (1.30) (2.25)* (5.55)** (0.64) (0.19)
poldis==frequently -0.059 -0.053 -0.056 -0.044 -0.025 -0.057 -0.054 -0.022 -0.017
(5.56)** (2.59)** (2.55)* (4.06)** (2.10)* (3.01)** (6.08)** (1.21) (0.88)
persuade==rarely -0.017 -0.013 -0.017 0.002 0.012 -0.001 -0.008 -0.037 -0.029
(2.01)* (0.74) (0.90) (0.25) (1.16) (0.09) (1.14) (2.49)* (1.80)
persuade==from time to time -0.032 -0.02 -0.014 -0.016 -0.002 -0.012 -0.015 -0.016 -0.014
(3.97)** (1.20) (0.78) (1.87) (0.17) (0.80) (2.13)* (1.10) (0.87)
persuade==often -0.016 -0.03 -0.03 -0.008 0.004 -0.035 -0.009 -0.016 -0.021
(1.47) (1.40) (1.27) (0.74) (0.32) (1.80) (0.99) (0.85) (1.02)
knowledge==box 2 -0.043 -0.076 -0.074 -0.053 -0.028 -0.092 -0.05 -0.034 -0.034
(3.34)** (2.62)** (2.26)* (4.04)** (1.81) (3.48)** (4.55)** (1.39) (1.22)
knowledge==box 3 -0.082 -0.055 -0.072 -0.098 -0.07 -0.095 -0.071 -0.056 -0.07
(6.86)** (2.00)* (2.35)* (8.10)** (4.97)** (3.81)** (6.90)** (2.45)* (2.73)**
knowledge==box 4 -0.088 -0.069 -0.076 -0.102 -0.067 -0.111 -0.091 -0.083 -0.089
(7.25)** (2.54)* (2.46)* (8.38)** (4.76)** (4.53)** (8.77)** (3.59)** (3.50)**
knowledge==box 5 -0.123 -0.086 -0.086 -0.128 -0.083 -0.122 -0.089 -0.065 -0.067
(10.41)** (3.21)** (2.84)** (10.76)** (5.97)** (4.99)** (8.62)** (2.77)** (2.58)**
knowledge==box 6 -0.136 -0.11 -0.116 -0.136 -0.09 -0.145 -0.102 -0.084 -0.086
(10.67)** (3.89)** (3.69)** (10.79)** (6.07)** (5.80)** (9.34)** (3.43)** (3.18)**
knowledge==box 7 -0.16 -0.103 -0.118 -0.141 -0.082 -0.137 -0.102 -0.047 -0.049
(11.92)** (3.45)** (3.59)** (10.65)** (5.13)** (5.29)** (8.74)** (1.78) (1.66)
knowledge==box 8 -0.179 -0.171 -0.177 -0.14 -0.07 -0.115 -0.1 -0.061 -0.05
(11.94)** (5.45)** (5.20)** (9.19)** (3.80)** (3.77)** (7.43)** (1.98)* (1.49)
knowledge==box 9 -0.178 -0.17 -0.185 -0.131 -0.08 -0.138 -0.091 -0.032 -0.02
(7.54)** (3.50)** (3.62)** (5.62)** (2.75)** (3.01)** (4.25)** (0.71) (0.42)
knowledge==know a great deal -0.151 -0.092 -0.107 -0.169 -0.132 -0.151 -0.051 0.044 0.023
(5.67)** (1.70) (1.89) (6.03)** (3.63)** (2.48)* (2.00)* (0.85) (0.41)
trustep==tend to trust -0.075 -0.041 -0.012 -0.069 -0.068 -0.062 -0.09 -0.066 -0.1
(6.13)** (1.57) (0.42) (5.31)** (4.42)** (2.45)* (8.56)** (2.98)** (4.10)**
trustep==tend not to trust 0.092 0.109 0.14 0.061 0.045 0.064 0.068 0.095 0.052
(6.50)** (3.78)** (4.27)** (3.95)** (2.54)* (2.18)* (5.32)** (3.75)** (1.87)
trustec==tend to trust -0.076 -0.079 -0.089 -0.06 -0.042 -0.049 -0.065 -0.07 -0.029
(6.51)** (3.35)** (3.33)** (4.87)** (2.96)** (2.11)* (6.61)** (3.42)** (1.31)
trustec==tend not to trust 0.041 0.026 0.001 0.068 0.055 0.056 0.044 0.039 0.071
(3.14)** (1.02) (0.02) (4.65)** (3.34)** (2.11)* (3.67)** (1.68) (2.79)**
trustecb==tend to trust -0.103 -0.083 -0.08 -0.069 -0.059 -0.08 -0.092 -0.098 -0.092
(11.67)** (4.42)** (3.83)** (7.17)** (5.25)** (4.32)** (12.17)** (6.30)** (5.37)**
trustecb==tend not to trust 0.084 0.049 0.042 0.084 0.079 0.07 0.084 0.069 0.076
(8.11)** (2.34)* (1.83) (7.12)** (5.94)** (3.26)** (9.03)** (3.78)** (3.80)**
gender==male -0.07 -0.075 -0.064 -0.065 -0.059 -0.061 -0.058 -0.067 -0.058
(11.11)** (5.92)** (4.67)** (9.81)** (8.00)** (5.09)** (10.66)** (6.07)** (4.83)**
couple==with couple -0.016 -0.021 -0.029 -0.012 -0.001 0.004 -0.023 -0.009 -0.016
(2.60)** (1.73) (2.21)* (1.83) (0.20) (0.32) (4.39)** (0.84) (1.37)
head==yes 0.013 0.031 0.016 -0.001 -0.011 -0.022 0.009 0.013 0
(1.85) (2.23)* (1.06) (0.17) (1.37) (1.68) (1.55) (1.06) (0.01)
edu -0.007 -0.005 -0.004 -0.007 -0.004 -0.004 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006
(10.91)** (3.54)** (2.89)** (9.10)** (5.40)** (3.55)** (13.08)** (5.97)** (4.96)**
age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.001
(6.69)** (2.39)* (1.81) (5.35)** (1.04) (0.59) (7.02)** (1.76) (1.55)
country==france -0.265 -0.255 -0.231 -0.181 -0.154 -0.172 -0.239 -0.248 -0.248
(22.71)** (10.27)** (8.15)** (15.80)** (11.34)** (7.42)** (27.47)** (12.78)** (11.86)**
country==belgium -0.31 -0.315 -0.299 -0.24 -0.222 -0.222 -0.277 -0.31 -0.302
(28.49)** (14.01)** (11.61)** (23.26)** (18.88)** (10.70)** (35.55)** (18.91)** (17.27)**
country==holand -0.227 -0.231 -0.226 -0.194 -0.173 -0.179 -0.178 -0.176 -0.195
(17.40)** (7.99)** (6.96)** (16.07)** (12.22)** (7.38)** (17.05)** (8.04)** (8.26)**
country==germany -0.179 -0.161 -0.135 -0.179 -0.158 -0.169 -0.213 -0.217 -0.225
(14.78)** (6.18)** (4.56)** (15.65)** (11.91)** (7.43)** (23.19)** (10.55)** (9.97)**
country==italy -0.34 -0.338 -0.307 -0.246 -0.225 -0.24 -0.244 -0.231 -0.233
(31.93)** (15.06)** (11.73)** (23.28)** (17.56)** (10.98)** (28.62)** (11.00)** (10.32)**
country==luxembourg -0.298 -0.271 -0.245 -0.246 -0.225 -0.234 -0.261 -0.271 -0.273
(22.16)** (8.05)** (6.48)** (20.40)** (15.63)** (9.08)** (27.41)** (12.56)** (12.17)**
country==denmark -0.022 -0.062 -0.037 -0.019 0.024 0.023 -0.102 -0.103 -0.108
(1.47) (2.10)* (1.12) (1.24) (1.31) (0.80) (8.73)** (4.12)** (3.94)**
country==ireland -0.287 -0.311 -0.282 -0.231 -0.218 -0.246 -0.261 -0.298 -0.292
(23.44)** (13.24)** (10.33)** (21.06)** (17.95)** (12.10)** (31.36)** (17.15)** (15.73)**
country==greece -0.303 -0.347 -0.348 -0.243 -0.244 -0.284 -0.213 -0.217 -0.236
(26.55)** (15.74)** (14.41)** (24.20)** (22.67)** (15.91)** (22.60)** (10.43)** (10.80)**
country==spain -0.304 -0.262 -0.244 -0.242 -0.222 -0.234 -0.256 -0.246 -0.236
(27.49)** (10.35)** (8.57)** (24.21)** (18.68)** (11.45)** (31.01)** (12.33)** (10.59)**
country==portugal -0.274 -0.296 -0.276 -0.222 -0.213 -0.241 -0.25 -0.283 -0.28
(22.47)** (11.86)** (9.53)** (20.40)** (17.21)** (11.81)** (29.71)** (15.74)** (14.49)**
country==finland -0.103 -0.142 -0.097 -0.102 -0.106 -0.056 -0.215 -0.257 -0.255
(7.45)** (5.30)** (3.19)** (7.48)** (7.17)** (2.13)* (23.07)** (13.55)** (12.53)**
country==sweden 0.015 0.038 0.077 -0.079 -0.073 -0.091 -0.064 -0.043 -0.059
(0.95) (1.20) (2.18)* (5.60)** (4.66)** (3.59)** (5.26)** (1.67) (2.11)*
country==austria -0.213 -0.21 -0.197 -0.21 -0.197 -0.224 -0.249 -0.263 -0.262
(16.57)** (7.98)** (6.66)** (18.79)** (15.78)** (10.88)** (29.16)** (13.70)** (12.60)**
satis==not very satisfied -0.044 -0.048 -0.011 -0.019 -0.036 -0.03
(1.22) (1.23) (0.54) (0.55) (1.26) (0.95)
satis==fairly satisfied -0.069 -0.031 -0.091 -0.077 -0.108 -0.088
(1.99)* (0.80) (4.48)** (2.20)* (3.80)** (2.80)**
satis==very satisfied -0.071 -0.035 -0.107 -0.105 -0.126 -0.103
(1.99)* (0.87) (5.49)** (3.10)** (4.51)** (3.27)**
trustpress==tend to trust 0.003 -0.003 -0.021 -0.021 -0.014 -0.005
(0.21) (0.16) (2.49)* (1.57) (1.11) (0.33)
trustradio==tend to trust -0.036 -0.025 0.017 0.035 0.011 0.002
(1.83) (1.16) (1.62) (2.03)* (0.73) (0.12)
trusttv==tend to trust 0.031 0.025 0.023 0.015 0.015 0.016
(1.69) (1.23) (2.34)* (0.91) (1.07) (1.05)
trustpol==tend to trust -0.08 -0.067 -0.04 -0.05 -0.034 -0.018
(5.53)** (4.26)** (4.91)** (3.85)** (2.60)** (1.22)
identity==(nationality) and european -0.248 -0.256 -0.19 -0.172 -0.176 -0.181
(20.95)** (19.93)** (26.80)** (15.14)** (16.24)** (15.45)**
identity==european and (nationality) -0.234 -0.236 -0.193 -0.198 -0.221 -0.234
(10.05)** (9.49)** (16.19)** (9.68)** (11.43)** (11.61)**
identity==european only -0.217 -0.205 -0.186 -0.177 -0.159 -0.166
(7.23)** (6.18)** (11.91)** (6.80)** (5.87)** (5.91)**
pride==not very proud 0.004 0.016 -0.027 -0.013 0.016 0.015
(0.10) (0.35) (1.13) (0.32) (0.41) (0.36)
pride==fairly proud 0.007 0.03 -0.053 -0.003 -0.002 0.003
(0.18) (0.72) (2.34)* (0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
pride==very proud 0.026 0.047 -0.027 0.028 0.019 0.019
(0.69) (1.10) (1.20) (0.75) (0.52) (0.50)
explife==same -0.019 -0.041 -0.03
(0.71) (1.89) (1.52)
explife==better -0.063 -0.055 -0.02
(2.18)* (2.33)* (0.90)
expeco==same -0.012 -0.01 -0.05
(0.70) (0.72) (3.49)**
expeco==better -0.045 -0.038 -0.079
(2.11)* (1.88) (4.03)**
expfin==same -0.048 -0.056 -0.004
(2.08)* (2.90)** (0.24)
expfin==better -0.008 -0.054 0.012
(0.30) (2.39)* (0.57)
expunemp==same -0.033 0.02 -0.009
(1.83) (1.42) (0.64)
expunemp==better -0.066 -0.006 -0.003
(3.16)** (0.29) (0.15)
expjob==same -0.067 -0.029 -0.012
(2.43)* (1.26) (0.57)
expjob==better -0.054 -0.019 0.008
(1.80) (0.72) (0.31)
Observations 41848 11250 9422 28046 22774 9462 43302 11582 9700
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%





Appendix 2.9: Interaction 1999a 
 
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7
'before' 'during' 'after' 'before wrt during' 'after wrt during' 'before/during interaction' after/during interaction'
Political discussion=yes -0.034 -0.054 -0.038 -0.047 -0.045 -0.037 -0.039
(2.55)* (4.50)** (4.25)** (5.10)** (6.15)** (2.93)** (4.47)**
Persuade Friends=yes -0.017 -0.014 -0.032 -0.017 -0.025 -0.013 -0.032
(1.47) (1.37) (4.14)** (2.16)* (4.08)** (1.25) (4.39)**
News TV=yes -0.044 -0.042 -0.042 -0.043 -0.04 -0.043 -0.04
(0.85) (0.75) (1.19) (1.09) (1.29) (0.89) (1.18)
Newspaper=yes 0.004 -0.048 -0.031 -0.026 -0.038 0.001 -0.028
(0.18) (2.88)** (2.35)* (1.97)* (3.62)** (0.04) (2.19)*
News Radio=yes -0.005 -0.018 -0.021 -0.015 -0.021 -0.01 -0.026
(0.26) (1.15) (1.72) (1.19) (2.09)* (0.54) (2.22)*
Knowledge EU (policy, institutions) -0.083 -0.074 -0.112 -0.08 -0.098 -0.079 -0.113
(6.92)** (6.84)** (13.29)** (9.70)** (14.65)** (7.13)** (13.90)**
newexplife= same or better -0.058 -0.064 -0.079 -0.063 -0.075 -0.053 -0.075
(2.80)** (3.20)** (4.49)** (4.25)** (5.57)** (2.71)** (4.41)**
newexpeco= same or better -0.107 -0.066 -0.078 -0.086 -0.075 -0.099 -0.075
(7.06)** (5.10)** (7.20)** (8.49)** (8.92)** (6.93)** (7.15)**
newexpfin=same or better 0.002 -0.081 -0.043 -0.042 -0.058 0.003 -0.04
(0.10) (4.68)** (3.00)** (3.26)** (5.21)** (0.18) (2.93)**
newexpunemp= same or better -0.064 -0.029 -0.046 -0.046 -0.037 -0.053 -0.041
(4.25)** (2.27)* (4.30)** (4.63)** (4.47)** (3.85)** (4.03)**
newexpjob= same or better -0.024 -0.04 -0.038 -0.033 -0.04 -0.026 -0.035
(1.09) (1.94) (2.19)* (2.15)* (2.99)** (1.28) (2.09)*
gender==male -0.098 -0.05 -0.075 -0.075 -0.066 -0.075 -0.066
(8.06)** (4.72)** (8.98)** (9.03)** (10.07)** (9.04)** (10.07)**
couple==with couple -0.026 -0.025 -0.031 -0.027 -0.029 -0.026 -0.029
(2.21)* (2.45)* (3.92)** (3.32)** (4.53)** (3.28)** (4.57)**
head==yes 0.009 0.001 0.013 0.004 0.008 0.004 0.009
(0.68) (0.11) (1.39) (0.49) (1.17) (0.49) (1.21)
edu -0.008 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
(6.50)** (5.57)** (8.62)** (8.68)** (10.42)** (8.61)** (10.40)**
age 0 0 0.001 0 0.001 0 0.001
(0.84) (1.31) (4.65)** (0.45) (4.60)** (0.41) (4.58)**
country==france -0.276 -0.208 -0.27 -0.245 -0.247 -0.245 -0.248
(10.96)** (11.12)** (18.04)** (15.63)** (21.12)** (15.57)** (21.04)**
country==belgium -0.299 -0.232 -0.327 -0.269 -0.294 -0.27 -0.294
(12.15)** (13.45)** (24.58)** (18.15)** (27.75)** (18.06)** (27.77)**
country==holand -0.21 -0.214 -0.286 -0.223 -0.26 -0.222 -0.26
(7.93)** (11.71)** (18.77)** (13.90)** (22.00)** (13.80)** (21.97)**
country==germany -0.172 -0.099 -0.23 -0.13 -0.184 -0.132 -0.184
(6.38)** (4.73)** (14.76)** (7.59)** (14.69)** (7.63)** (14.70)**
country==italy -0.424 -0.283 -0.35 -0.354 -0.326 -0.353 -0.326
(19.51)** (17.44)** (27.05)** (26.49)** (32.38)** (26.37)** (32.35)**
country==luxembourg -0.315 -0.234 -0.321 -0.277 -0.291 -0.278 -0.291
(11.16)** (11.83)** (19.94)** (16.28)** (22.95)** (16.23)** (22.94)**
country==denmark 0.076 0.068 -0.076 0.076 -0.023 0.076 -0.023
(2.57)* (2.74)** (4.03)** (3.85)** (1.51) (3.85)** (1.54)
country==ireland -0.36 -0.244 -0.335 -0.303 -0.303 -0.304 -0.304
(15.24)** (13.35)** (24.11)** (20.27)** (27.37)** (20.29)** (27.36)**
country==greece -0.331 -0.241 -0.341 -0.288 -0.306 -0.288 -0.306
(13.47)** (14.09)** (25.12)** (19.43)** (28.47)** (19.42)** (28.57)**
country==spain -0.338 -0.241 -0.325 -0.291 -0.295 -0.292 -0.296
(14.21)** (14.12)** (24.06)** (20.00)** (27.79)** (19.98)** (27.69)**
country==portugal -0.287 -0.207 -0.312 -0.249 -0.276 -0.249 -0.276
(10.42)** (10.55)** (20.88)** (14.79)** (23.15)** (14.76)** (23.08)**
country==finland 0.036 -0.089 -0.124 -0.035 -0.109 -0.036 -0.11
(1.26) (4.10)** (7.07)** (1.96) (7.96)** (2.00)* (7.97)**
country==sweden 0.003 0.021 -0.038 0.017 -0.015 0.017 -0.014
(0.10) (0.87) (1.92) (0.84) (0.97) (0.88) (0.92)
country==austria -0.209 -0.142 -0.24 -0.175 -0.205 -0.176 -0.205
(7.75)** (6.81)** (14.94)** (10.26)** (16.06)** (10.24)** (16.02)**
event==during -0.166 -0.103 -0.017 -0.086























Observations 11064 11391 22883 22455 34274 22455 34274
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%





Appendix 2.10: Interaction 1999b 
 
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7
'before' 'during' 'after' 'before wrt during' 'after wrt during' 'before/during interaction' 'after/during interaction'
Political discussion=yes 0.009 -0.033 -0.01 -0.012 -0.017 0.005 -0.011
(0.81) (3.01)** (1.52) (1.55) (2.82)** (0.44) (1.70)
Persuade Friends=yes 0.003 0.006 -0.028 0.004 -0.019 0.004 -0.029
(0.26) (0.69) (4.79)** (0.64) (3.74)** (0.43) (5.07)**
News TV=yes -0.099 -0.018 -0.022 -0.048 -0.02 -0.097 -0.022
(2.01)* (0.47) (0.86) (1.60) (0.96) (2.02)* (0.88)
Newspaper=yes -0.033 -0.048 -0.036 -0.043 -0.04 -0.029 -0.033
(1.80) (3.18)** (3.66)** (3.68)** (4.82)** (1.68) (3.47)**
News Radio=yes -0.03 -0.013 -0.022 -0.022 -0.02 -0.026 -0.024
(1.78) (0.92) (2.37)* (1.98)* (2.55)* (1.62) (2.59)**
Knowledge EU (policy, institutions) -0.044 -0.048 -0.09 -0.046 -0.078 -0.044 -0.09
(4.22)** (4.86)** (13.95)** (6.39)** (14.33)** (4.45)** (14.41)**
Identity pro european -0.238 -0.265 -0.277 -0.252 -0.275 -0.226 -0.27
(24.51)** (28.70)** (47.20)** (37.56)** (55.18)** (24.58)** (47.68)**
gender==male -0.072 -0.049 -0.073 -0.06 -0.067 -0.06 -0.067
(6.75)** (5.00)** (11.49)** (8.26)** (12.51)** (8.30)** (12.51)**
couple==with couple -0.014 -0.019 -0.016 -0.017 -0.016 -0.017 -0.016
(1.39) (2.05)* (2.56)* (2.46)* (3.16)** (2.47)* (3.18)**
head==yes -0.005 0.009 0.016 0.001 0.014 0.002 0.014
(0.39) (0.82) (2.30)* (0.17) (2.39)* (0.24) (2.41)*
edu -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005
(2.44)* (3.10)** (7.60)** (3.94)** (8.32)** (3.93)** (8.29)**
age -0.001 0 0.001 0 0 0 0
(2.36)* (0.38) (3.94)** (1.80) (3.26)** (1.91) (3.25)**
country==france -0.208 -0.191 -0.252 -0.2 -0.236 -0.2 -0.235
(10.46)** (11.32)** (21.95)** (15.38)** (24.73)** (15.39)** (24.67)**
country==belgium -0.221 -0.221 -0.319 -0.224 -0.293 -0.223 -0.294
(11.68)** (14.48)** (31.76)** (18.59)** (34.73)** (18.52)** (34.83)**
country==holand -0.232 -0.21 -0.277 -0.223 -0.259 -0.222 -0.259
(12.18)** (13.29)** (23.91)** (18.06)** (27.24)** (18.01)** (27.29)**
country==germany -0.117 -0.104 -0.195 -0.112 -0.17 -0.111 -0.17
(5.71)** (5.81)** (16.45)** (8.21)** (17.11)** (8.16)** (17.16)**
country==italy -0.309 -0.264 -0.34 -0.287 -0.32 -0.286 -0.32
(17.74)** (17.81)** (33.47)** (25.17)** (38.07)** (25.15)** (38.06)**
country==luxembourg -0.249 -0.212 -0.295 -0.232 -0.273 -0.231 -0.273
(11.26)** (11.05)** (22.02)** (15.96)** (24.49)** (15.82)** (24.50)**
country==denmark 0.095 0.057 -0.081 0.075 -0.043 0.075 -0.043
(3.71)** (2.53)* (5.74)** (4.44)** (3.55)** (4.43)** (3.60)**
country==ireland -0.277 -0.246 -0.33 -0.263 -0.307 -0.262 -0.308
(15.34)** (16.35)** (31.31)** (22.44)** (35.23)** (22.47)** (35.28)**
country==greece -0.268 -0.219 -0.328 -0.244 -0.299 -0.243 -0.3
(14.84)** (14.17)** (31.49)** (20.59)** (34.32)** (20.48)** (34.44)**
country==spain -0.265 -0.229 -0.31 -0.248 -0.289 -0.248 -0.289
(14.47)** (14.77)** (28.73)** (20.78)** (32.28)** (20.72)** (32.27)**
country==portugal -0.228 -0.211 -0.309 -0.222 -0.283 -0.22 -0.283
(11.09)** (12.95)** (27.96)** (17.07)** (30.69)** (16.96)** (30.72)**
country==finland -0.12 -0.123 -0.159 -0.123 -0.149 -0.123 -0.149
(5.60)** (6.77)** (12.41)** (8.80)** (14.05)** (8.76)** (14.04)**
country==sweden 0.001 -0.022 -0.08 -0.012 -0.063 -0.011 -0.063
(0.04) (1.03) (5.35)** (0.72) (5.11)** (0.71) (5.06)**
country==austria -0.173 -0.141 -0.225 -0.157 -0.202 -0.157 -0.203
(8.25)** (7.70)** (18.33)** (11.30)** (19.69)** (11.30)** (19.72)**
event==during -0.048 -0.094 -0.057 -0.111















Observations 13315 13671 41015 26986 54686 26986 54686
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%





Appendix 2.11: Interaction 2002a 
 
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7
'before' 'during' 'after' 'before wrt during' 'after wrt during' 'before/during interaction' 'after/during interaction'
Political discussion=yes -0.036 -0.038 -0.047 -0.037 -0.043 -0.031 -0.047
(5.29)** (5.19)** (7.60)** (7.26)** (9.07)** (4.88)** (7.84)**
Persuade Friends=yes -0.027 -0.02 -0.011 -0.024 -0.016 -0.025 -0.005
(4.44)** (3.15)** (2.19)* (5.41)** (3.86)** (4.43)** (1.04)
Knowledge EU (policy, institutions) -0.078 -0.071 -0.048 -0.076 -0.058 -0.073 -0.05
(12.14)** (10.27)** (8.52)** (15.93)** (13.10)** (12.04)** (8.92)**
European Parliament==tend to trust -0.079 -0.075 -0.094 -0.079 -0.084 -0.078 -0.087
(6.50)** (5.75)** (8.91)** (8.72)** (10.33)** (6.74)** (8.40)**
European Parliament==tend not to trust 0.092 0.059 0.065 0.08 0.064 0.086 0.07
(6.49)** (3.78)** (5.14)** (7.53)** (6.56)** (6.38)** (5.60)**
European Comision==tend to trust -0.08 -0.064 -0.068 -0.073 -0.066 -0.077 -0.071
(6.85)** (5.19)** (6.84)** (8.54)** (8.65)** (6.97)** (7.31)**
European Comision==tend not to trust 0.036 0.065 0.042 0.048 0.051 0.036 0.035
(2.72)** (4.41)** (3.52)** (4.87)** (5.51)** (2.90)** (2.98)**
European Central Bank==tend to trust -0.108 -0.073 -0.093 -0.095 -0.085 -0.098 -0.095
(12.27)** (7.56)** (12.35)** (14.43)** (14.25)** (11.85)** (12.81)**
European Central Bank==tend not to trust 0.081 0.081 0.084 0.081 0.082 0.078 0.081
(7.84)** (6.87)** (9.02)** (10.34)** (11.31)** (7.98)** (8.84)**
gender==male -0.078 -0.069 -0.06 -0.075 -0.064 -0.075 -0.064
(12.35)** (10.49)** (11.12)** (16.15)** (15.21)** (16.19)** (15.24)**
couple==with couple -0.017 -0.012 -0.024 -0.015 -0.02 -0.015 -0.02
(2.78)** (1.92) (4.55)** (3.38)** (4.82)** (3.40)** (4.82)**
head==yes 0.011 -0.002 0.009 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005
(1.59) (0.27) (1.47) (1.15) (0.99) (1.15) (0.99)
edu -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
(12.45)** (9.85)** (13.80)** (16.04)** (16.62)** (15.99)** (16.61)**
age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(6.33)** (5.30)** (7.24)** (8.23)** (8.92)** (8.24)** (8.93)**
country==france -0.264 -0.184 -0.24 -0.232 -0.22 -0.232 -0.22
(22.64)** (16.05)** (27.81)** (27.76)** (31.92)** (27.74)** (31.91)**
country==belgium -0.311 -0.241 -0.278 -0.284 -0.265 -0.284 -0.265
(28.72)** (23.45)** (35.87)** (37.15)** (42.82)** (37.17)** (42.81)**
country==holand -0.225 -0.195 -0.18 -0.217 -0.187 -0.216 -0.187
(17.37)** (16.19)** (17.38)** (23.79)** (23.69)** (23.76)** (23.68)**
country==germany -0.186 -0.184 -0.217 -0.189 -0.205 -0.189 -0.205
(15.52)** (16.25)** (23.81)** (22.30)** (28.81)** (22.33)** (28.84)**
country==italy -0.341 -0.248 -0.246 -0.304 -0.247 -0.304 -0.247
(32.17)** (23.55)** (28.97)** (39.79)** (37.54)** (39.77)** (37.54)**
country==luxembourg -0.3 -0.247 -0.261 -0.281 -0.257 -0.281 -0.257
(22.41)** (20.63)** (27.56)** (30.49)** (34.45)** (30.50)** (34.44)**
country==denmark -0.028 -0.025 -0.105 -0.028 -0.075 -0.028 -0.075
(1.87) (1.66) (8.99)** (2.54)* (8.07)** (2.56)* (8.10)**
country==ireland -0.288 -0.232 -0.261 -0.268 -0.251 -0.268 -0.251
(23.54)** (21.26)** (31.55)** (31.65)** (37.92)** (31.65)** (37.95)**
country==greece -0.306 -0.245 -0.215 -0.283 -0.228 -0.283 -0.228
(27.05)** (24.48)** (22.95)** (36.40)** (33.04)** (36.40)** (32.99)**
country==spain -0.304 -0.243 -0.257 -0.282 -0.253 -0.282 -0.253
(27.56)** (24.42)** (31.27)** (36.81)** (39.74)** (36.82)** (39.69)**
country==portugal -0.273 -0.223 -0.251 -0.255 -0.241 -0.255 -0.241
(22.45)** (20.56)** (29.88)** (30.41)** (36.16)** (30.42)** (36.13)**
country==finland -0.106 -0.105 -0.217 -0.108 -0.179 -0.108 -0.179
(7.65)** (7.77)** (23.45)** (10.89)** (23.10)** (10.92)** (23.14)**
country==sweden 0.015 -0.083 -0.067 -0.033 -0.075 -0.033 -0.075
(0.94) (5.88)** (5.51)** (3.02)** (8.13)** (3.01)** (8.11)**
country==austria -0.222 -0.215 -0.251 -0.225 -0.239 -0.225 -0.238
(17.62)** (19.62)** (29.62)** (26.09)** (35.50)** (26.10)** (35.47)**
event==during -0.078 -0.011 -0.079 -0.021







trust european parliament*during 0.007 0.008
(0.41) (0.48)
not to trust european parliament*during -0.028 -0.019
(1.27) (0.91)
trust european comission*during 0.018 0.015
(1.09) (0.96)
not to trust european comission*during 0.027 0.004
(1.32) (2.01)
trust ECB*during 0.02 0.028
(1.60) (2.42)*
not to trust ECB*during -0.001 0.002
(0.08) (0.14)
Observations 41848 28046 43302 69894 71348 69894 71348
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%





Appendix 2.12: Interaction 2002b 
 
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7
'before' 'during' 'after' 'during wrt before' 'during wrt after' 'during/before interaction' 'during/after interaction'
Political discussion=yes -0.035 -0.017 -0.022 -0.022 -0.019 -0.025 -0.026
(2.49)* (2.08)* (1.77) (3.06)** (2.84)** (2.05)* (2.29)*
Persuade Friends=yes -0.022 -0.009 0.007 -0.013 -0.005 -0.021 0.018
(1.85) (1.30) (0.64) (2.12)* (0.82) (2.05)* (1.83)
Knowledge EU (policy, institutions) -0.046 -0.04 -0.032 -0.043 -0.036 -0.041 -0.029
(3.48)** (5.20)** (2.78)** (6.28)** (5.65)** (3.50)** (2.73)**
European Parliament==tend to trust -0.044 -0.074 -0.07 -0.066 -0.067 -0.04 -0.046
(1.70) (4.84)** (3.18)** (4.97)** (5.32)** (1.74) (2.26)*
European Parliament==tend not to trust 0.11 0.042 0.092 0.063 0.065 0.098 0.104
(3.80)** (2.35)* (3.63)** (4.10)** (4.46)** (3.79)** (4.32)**
European Comision==tend to trust -0.082 -0.044 -0.072 -0.055 -0.054 -0.078 -0.077
(3.49)** (3.09)** (3.55)** (4.49)** (4.65)** (3.76)** (4.05)**
European Comision==tend not to trust 0.022 0.055 0.04 0.045 0.047 0.016 0.013
(0.87) (3.34)** (1.72) (3.17)** (3.45)** (0.69) (0.62)
European Central Bank==tend to trust -0.086 -0.06 -0.098 -0.069 -0.073 -0.071 -0.1
(4.60)** (5.35)** (6.25)** (7.08)** (8.06)** (4.27)** (6.90)**
European Central Bank==tend not to trust 0.048 0.078 0.072 0.068 0.073 0.048 0.059
(2.28)* (5.86)** (3.92)** (5.95)** (6.80)** (2.52)* (3.48)**
Life satisfaction -0.033 -0.09 -0.084 -0.074 -0.087 -0.032 -0.1
(1.99)* (9.03)** (6.15)** (8.58)** (10.86)** (2.24)* (7.81)**
Press==tend to trust 0.001 -0.022 -0.015 -0.017 -0.017 -0.001 -0.015
(0.06) (2.52)* (1.20) (2.19)* (2.41)* (0.10) (1.29)
Radio==tend to trust -0.037 0.016 0.01 0.002 0.014 -0.032 0.004
(1.89) (1.52) (0.63) (0.16) (1.56) (1.83) (0.31)
TV==tend to trust 0.036 0.026 0.017 0.028 0.023 0.035 0.002
(1.95) (2.65)** (1.22) (3.10)** (2.81)** (2.17)* (0.14)
Political parties==tend to trust -0.082 -0.041 -0.033 -0.054 -0.04 -0.071 -0.032
(5.65)** (5.02)** (2.54)* (7.38)** (5.81)** (5.67)** (2.71)**
Identity pro european -0.26 -0.217 -0.197 -0.232 -0.21 -0.233 -0.182
(22.15)** (30.60)** (18.42)** (37.53)** (35.44)** (22.51)** (18.58)**
National Pride 0.013 -0.014 -0.003 -0.003 -0.011 0.008 0.005
(0.72) (1.23) (0.14) (0.30) (1.17) (0.53) (0.33)
gender==male -0.081 -0.061 -0.067 -0.068 -0.063 -0.068 -0.063
(6.41)** (8.32)** (6.12)** (10.43)** (10.22)** (10.44)** (10.24)**
couple==with couple -0.022 -0.003 -0.011 -0.008 -0.006 -0.009 -0.007
(1.86) (0.43) (1.06) (1.35) (1.09) (1.36) (1.12)
head==yes 0.028 -0.011 0.012 0.001 -0.004 0.002 -0.004
(2.04)* (1.34) (1.03) (0.19) (0.55) (0.21) (0.52)
edu -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(4.22)** (5.94)** (6.11)** (7.35)** (8.14)** (7.33)** (8.09)**
age 0.001 0 0.001 0 0 0 0
(2.40)* (1.18) (2.29)* (2.33)* (2.38)* (2.38)* (2.39)*
country==france -0.253 -0.154 -0.247 -0.186 -0.189 -0.187 -0.187
(10.30)** (11.43)** (12.81)** (15.28)** (17.01)** (15.33)** (16.81)**
country==belgium -0.317 -0.224 -0.31 -0.256 -0.256 -0.256 -0.256
(14.31)** (19.25)** (18.96)** (24.02)** (26.94)** (24.09)** (26.89)**
country==holand -0.232 -0.175 -0.179 -0.196 -0.179 -0.196 -0.178
(8.11)** (12.47)** (8.23)** (14.91)** (15.13)** (14.88)** (15.04)**
country==germany -0.17 -0.162 -0.22 -0.169 -0.184 -0.169 -0.183
(6.70)** (12.45)** (10.84)** (14.02)** (16.70)** (14.02)** (16.58)**
country==italy -0.339 -0.225 -0.228 -0.263 -0.228 -0.263 -0.228
(15.21)** (17.43)** (10.86)** (23.31)** (20.83)** (23.24)** (20.74)**
country==luxembourg -0.272 -0.228 -0.271 -0.248 -0.245 -0.248 -0.244
(8.13)** (16.20)** (12.62)** (17.56)** (20.75)** (17.59)** (20.66)**
country==denmark -0.069 0.015 -0.105 -0.01 -0.026 -0.01 -0.025
(2.35)* (0.87) (4.21)** (0.62) (1.78) (0.63) (1.69)
country==ireland -0.31 -0.217 -0.298 -0.249 -0.247 -0.249 -0.246
(13.25)** (17.81)** (17.07)** (22.33)** (24.58)** (22.30)** (24.50)**
country==greece -0.345 -0.243 -0.208 -0.277 -0.238 -0.277 -0.237
(15.81)** (22.31)** (9.96)** (27.37)** (23.92)** (27.35)** (23.76)**
country==spain -0.26 -0.222 -0.244 -0.24 -0.232 -0.24 -0.231
(10.28)** (18.67)** (12.15)** (21.14)** (22.36)** (21.08)** (22.31)**
country==portugal -0.298 -0.212 -0.28 -0.242 -0.238 -0.242 -0.237
(12.07)** (17.09)** (15.52)** (20.89)** (23.12)** (20.98)** (22.96)**
country==finland -0.143 -0.103 -0.254 -0.118 -0.159 -0.118 -0.159
(5.35)** (6.90)** (13.29)** (8.80)** (13.45)** (8.77)** (13.39)**
country==sweden 0.037 -0.078 -0.038 -0.051 -0.071 -0.052 -0.07
(1.18) (4.96)** (1.47) (3.48)** (5.29)** (3.50)** (5.20)**
country==austria -0.218 -0.199 -0.261 -0.212 -0.222 -0.212 -0.221
(8.45)** (16.06)** (13.57)** (18.02)** (21.14)** (18.03)** (21.05)**
event==during -0.115 -0.044 -0.083 -0.047













trust european parliament*during -0.030 -0.030
(1.01) (1.15)
not to trust european parliament*during -0.065 -0.071
(1.90) (2.24)*
trust european comission*during 0.044 0.042
(1.64) (1.74)
not to trust european comission*during 0.040 0.051
(1.27) (1.76)
trust ECB*during 0.014 0.050
(0.67) (2.71)**
not to trust ECB*during 0.024 0.019
(0.93) (0.84)
trust press*during -0.020 -0.003
(1.21) (0.22)
trust radio*during 0.052 0.012
(2.31)** (0.67)
trust TV*duirng -0.012 0.034
(0.59) (2.01)*
trust political parties*during 0.038 -0.009
(2.41)** (0.62)
Observations 11250 22774 11582 34024 34356 34024 34356
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%





Chapter 3: Does trust still matter? The causal effect of 






The  relevance  of  trust  in  determining  economic  outcomes  has  received  increasing 
importance during the last decades. The main idea is that trust, viewed as a propensity of 
people in a society to cooperate, makes possible the avoidance of social inefficiency. La 
Porta et al (1997), among others
16, shows that trust promotes cooperation, especially in 
large organizations. They collect indicators for government performance, participation in 
civic and professional societies, relative importance of large firms and social efficiency and 
they show, for the set of countries with information on trust available at the time, that trust 
significantly reduces social inefficiency.  
 
In this chapter, I replicate the results of La Porta et al for a richer set of countries and 
updated information for economic outputs. The significant relevance of trust is observed 
when the sample under analysis is the same as in La Porta, but the effect disappears for 
many of the indicators of social efficiency when using the larger  set of countries. The 
original  set  of  countries  available  for  La  Porta  was  biased  through  the  more 
developed/western  countries.  In  fact,  separate  regressions  for  the  additional  set  of 
countries (mainly African and Asian) do not show any significant role of trust. I introduce a 
more homogeneous country sampling based on the Human Developing Indicators ranking 
from the World Bank, 2008. The two groups correspond to High Human Developed (HHD) 
and Medium Human Developed (MHD) countries. Strikingly, the results show no significant 
effect of trust for most of the indicators in both groups of countries. The sensitivity of the 
                                                           
16 See Knack (2001) for a literature review and Mouw (2006) for a review of recent research estimating the 
causal effect of Social Capital and Trust.  





estimated coefficients to the sampling decision should call into question the conclusions of 
previous research. 
 
More  relevant  than  the  sampling  sensitivity  mentioned  above,  the  main  problem  when 
estimating  the  effect  of  trust  on  social  efficiency  lies  in  the  weak  specification  of  the 
relevant causal relationship. It is true that trust could facilitate cooperation and then, social 
efficiency but it is also true that the observed social efficient institutions could be what 
make  people  trust  others.  To  solve  this  reversed-causality  problem,  which  makes  the 
estimated coefficients spurious in Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions, I introduce an 
innovative  set  of  instruments  for  trust  from  the  area  of  neuroeconomics.  There  are 
experimental studies showing that oxytocin facilitates trusting behavior in humans (Kosfeld 
et  al,  2005;  Baumgartner  et  al,  2008).  If  international  data  on  hormones  levels  were 
available, then oxytocin levels could be a good candidate for explaining society-wide trust 
levels.  Oxytocin  facilitates  trust  but  it  seems  less  probable  that  oxytocin  could  directly 
affect  cooperation  in  large  organizations,  i.e.  oxytocin  correlates  with  trust  but  it  is 
uncorrelated with the stochastic part of the social efficiency variables. Due to the lack of 
international hormone data, Zak and Fakhar (2006) collects data of variables correlated 
with oxytocin (biological, social and environmental factors associated with the hormone‟s 
level) to get a proxy of oxytocin level by country. The authors extract three orthogonal 
factors that explain 70% of the variation on trust in their sample of countries. I reconstruct 
these factors for the updated data set and additional variables correlated to oxytocin. The 
findings support the relevance of trust causing social efficiency: for the sample of High and 
Medium  Human  Developed  countries,  robustness  is  recovered  for  most  of  the  social 
indicators. Further, the effect of trust on social efficiency indicators more than doubled with 
respect to previous estimations, indicating the underestimation of previous results.  
 
The  chapter  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  3.2  shows  the  data  used  and  the  main 
differences with respect to the set available in La Porta et al (1997). It also shows the 
instrument for trust used in the following section. Section 3.3 estimates the role of trust for 
large organizations, using both OLS and IV, and highlights the selection bias that drives 
the results in La Porta et al. Section 3.4 concludes.  





3.2. The data 
Trust and Performance of Large Organizations 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to get the effect of trust on the performance of large 
organizations.  Following  La  Porta  et  al,  the  performance  of  large  organizations  is 
measured  by  government  effectiveness,  participation  in  civic  organizations,  size  of  the 
largest  firms  relative  to  GDP  and  the  performance  of  society  in  general  terms.  The 
measure of trust comes from the second (1989-1993) and fourth (1999-2004) waves of the 
World Value Survey (WVS). The second wave covers data for 42 countries, the sample 
available  for  La  Porta  et  al. The fourth  wave  covers  69  countries.  Trust  by  country  is 
defined as the proportion of people declaring “Generally speaking, I would say that most 
people can be trusted”.  The correlation between the two measures of trust from WVS2 
and WVS4 is high and statistically significant (the coefficient of correlation is 0.86 for the 
38 countries in common).   
 
Table 3.1 describes the variables measuring performance of large organizations. As La 
Porta et al specifies, for government effectiveness updated (subjective) estimates of the 
corruption, bureaucracy quality and tax compliance (a proxy for effectiveness of the tax 
authority)
17 in each country are used from investor surveys. For participation the same 
updated  variables  were  included;  participation  in  civic  activities  and  in  professional 
associations from the WVS. For large organizations, the relative success of large firms is 
constructed  as  sales  over  GDP,  using  the  Forbes  Global  2000  indicator.  It  basically 
selects, for a defined threshold, the biggest firms publicly listed around the world and then 
classifies  them  by  country.  This  measure  is  different  from  the  one  used  by  La  Porta 
because it considers only firms that are classified worldwide as “big companies”, not the 
20 biggest firms by country. Therefore, the measure  used here makes the differences 
across countries more realistic in terms of worldwide presence of large organizations. 
                                                           
17 It was not possible to include in the updated data a measure for efficiency of the judicial system in 
the present study. 





Table 3.1: Description of the Variables, compared to La Porta (1998) 
 
Variable La Porta et al (1998) Present study
Trust in people
Percentage of respondents who answered that most people 
can be trusted when asked: "Generally speaking, would you 
say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too 
careful in dealing with people?" Source: World Values 
Survey 1990-93 (WVS).
Percentage of respondents who answered that most people 
can be trusted when asked: "Generally speaking, would you 
say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too 
careful in dealing with people?" Source: World Values 
Survey 1989/1993 (WVS 2) and 1999/2004 (WVS 4)
Corruption
Low ratings if "high government officials are likely to demand 
special payments and illegal payments are generally 
expected throughout lower levels of government in the form 
of bribes connected with import and export licenses, 
exchange controls, tax assessment, policy protection, or 
loans." Scale from 0 to 10. Average of the months of April 
and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. 
Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).
Low ratings if "high government officials are likely to demand 
special payments and illegal payments are generally 
expected throughout lower levels of government in the form 
of bribes connected with import and export licenses, 
exchange controls, tax assessment, policy protection, or 
loans." Scale from 0 to 6. Value for July 2008. Source: 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).
Bureaucratic 
Quality
High scores indicate "autonomy from political  pressure" and 
"strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in 
policy or interruptions in government services." Scale from 0 
to 10, with higher scores for greater efficiency. Average of 
the months of April and October of the monthly index 
between 1982 and 1995. Source: ICRG
High scores indicate "autonomy from political  pressure" and 
"strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in 
policy or interruptions in government services." Scale from 0 
to 4, with higher scores for greater efficiency. Value for July 
2008. Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).
Tax compliance
Assessment of the level of tax compliance. Scale from 0 to 
6, where higher scores indicate higher compliance. Source: 
The Global Competitiveniess Report 1996 (GCR).
Assessment of the level of tax compliance. Scale from 0 to 
7, where higher scores indicate higher compliance. Source: 
The Global Competitiveniess Report 2007/2008  (GCR).
Civic participation
Percentage of civic activities in which an average individual 
participates. The activities included are: (i) social-welfare 
services for elderly and deprived, (ii) education, art, and 
cultural activities, (iii) local community affairs, (iv) 
conservation, environment, ecology, (v) work with youth, (vi) 
sports or recreation, and (vii) voluntary associations for 
health. Source: WVS
Percentage of civic activities in which an average individual 
participates. The activities included are: (i) social-welfare 
services for elderly and deprived, (ii) education, art, and 
cultural activities, (iii) local community affairs, (iv) 
conservation, environment, ecology, (v) work with youth, (vi) 
sports or recreation, and (vii) voluntary associations for 




Participation in Percentage of respondents who answered 
positively professional when asked if they belonged to 
professional associations associations. Source: WVS
Participation in Percentage of respondents who answered 
positively professional when asked if they belonged to 
professional associations associations. Source: WVS 2 and 
WVS 4.
Sales' top 20/GNP
The ratio of sales generated by the top 20 publicly  traded 
firms to GNP for 1994. Firms within a country are ranked by 
sales. Source: WorldScope Global 1996 data base
The ratio of sales generated by the Forbes Global 2000 
publicly traded firms as of Feb 27 2009, to GDP for 2005. 
Firms within a country are ranked by sales. Source: Forbes 
Global 2000, April 2009.
Adequacy of 
Infrastructure
Average of five scores measuring the extent to which a  
country's infrastructure meets business needs in each of the 
following areas: (i) roads, (ii) air transport, (iii) ports, (iv) 
telecommunications, and (v) power supply. Scale from 0 to 
6, where higher score's are for a superior infrastructure. 
Source: GCR.
Average of five scores measuring the extent to which a  
country's infrastructure meets business needs in each of the 
following areas: (i) roads, (ii) air transport, (iii) ports, (iv) 
telecommunications, and (v) power supply. Scale from 0 to 
7, where higher score's are for a superior infrastructure. 
Source: GCR 2007/2008.
Log of Infant 
Mortality
Logarithm of the number of deaths of infants under one year 
of age per one thousand live births for 1993 or the most 
recent year available. Source: Health-For-All Global 
Indicators Database
Logarithm of the number of deaths of infants under one year 
of age per one thousand live births for 2005 or the most 




Percentage of the 1985 male population aged 25 and  over 
that has completed high school. Source: Robert Barro and 
Jong-Wha Lee ( 1994).





Assessment of the extent to which the educational system 
meets the needs of a competitive economy. system Score 
from 0 to 6, where higher scores are for a superior 
educational system. Source: GCR
Assessment of the extent to which the educational system 
meets the needs of a competitive economy. system Score 
from 0 to 7, where higher scores are for a superior 
educational system. Source: GCR 2007/2008.
Log inflation
Logarithm of the geometric average annual growth rate of the 
implicit price deflator for the time period 1970-1993. Source: 
World Development Report 1995 (WDR95).
Logarithm of the average annual growth rate of the ICP for 
the time period 1990-2005. Source: HDR 2007/2008..
GDP growth
Average annual growth in per capita GDP for the period 1970-
1993. Source: WDR95.
Average annual growth in per capita GDP for the period 1990-
2005. Source: HDR 2007/2008.
Log GNP per capita
Logarithm of the GNP per capita expressed in dollars capita 
of 1994 unless otherwise noted. Source: World 
Developmnent Report 1996.
Logarithm of the GNI per capita, PPP expressed in current 
international dollars. Source: World Bank on-line data set, 
2005.
Trust in family
Rating based on respondents' answers to how much they 
trust their families. Scale from 0 to 4. The highest (lowest) 
rating is awarded when respondents manifest that they trust 
(distrust) their families. Source: WVS.
Percentage of respondents who answered that family can be 
trusted (a little or completely) when asked: "How much do 
you trust your family?" Source: WVS 2 and WVS 4. 
Hierarchical religion
Percentage of the population of each country that are 
religion Roman Catholic, Eastem Orthodox, or Muslim. 
Sources: Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations 1995, 
Statistical Abstract of the World 1994.
Percentage of the population of each country that are 
religion Roman Catholic, Eastem Orthodox, or Muslim. 
Sources: WVS 2 and WVS 4.





Finally,  the  variables  reflecting  social  efficiency  are  related  to  the  effectiveness  of  the 
government and other institutions in society as well (inflation, GDP growth, infant mortality 
rate, rate of enrollment in tertiary education, adequacy of infrastructure and adequacy of 
educational  system).  They  come  from  the  same  sources  as  La  Porta,  except  by 
“Completed high school”. In the present study, a measure of the percentage of population 
enrolled in tertiary education is included, taken from the World Bank Indicators. 
 
The set used by La Porta seems to have a “selection/availability” bias through European 
countries (see appendix 3.1 for the list of countries in each sample). As can be seen in 
Table 3.2, more than 35% of the additional countries, with respect to La Porta, are Asian 
showing the under representation of these countries in the original sample. Overall, the 
additional countries are poorer both in GDP and GDP per capita, show smaller degrees of 
trust, worse indices for adequacy of infrastructure and adequacy of educational system, 
higher levels of corruption and more than doubled infant mortality rate. Overall, the original 
sample used by La Porta and the richer sample available for this study are not equivalent 
and the conclusions derived by La Porta should take into account this evident problem. La 
Porta briefly justifies the sample used by commenting about the lack of data for Eastern 
European countries. There is no mention about the under representation of African and 
Asian countries.  
 
I introduce a sampling based on the Human Development Index (HDI), World Bank 2008. 
HDI is a composite statistic used as an index/glossary to rank countries by level of "human 
development"  and  separate  developed  (high  development),  developing  (middle 
development),  and  underdeveloped  (low  development)  countries.  The  statistic  is 
composed  from  statistics  for  Life  Expectancy,  Education,  Standard  of  living  and  GDP 
collected at national level. Given the data available, I have 43 countries qualifying as High 
Human Developed (HHD), 21 as Medium Human Developed (MHD) and 2 as Low Human 
Developed (LHD). I decided to include Tanzania and Nigeria, the two LHD countries, into 
the sample of MHD in what follows, given they are very close in the ranking (see appendix 
3.2 for the list of countries in each group).   
   





Table 3.2: Summary statistics for sample of countries common to La Porta (1998), 
the additional countries available in the present study and the whole sample. 
 
 
Table  3.3  reports  summary  statistics  for  HHD  and  MHD  countries.  At  first  sight,  we 
observe better average indicators for HHD in comparison to MHD, in line with the intuition. 
The standard deviation for most of the indicators is smaller than the sampling shown in 
table 3.2. This is consistent with the more homogeneous sampling intention. 
 
Table  3.3:  Summary  statistics  for  High  Human  Developed  and  Medium  &  Low 
Human Developed countries. 
 
Variable
Mean Std. Dev . Mean Std. Dev . Mean Std. Dev .
Trust (proportion people that trust) 0.31 0.15 0.25 0.15 0.28 0.15
Corruption (higher means less corrupted) 3.37 1.23 2.50 1.09 2.98 1.26
Bureaucracy Quality (the higher the better) 2.97 0.95 2.22 0.89 2.65 0.99
GDP 2005 (billions US dollars) 969 2113 87 86 614 1687
GDP percapita 2005 (US dollars) 20187 16218 7492 16006 14811 17268
Inflation 1990-2005 (%) 15.62 27.98 13.03 15.01 15.15 23.65
Tax Compliance (higher indicated higher compliance) 3.39 0.86 3.66 0.89 3.44 0.83
Adequacy of Infrastructure (the higher the better) 4.79 1.15 3.60 1.02 4.24 1.22
Adequacy of Educational System (the higher the better) 4.33 0.98 3.44 0.84 3.94 0.98
Infant Mortality Rate 2005 (over 1000 live births) 12.38 18.85 27.73 24.83 19.72 23.07
Sales biggest firms/GDP 0.43 0.43 0.31 0.96 0.36 0.69
N 39 27 66
European 67% 33% 53%
African 5% 22% 12%
American 13% 7% 11%
Asian 15% 37% 25%
Common countries Additional countries Whole sample
Variable
Mean Std. Dev . Mean Std. Dev . Mean Std. Dev .
Trust (proportion people that trust) 0.30 0.14 0.25 0.16 0.28 0.15
Corruption (higher means less corrupted) 3.40 1.26 2.20 0.81 2.98 1.26
Bureaucracy Quality (the higher the better) 3.10 0.89 1.84 0.56 2.65 0.99
GDP 2005 (billions US dollars) 828 2047 223 472 614 1687
GDP percapita 2005 (US dollars) 21954 17788 1768 1580 14811 17268
Inflation 1990-2005 (%) 14.12 26.59 16.98 17.62 15.15 23.65
Tax Compliance (higher indicated higher compliance) 3.42 0.89 3.49 0.71 3.44 0.83
Adequacy of Infrastructure (the higher the better) 4.75 1.17 3.34 0.65 4.24 1.22
Adequacy of Educational System (the higher the better) 4.27 0.96 3.33 0.69 3.94 0.98
Infant Mortality Rate 2005 (over 1000 live births) 7.31 5.09 42.39 25.85 19.72 23.07
Sales biggest firms/GDP 0.49 0.82 0.11 0.16 0.36 0.69
N 43 23 66
European 9% 76% 53%
African 34% 0% 12%
American 9% 12% 11%
Asian 48% 12% 24%










Instruments for Trust 
 
The key problem estimating the effect of trust on social efficiency indicators is the potential 
reverse-causality:  trust  facilitates  cooperation  and  diminishes  inefficiencies  but  also  it 
could be that these more efficient institutions create the environment for people to trust. 
Technically, trust correlates with the stochastic part of the social indicators we want to 
explain, making the estimated coefficient for trust spurious.  
 
Mouw (2008) examines recent attempts to estimate the causal effect of social capital and 
trust. One of the possible solutions is to find an IV (instrumental variable) that is correlated 
with the independent variable of interest but not with unobserved factors. I introduce here 
a  set  of  instruments  from  the  area  of  neuroeconomics,  proposed  by  Zak  and  Fakhar 
(2006). Experimental research shows that oxytocin facilitates trusting behavior in humans 
(Kosfeld et al, 2005; Baumgartner et al, 2008). Following the methodology of Zak and 
Fakhar, I construct a set of instruments that attempt to measure country oxytocin levels. 
This set of instruments should correlate with trust but not with the unobserved factors of 
the social indicators we want to explain.   
 
La Porta et al instrument regressions using a measure of hierarchical religion. According to 
Putman  (1993),  trust  is  a  habit  formed  during  a  centuries-long  history  of  “horizontal 
networks  association”  between  people.  The  author  argues  that  the  imposition  of 
hierarchical  structures  on  the  society  has  discouraged  the formation  of  trust.  La  Porta 
identifies  the  percentage  of  population  belonging  to  a  hierarchical  religion  (defined  as 
Catholic, Muslim or Orthodox) by country. The first stage regression (trust on hierarchical 
religion and log of per capita Gross National Income) for the original sample in La Porta 
explains around 42% of the variation in trust, with estimated coefficient for hierarchical 
religion negative, high and statistically significant. For the set of High Human Developed 
countries,  the  first  stage  regression  explains  44%  of  the  variation  of  trust  also  with 
negative and statistically significant estimated coefficient. However, hierarchical religion 
does not have any explanatory power for the Medium Human Developed set of countries 





weakening  the  theoretical  argument  of  Putman,  at  least  for  less  developed  countries. 
Therefore,  the  introduction  of  the  instruments  for  trust  coming  from  the  area  of 
neuroeconomics becomes more attractive.  
 
Recent neuroeconomics experiments with humans have demonstrated that trust between 
two random individuals is facilitated by oxytocin (Kosfeld et al, 2005; Baumgartner et al, 
2008).   It  has  also been  showed  that  an  increase  in  oxytocin  level  is  associated  with 
trustworthy behavior (Zak et al, 2004). Therefore, if we could measure the level of oxytocin 
by country it would be expected to qualify as good instrument for trust.  
 
I  will  briefly  describe  the  experiments  above  in  order  to  more  easily  understand  how 
oxytocin  operates  in  causing trusting  behavior.  It  is  important to know  that  oxytocin  is 
synthesized in the brain (specifically, paraventricular nucleus and the supraoptic nucleus 
of  the  hypothalamus).  One  of  its  functions  in  the  central  system  is  to  act  as  a 
neuromodulator; an endogenous chemical which relays, amplifies and modulates signals 
between a neuron and another cell. It does this through the process of receptor binding to 
a  neuroreceptor,  which  triggers  a  response  in  the  neuron  to  alter  its  functioning.  The 
olfactory  bulb  has  a  collection  of  oxytocin  receptors,  which  is  crucial  for  experiment‟s 
design.  The  experiment  consists  of  two  individuals  (the  investors  and  the  trustee) 
interacting anonymously in a trust game with real monetary stakes. The investor is given 
an initial endowment which he can keep or invest. Investment here is represented by a 
costly trusting action. If the investor transfers money to the trustee, the amount transferred 
triples. The trustee is informed about the investor‟s transfer and then he has to decide to 
honor the investor‟s trust by sharing the monetary increase generated by the investor‟s 
transfer.  Before  starting  the  game,  half  of  the  sample  of  individuals  where  randomly 
administrated a single dose of intranasal oxytocin (treatment group) and the other half a 
placebo (control group). The results show that investors in the treatment group exhibited 
higher money transfers than those in the control group.  
 
   





Table 3.3: Description of the input variables for neuroactive hormone instruments, 
compared to Zak and Fakhar (2006). 
 
Zak and Fakhar (2006) Present study
Percentage of respondents who answered that most people 
can be trusted when asked: "Generally speaking, would you 
say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too 
careful in dealing with people?" Source: World Values Survey 
1995-96 (WVS 3).
Percentage of respondents who answered that most people 
can be trusted when asked: "Generally speaking, would you 
say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too 
careful in dealing with people?" Source: World Values Survey 
1994/1999 (WVS 3) and 1999/2004 (WVS 4)
real income per capita in international prices, 1985. Source: 
Summers and Heston, 1991.
GNI per capita, PPP expressed in thouisand current 
international dollars. Source: World Bank on-line data set, 
1990-2005
Total breastfeeding
percent of breastfed infants.Exclusive breastfeeding rate (<4 
months) + time complementary breastfeeding rate (6–9 
months) + continued breastfeeding rate (12–15 months) + 
continued breastfeeding rate (20–23 months). Source: 
Breastfeeding indicators, UNICEF Global database.
percent of breastfed infants.Exclusive breastfeeding rate (<4 
months) + time complementary breastfeeding rate (6–9 
months) + continued breastfeeding rate (12–15 months) + 
continued breastfeeding rate (20–23 months). Source: 
Breastfeeding indicators, UNICEF Global database.
Fertility Rate
total births per woman. Source: World Development Indicators 
database, World Bank, 1990.
total births per woman. Source: World Development Indicators 
database, World Bank, Average 1989-1993 and 1999-2004.
Female population
percentage of total population. Source: World Development 
Indicators database, World Bank, 1990.
percentage of total population. Source: World Development 
Indicators database, World Bank, Average 1989-1993 and 
1999-2004.
Sex frequency
respondents from the Global Sex Survey 2002 answering the 
question: „„How often do you have sex‟‟. Source: Durex Global 
Survey.
respondents from the Global Sex Survey 2007. % of 
population that has sex weekly or more. Source: Durex Global 
Survey.
Ownership
households in occupied housing units, % owner. Source: 




percentage of the total population. Source: World 
Development Indicators database, World Bank, 1990
percentage of the total population. Source: World 
Development Indicators database, World Bank, Average 1989-
1993 and 1999-2004.
Religion Variables
International Social Survey Programme. Source: 
http://www.issp.org/
Percentage of the population of each country. Source: CIA 
World Factbook, 2006. 
Thelephone usage
mainlines per 1000 population. Source: World Bank: World 
Development Indicators
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 100 people). 
Source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 
Average 1989-1993 and 1999-2004.
Internet Users
Internet users (per 100 people). Source: World Development 
Indicators database, World Bank, Average 1989-1993 and 
1999-2004.
Density
population per square mile Source: Population Reference 
Bureau, 1996, World Population Data, United Nations 
Population Division.
Population density (people per sq. km). Source: World 
Development Indicators database, World Bank, Average 1989-
1993 and 1999-2004.
Distance from the 
Equator




in degrees and minutes, of various major cities around the 
world. Source: http://www.maxmind.com/app/country_latlon, 
CIA World Factbook
Biodiversity
nationally protected area (% of land protected). Source: The 
Little Green Data Book, 2001, World Bank Indicators
nationally protected area (% of land protected). Source: World 
Development Indicators database, World Bank, 2004
Water Pollution
emissions of organic water pollutants: (kgs per day per worker 
1998) * 360 Emissions of organic water pollutants are 
measured in terms of biochemical oxygen demand (the 
amount of oxygen that bacteria in water will consume in 
breaking down waste). Source: World Development Indicators, 
Table 3.6. World Bank
Organic water pollutant (BOD) emissions (kg per day per 
worker). Emissions of organic water pollutants are measured 
in terms of biochemical oxygen demand (the amount of 
oxygen that bacteria in water will consume in breaking down 
waste). Source: World Development Indicators database, 
World Bank, Average 1989-1993 and 1999-2004.
Air Pollution three types: (Metric tonnes per capita)
Airp1: total suspended particulates refer to smoke, soot, dust, 
and liquid droplets from combustion.
CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) 
Airp2: sulfur dioxide (SO2) is an air pollutant produced when 
fossil fuels containing sulfur are burned.
Nitrous oxide emissions (thousand metric tons of CO2 
equivalent) 
Airp3: nitrogen dioxide (NO2) is a poisonous, pungent gas 
formed when nitric oxide combines with hydrocarbons and 
sunlight.
Other greenhouse gas emissions, HFC, PFC and SF6 
(thousand metric tons of CO2 equivalent) 
Source: 1998 World Development Indicators, World Bank Source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 
Average 1989-1993 and 1999-2004.
dietary intake of phytoestrogens (ug/day) * 360 based on the  dietary intake of phytoestrogens (ug/day) * 365 based on the 
questionnaire in selected population. questionnaire in selected population.
Food types: (1) peas, dry; (2) beans, dry; (3) infant food; (4) 
rye: rye, flour rye, bran rye; (5) bovine meat: beef veal, beef 
boneless, beef dried salted and smoked, meat extracts, 
sausage beef, beef preparations, beef canned, meat 
homogenized, buffalo meat; (6) soybeans and products: 
soybeans, soya sauce, soya paste, soya curd; (7) spices: 
vanilla, cinnamon, nutmeg, anise, ginger, spices; (8) tea: tea, 
extract tea, mate.
Food types: (1) Legumes: peas, beans, pulses and other 
pulses; (2) Nuts & Oil Seeds: nuts and products, sesame 
seed; (3) Vegetables: olive oil, tomamtoes, vegetables, other 
vegetables & products, olives; (4) Fruits: dates, oranges, 
grapes, apples, banana, grapefruit; (5) Cereals and Bread: rye, 
wheat, rice (6) Soya products: soya beans and products (7) 
Beverage, no alcoholic: coffee and products, tea (8) Beverage, 
alcohol: wine, barely beer. 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations.
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 







Exposure to estrogen-like molecules in the enviroment
Trust in people





Given that international data on hormones levels are unavailable, Zak and Fakhar (2006) 
provides  evidence  showing  that  oxytocin  levels  are  related  to  international  levels  of 
generalized trust. They collect data for three areas that are expected to be correlated with 
oxytocin  and  estrogen
18  levels:  biological  processes  that  directly  impact  oxytocin,  the 
exposure  to  estrogen-like  molecules  in  the  environment  and  frequency  of  social 
interactions.  The  authors  discuss  previous  research  showing  that  oxytocin  appears  to 
stimulate, and be stimulated by, positive social interactions. It has been empirically shown 
that  oxytocin  increases  when  a  person  receives  an  intentional  trust  signal  (Zak  et  al, 
2004), which is more probable to happen in more social interactive environments. 
 
The authors use factor analysis as a reduction method to capture the common variance 
between the sets of variables theoretically correlated with oxytocin. Many of the variables 
are highly correlated. Therefore, simultaneously testing all of them would give a spurious 
result. Further, each variable imperfectly reflects oxytocin or estrogens levels, which also 
prevents us from carrying out a one-by-one examination.  
 
The authors extract three orthogonal factors that together explain 70% of the variation in 
trust.  Table  3.3  shows  the  associated  variables  used  to  construct  the  factors,  a  brief 
description  and  sources.  A  first  problem  presents  itself  when  collecting  some  of  the 
variables used. Information for Sex Frequency and Breast Feeding is not available for an 
important set of countries in their sample (Sex frequency is available only for 18 countries 
and  breast  feeding  for  16,  for  a  sample  size  of  39  countries
19).  Ownership  was  not 
included because of source accessibility. Finally, and most importantly, some doubts arise 
with respect to the collection of the percentage of phytoestrogens in food. The authors 
collected  the  information  from  a  variety  of  sources,  not  homogeneous  relative  to  the 
                                                           
18 “Animal studies indicate that estrogens facilitates oxytocin uptake by increasing receptor binding and 
expanding the number of oxytocin receptors (Verbalis, 1999)” Zak and Fakhar (2006). 
19 The original sample of Zak was 41 countries available in the WVS3 and WVS2. In this study, the WVS3 used 
is an updated version corrected by the official source in 2006, after reported mistakes in the original version. 
As a consequence, data for New Zealand and Taiwan are not included in the present study. For details about 
the replication of Zak methodology, see Appendix 3.3.  





scientific  method  to measure  the  content  of  phytoestrogens  in food. In  a  recent  work, 
Schwartz, Sontag and Plumb (2009) presents an inventory of phytoestrogens datasets, 
concluding that nowadays there is better and more accurate information than available for 
Zak.  I  select  a  recent  study  that  uses  the  same  method  for  a  wider  variety  of  foods 
(Thompson, Boucher, Liu, Cotterchio and Kreiger, 2006). The phytoestrogens measured in 
this  study  are:  Isoflavones  (formononetin,  daidzein,  genistein,  glycitein),  Coumestans 
(courmestrol)  and  Lignans  (matairesinol,  lariciresinol,  pinoresinol,  secoisolariciresinol). 
Finally, Telephone usage now also includes mobiles and a measure of Internet users was 
included as an extra social interaction variable.  
 
A detailed replication of the Zak methodology can be seen in Appendix 3.3. For the same 
set  of  countries  as  Zak  (N=39)  but  for  the  updated  data  set  (i.e.  1999-2004),  the 
methodology generates three factors that explain 42% of the variation in trust (together 
with GNI per capita). For the High Human Developed countries, the first stage regression 
explains 60% of the trust variation; for the Medium Human Developed set of countries, 
50%.  Overall, the factors extracted seem to qualify as good instruments for trust, invariant 
to the sampling decisions.  
 
Table  3.4  shows  the  rotated  loading  factor  matrix  (Varimax  rotation  with  Kaiser 
normalization) after factor analysis for the 24 hormone-correlate variables included in this 
study,  for  the  two  groups  of  countries:  High  Human  Developed  and  Medium  Human 
Developed. Factor assignments were made based on the largest loadings.  
 
   





Table 3.4: Rotated factor matrix.  
 
  
Most  of  the  loading  factors  support  the  intuition.  One  of  the  exceptions  is  the  female 
population for HHD countries, which does not seem to have a positive relation to oxytocin. 
Religious  association  has  negative  loadings  for  most  hierarchical  classes  in  MHD 
countries in contrast to the positive effect for HHD countries. Notice the similarity among 
variables  loaded  in  each  factor  across  samples:  two  of  them  mainly  loading 
phytoestrogens and the one left, social interaction.   
 
The first, second and third factors for the HHD countries account for 25%, 18% and 14%, 
respectively,  of  the  overall  inter-country  variance  among  the  24  hormone-correlate 
variables included in the analysis. In the sample of MHD countries, these magnitudes are 
25%, 18% and 12%.  
Extracted Factors
f1 f2 f3 f1 f2 f3
Biological 0.42
Fertility rate 0.41
Female population -0.47 0.34
Social Interaction
Internet usage 0.85 0.77
Fixed and mobile phones 0.81 0.69








Estrogens-like molecules in the enviroment
Latitud 0.33 0.69
Water pollution -0.28 -0.17
Protected land areas 0.45 0.43










Extraction Method: Factor Analysis. Rotation: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
High Human Developed Medium Human Developed





There  are  two  factors  in  each  sample  mainly  related  to  the  dietary  intake  of 
phytoestrogens. In general, the majority of phytoestrogens belong to a large group known 
as  flavoids  (isoflavones,  coumestans  and  prenyl  flavonoids).  They  possess  the  most 
potent known oestrogenic activity.  A class of non-flavonoids, the lignans, has also been 
identified.  Even  though  they  are  not  thought  to  be  oestrogenics  themselves,  they  are 
converted to oestrogenic compounds by the gut microflora (Bakker, 2004).  As can be see 
here, the first factor in each sample collects mainly lignans loading. The second factor for 
HHD and the third factor for MHD collect isoflavones. Therefore, I will call them lignan-
factor  and  isoflavon-factor,  respectively.  The  left  factor  has  mainly  social  and 
environmental loading reason so it is referred to as eco-social-factor in what follows. 
 
The first stage OLS regression of trust on these three factors, with the logarithm of GNI per 
capita as a covariate control, explains 60% of the variation in trust for the HHD sample. 
The eco-social factor is positively and statistically significantly related to trust (p=0.000, t-
test). The lignan and isoflavon factors have non-different from zero effects on trust (p=0.9 
and p=0.2, t-test). In the case of MHD countries, the first stage regression explains 50% of 
the  variation  in  trust.  The  eco-social  factor  is  negatively  and  statistically  significantly 
related  to trust  (p=0.01,  t-test). The  isoflavon-social  factor  is  positively  and  statistically 
significantly related to trust (p=0.03, t-test). Finally, the lignan-factor has non-different from 
zero effect on trust (p=0.46, t-test). 
 
Therefore, it seems that the dietary intake of isoflavones is more relevant in accounting for 
oxytocin  levels  in  MHD  countries  than  in  HHD  countries.  Results  also  interestingly 
demonstrate  the  negative  effect  on  trust  coming  from  the  eco-social  factor  in  MHD 
countries,  which  could  reflect  the  worse  quality  of  social  interaction  in  less  developed 
countries.  
   





3.3. Regression analysis, the role of trust. 
 
In  what  follows,  I  will  test  the  hypothesis  that  trust  affects  the  performance  of  large 
organizations,  measured  by  government  effectiveness,  participation  in  civic  and 
professional  associations,  size  or  large  firms  relative  to  GDP  and  the  performance  of 
society in general terms, following La Porta et al (1997). The causal effect of trust on social 
efficiency indicators is estimated using Neuroactive Hormone Factors as instruments for 
trust. The samples analyzed correspond to High Human Developed (HHD) and Medium 
Human Developed (MHD) countries. 
 
Table 3.5 shows the original OLS regressions from la Porta et al and the regressions using 
the updated data for the same sample as La Porta. The different measures of performance 
of large organizations are regressed on trust, controlling for the log of 2005 per capita 
GDP.  To  interpret  the  coefficients,  we  use  a  one  standard  deviation  change  in  trust 
(approximately 0.15 percentage points) holding GPD per capita constant. The similarity of 
the results is remarkable. Corruption decreases by 0.4 of a standard deviation
20 and the 
index for bureaucracy quality improves by 0.3 of a standard deviation, the same as in La 
Porta. Participation in civic and professional associations increases a bit less than in La 
Porta (0.5 and 0.4 of a standard deviation compared to 0.7 and 1.0 standard deviation). 
The  result for  Sales  of biggest  firms/GDP  is  quite  similar  (0.3  of  a  standard  deviation 
compared  to  0.5),  whereas  my  results  are  higher  for  Adequacy  of  Infrastructure  and 
Educational System. Even though the coefficients for Tax Compliance, Log Infant Mortality 
Rate,  Enrollment  in  Tertiary  Education  and  GDP  growth  have  theoretically  consistent 
signs, they are not statistically significant different from zero.   
 
The results above are not robust to sampling decisions. Table 3.6 shows OLS regressions 
for  HHD  and  MHD  countries.  For  the  HHD  sample  only  three  specifications  show  a 
statistically  significant  role  of  trust:  civic  participation,  participation  in  professional 
associations and adequacy of educational system. In the case of MHD countries, only one 
                                                           
20 Higher scores means less corruption. 





of the Government Efficiency variables and three out of six indicators in the category of 
social efficiency display significance.  
 
Table 3.5: Comparison of OLS regressions, sample of countries available for La 
Porta et al. 
 
Table  3.6:  OLS  regressions,  High  Human  Developed  and  Medium  Human 
Developed countries. 
 































0.9214 1.1596 0.3595 0.0127 -0.0072 0.0103 0.5943 -0.4598 1.2884 0.2200 0.0371 -0.2738
(0.10)*** (0.19)*** (0.09)*** (0.00)*** (0.01) (0.03) (0.06)*** (0.05)*** (0.44)*** (0.09)*** (0.08) (0.15)*
Trust in people 4.8068 3.9797 1.733 0.1224 0.3056 0.4927 1.2511 -1.0283 10.9714 1.2334 -3.4128 2.0266
(0.71)*** (1.35)*** (0.58)*** (0.03)*** (0.07)*** (0.17)*** (0.42)*** (0.52)** (3.46)*** (0.68)** (1.15)*** (1.22)*
Constant -2.3608 -4.0842 -0.9124 -0.0921 0.033 -0.0374 -1.6559 6.9682 -7.4405 0.8525 3.1306 3.5847
(0.90)*** (1.6763)** (0.78) (0.03)*** (0.07) (0.28) (0.58)*** (0.45)*** (3.53)** (0.77) (0.65)*** (1.36)***
Observations 33 33 32 33 33 26 32 40 29 32 37 39
Adjusted R-squared  0.7316 0.6806 0.354 0.4614 0.5492 0.2433 0.7222 0.7141 0.3474 0.2107 0.2059 0.0072
Halbert White (1980) corrected standard errors in parentheses































0.943 0.831 -0.235 0.038 0.033 0.195 0.973 -1.035 17.6290 0.5470 -0.929 -0.503
(5.93)*** (4.24)*** (2.02)* (2.28)** (1.73)* (2.35)** (7.41)*** (16.37)*** (7.58)*** (3.15)*** (3.42)*** (0.86)
Trust in people 3.257 1.764 0.195 0.194 0.15 1.257 2.589 -0.446 14.541 3.383 -2.819 2.721
(4.39)*** (2.65)** (0.23) (2.98)*** (3.19)*** (2.66)** (4.40)*** (1.06) (0.92) (5.52)*** (2.57)** (1.13)
Constant -6.797 -5.661 5.605 -0.352 -0.312 -1.884 -5.495 12.196 -125.804 -2.05 11.724 6.486
(4.59)*** (3.11)*** (4.89)*** (2.21)** (1.73)* (2.33)** (4.59)*** (18.75)*** (5.68)*** (1.26) (4.57)*** (1.22)
Observations 38 38 37 37 37 37 35 38 38 37 38 38
R-squared 0.61 0.62 0.04 0.45 0.35 0.39 0.69 0.80 0.51 0.58 0.47 0.09
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Government Efficiency Participation Social efficiency
Log GNI per capita 
2005
Government Efficiency Participation Social efficiency
































1.514 1.364 0.315 0.038 0.034 0.928 1.609 -0.865 5.403 0.8460 -1.697 -0.715
(6.00)*** (5.93)*** (0.97) (2.05)** (1.63) (2.00)* (6.56)*** (6.81)*** (0.62) (3.58)*** (4.10)*** (0.72)
Trust in people 1.915 -0.018 -0.538 0.188 0.13 -0.561 1.162 0.247 30.946 2.304 -1.311 -1.324
(1.62) (0.02) (0.37) (2.42)** (2.30)** (0.45) (1.62) (0.39) (1.21) (2.54)** (0.95) (1.00)
Constant -12.229 -10.443 0.454 -0.343 -0.306 -8.497 -11.501 10.273 -10.802 -4.782 18.9 10.044
(5.22)*** (4.75)*** (0.16) (2.02)* (1.60) (2.05)** (5.17)*** (8.98)*** (0.13) (2.25)** (4.82)*** (1.01)
Observations 40 40 41 41 41 43 39 42 39 41 41 42
R-squared 0.57 0.64 0.02 0.47 0.32 0.35 0.74 0.59 0.13 0.56 0.58 0.07






























-0.217 0.012 -0.055 -0.055 -0.049 0.07 0.528 -0.439 8.966 -0.0780 0.467 -0.732
(1.10) (0.08) (0.28) (2.75)** (2.46)** (1.46) (3.32)*** (3.31)*** (3.06)*** (0.56) (2.01)* (1.43)
Trust in people 1.254 0.653 2.516 -0.117 -0.075 0.121 1.782 -0.362 -17.315 1.671 -1.024 8.215
(1.50) (0.97) (2.94)*** (1.38) (0.88) (0.43) (2.78)** (0.57) (1.73) (1.77)* (1.18) (2.30)**
Constant 3.745 1.585 3.388 0.564 0.494 -0.485 -1.337 7.183 -49.12 3.514 -1.16 5.523
(2.39)** (1.20) (2.36)** (3.53)*** (2.80)** (1.37) (1.14) (6.85)*** (2.02)* (3.39)*** (0.66) (1.28)
Observations 21 21 21 15 16 22 21 22 21 21 22 22
R-squared 0.14 0.04 0.3 0.44 0.42 0.13 0.48 0.32 0.32 0.13 0.17 0.28
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Government Efficiency Participation Social efficiency
Log GNI per capita 
2005
Government Efficiency Participation Social efficiency
Log GNI per capita 
2005





To get the causal effect of trust on social efficiency indicators, I instrument trust using the 
neuroactive  hormone  factors  presented  in  section  III:  eco-social,  lignan  and  isoflavon 
factors.  As mentioned before, the first stage regression explains 60% of the total variation 
of trust for HHD countries and 50% for MHD countries.  Table 3.7 reports the IV regression 
using the neuroactive hormone factors as instruments for trust. It is important to notice that 
the  extraction  of  the factors  to  instrument  trust  is  done  separately for each  sample of 
countries.  
 
Table 3.7: IV regressions. Instrument: Neuroactive hormone factors  
 
 
The findings support the relevance of trust in causing efficiency in general but not for the 
specification for Large Organizations. The positive effect of trust on the measure for large 
organizations  in  La  Porta  was  an  important  empirical  support  for  the  argument  of 
Fukuyama (1995). In the present study we cannot reject that generalized trust has no 
effect on the size of firms.  
 































1.014 0.978 0.11 0.007 -0.005 1.076 1.367 -0.895 1.744 0.3730 -1.605 -0.484
(2.27)** (3.67)*** (0.25) (0.36) (0.25) (2.04)** (4.03)*** (6.46)*** (0.18) (1.03) (4.03)*** (0.41)
Trust in people 4.913 1.819 1.019 0.349 0.359 -1.301 2.787 0.303 60.206 5.409 -0.815 -3.001
(2.31)** (1.79)* (0.43) (2.57)** (1.94)* (0.76) (1.83)* (0.33) (1.87)* (2.83)*** (0.70) (1.13)
Constant -8.149 -7.131 1.983 -0.09 0.016 -9.745 -9.602 10.56 16.211 -1.036 17.774 8.235
(2.08)** (2.92)*** (0.54) (0.50) (0.09) (2.08)** (3.30)*** (8.88)*** (0.18) (0.34) (4.75)*** (0.71)
Observations 38 38 40 38 38 40 38 40 37 40 39 40
Robust z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%































-0.201 -0.048 -0.069 -0.049 -0.046 0.059 0.509 -0.511 9.678 -0.1190 0.452 -0.860
(1.04) (0.28) (0.38) (2.66)*** (2.44)** (1.16) (3.39)*** (3.76)*** (2.97)*** (0.93) (2.07)** (1.27)
Trust in people 2.038 2.491 3.245 -0.344 -0.206 0.291 2.095 0.531 -37.57 1.536 -1.517 14.459
(1.55) (2.08)** (1.90)* (1.98)** (1.58) (0.73) (1.65)* (0.44) (1.69)* (1.54) (0.98) (2.70)***
Constant 3.369 1.601 3.351 0.554 0.493 -0.436 -1.228 7.588 -49.74 3.931 -0.875 4.865
(2.19)** (1.17) (2.68)*** (3.86)*** (3.02)*** (1.20) (1.25) (8.03)*** (1.90)* (4.10)*** (0.55) (0.88)
Observations 20 20 20 14 15 21 20 21 20 20 21 21
Robust z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Government Efficiency Participation Social efficiency
Log GNI per capita 
2005
Government Efficiency Participation Social efficiency
Log GNI per capita 
2005





In  the  case  of  HHD  countries,  we  observed  the  estimated  coefficients  for  trust  are 
statistically significant for most of the specifications. These better estimated coefficients 
doubled  in  magnitude  the  coefficients  obtained  in  the  OLS  regressions,  revealing  the 
underestimation  in  previous  results.    Trust  reduces  corruption,  improves  bureaucracy 
quality, facilitates participation and impacts positively on the adequacy of infrastructure 
and educational system indicators, as well as on the rate of people enrolling in tertiary 
education.  
 
For the sample of MHD countries, robustness is recovered for the specification related to 
Government Efficiency and Social Efficiency. The magnitude of the estimated coefficients 
for trust is again higher in comparison to their analogues OLS regressions. It is interesting 
to notice that trust seems to reduce participation and enrollment in tertiary education for 
this sample of countries. One possible explanation for the negative effect on participation 
could be related to the quality of these kinds of institutions in the countries. The indicators 
available  for  participation  could  be  capturing  something  other  than  the  simple  fact  of 
participating  in  “healthy”  associations.  If  they  are  associated  with  corrupted  groups  of 
people or politically manipulated institutions, the effect of trust being negative would be 
correctly reflecting the negative impact of corruption, for example. In the case of tertiary 
education, the original measure in La Porta was Completed High School, attempting to 
account for social efficiency in the sense of the share of educated population. For the 
sample  of  HHD  countries,  our  measure  of  enrollment  in  tertiary  education  is  probably 
highly correlated with completed high school, because most of the people that finish high 
school  in  more  developed  countries  continue  studying.  However,  in  less  developed 
countries the direct link between finishing high school and going further is not clear any 
more. The self selection through working status could bias the results here. Also, if tertiary 
education requires fees, omitted variables referred to the population distribution of income 
could also be making the result spurious. 
 
Overall, the causal effect of generalized trust on variables that capture the efficiency of 
societies as a whole has been estimated. The results confirm the relevant role of trust 
facilitating cooperation and then, reducing social inefficiencies.    







The main contribution of this chapter is the estimation of the causal effect of generalized 
trust on reducing social inefficiencies in societies. The magnitude of the effect is doubled 
with  respect  to  previous  results  and  the  role  of  trust  seems  to  be  relevant  both  in 
developed and developing countries.  
 
The instrument for trust that makes it possible to estimate the causal effect is based on 
neuroeconomic research. Oxytocin facilitates trusting behavior in humans and following 
Zak and Fakhar (2006) we have constructed a set of instruments that attempts to capture 
international  levels  of  oxytocin.  The  instruments  perform  better  than  previous  attempts 
using hierarchical religion in each country as an instrument for trust, following Putman 
(1993).  For  less  developed  countries,  the  Putman  argument  does  not  work,  i.e.  the 
imposition of hierarchical religions has no relation to the level of generalized trust for the 
sample  of  Medium  Human  Developed  countries.  In  the  present  study  the  neuroactive 
hormones factors explain generalized trust satisfactorily in High Human Developed as well 
as in Medium Human Developed countries.  
 
 





Appendix 3.1: List of countries 
 
Common set of countries between 
present study and La Porta et al (1998) 



































































   





Appendix 3.2: Human Development Indicators 
 
















































Egypt, Arab Rep. 
India 
Indonesia 


















(*) Low Human Developed countries. 





Appendix 3.3: Zak and Fakhar (2006) Replication 
 
The main purpose of this section is to replicate the factor extraction done by Zak and 
Fakhar  (2006).  They  get  three  orthogonal  factors  that,  together  with  GNI  per  capita, 
account  for  70%  of  the  international  variation  of  trust.  Therefore,  these  factors  would 
qualify as good instruments to get the causal effect of trust on social efficiency indicators. I 
used data contemporary to the one available for Zak et al to understand the procedure 
(see  Table  3.3  in  section  3.2).  After  correcting  some  limitations  and  introducing  new 
neuroactive hormone related variables I obtain three factors that account for almost 60% 
of the variation of trust for the same sample or countries in Zak et al. The three factors are 
called biosocial-eco, lignan and isoflavon factors and the extraction procedure will be the 
one used to construct the instruments for trust in the present study (described in section 
III).  
 
The sample of countries 
 
Zak and Fakhar report to have a sample of countries of 41 countries with measures of 
generalized trust available. At the time, the third wave of the World Value Survey (WVS3) 
was available. In this study the WVS3 used is an updated version corrected by the official 
source in 2006, after reported mistakes in the original version. Only 26 countries of the Zak 
sample were present in the WVS3. The missing country information (10 countries) was 
taken from WVS2 and Greece and Luxembourg from WVS4. Information for New Zealand 




As I said before, the value of generalized trust used by the authors most probably mixed 
information from WVS3 and WVS2. Here the value of trust is taken from WVS3 for 26 
countries, from WVS2 for 10 countries and from WVS4 for 2 countries. The authors argue 





in favor  of the dynamic stability of trust over time. It is important to mention that time 
specific shocks could have affected the contemporary levels of trust of some countries. For 
example, the formation of the European Union, economic crises, country specific shocks, 
etc. could have influenced the trust  levels accordingly. Attempting to replicate  the  Zak 
results, I follow the same methodology bu, to prevent my results from confounding effects, 
the data for trust will be taken exclusively from WVS4 (1999-2004) for the whole sample of 
countries.   
 
Neuroactive hormone-correlate variables 
 
Recent neuroeconomics experiments with humans have demonstrated that trust between 
two individuals is facilitated by oxytocin (Zak et al, 2004, 2005b). Zak and Fakhar (2006) 
provides evidence showing the scaling up to a country level, i.e. that endocrine correlates 
are related to international levels of generalized trust. They collect data for three areas that 
are expected to be correlated with oxytocin and estrogen levels: biological processes that 
directly  impact  oxytocin;  the  frequency  of  social  interactions,  and  the  exposure  to 
estrogen-like molecules in the environment (see Table 3 in section II).  
 
The main limitations faced during the process referred to the availability of some of these 
variables  for  the  whole  sample  of  countries  and,  therefore,  were  not  included  in  the 
present analysis.  As discussed in section II, Sex Frequency and Breast Feeding do not 
have information for almost half of the sample of countries: 18 countries for sex frequency 
and 16 for breast feeding. Ownership was not included because of source accessibility. 
 
The first attempt to construct the phytoestrogens data set by country was made following 
the references in Zak et al. They extract the phytoestrogen content in food identifying 13 
components  from  Manzur  (1998),  Albertazzi  et  al  (1999)  and  Pillow  et  al  (1999).  The 
information has many flaws that make it impossible to get information about phytoestrogen 
contents for many of the foods they summarize in the paper. As an example, they collect 





information about baby food, spices and meat consumption per capita, by country, but 
information about these items does not appear in the sources. I tried many approximations 
based on their sources without success.  
 
The  main  problem  of the  sources  used  by  the  authors  refers  to  the  no-homogeneous 
scientific  method  to measure  the  content  of  phytoestrogens  in food. In  a  recent  work, 
Schwartz, Sontag and Plumb (2009) presents an inventory of phytoestrogens datasets, 
concluding that nowadays there is better and more accurate information than available for 
Zak. I select a more recently available study now that the same method for a wider variety 
of foods (Thompson, Boucher, Liu,  Cotterchio and Kreiger, 2006). The phytoestrogens 
measured  in  this  study  are:  Isoflavones  (formononetin,  daidzein,  genistein,  glycitein), 
Coumestans  (courmestrol)  and  Lignans  (matairesinol,  lariciresinol,  pinoresinol, 
secoisolariciresinol).  
 
Finally, Telephone usage now also includes mobiles and a measure of Internet users was 




Table  3.9  shows  the  rotated  loading  factor  matrix  (Varimax  rotation  with  Kaiser 
Normalization)  after  factor  analysis  for  the  24  hormone-correlate  variables  discussed 
before (see table 3.3 in section 3.2). Factor assignments were made based on the largest 
loadings. The first constructed factor, call biosocial-eco factor, includes loadings factors for 
variables related to social interaction (internet and telephone penetration, share of rural 
population,  share  of  Muslims,  Hindus  and  Protestants  in  the  population)  as  well  as 
consistent-with-intuition loadings for biological processes (share of females in population, 
fertility rate) and environmental exposure (water pollution, CO2 emissions). It accounts for 
21%  of  the  overall  inter-country  variance  among  the  24  hormone-correlate  variables 
included in the analysis.  






The second and third factors are mainly related to the dietary intake of phytoestrogens. 
The  majority  phytoestrogens  belong  to  a  large  group  known  as  flavoids  (isoflavones, 
coumestans and prenyl flavonoids). They possess the most potent oestrogenic activity.  A 
class of non-flavonoids, the lignans, has also been identified. Even though they are not 
thought to be oestrogenics themselves, they are converted to oestrogenic compounds by 
the gut microflora (Bakker, 2004).  As can be see here, the second factor collects mainly 
lignans  loading  and  the  third,  isoflavones.  Therefore,  I  will  call  them  lignan-factor  and 
isoflavon-factor,  respectively.  The  lignan-factor  accounts  for  31%  of  the  overall  inter-
country variance among the 24 hormone-correlate variables included in the analysis. The 
isoflavon-factor, for 14%.  
 





























Extraction Method: Factor Analysis. Rotation: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.





Figure 3.3 shows the scatter plots of trust and the three factors. The expected positive 
relationship with trust is not very clear for the lignan-factor as it is for the biosocial-eco and 
isoflavon-factors. 
 
Figure 3.3: Trust and neuroactive hormone factors 
 
3.3a. Biosocial-eco factor  3.3b. Lignan-factor 













The first stage OLS regression of trust on these three factors, with the logarithm of GNI per 
capita as a covariate control, explains 57% of the variation in trust for the sample of 39 
countries, compared to 70% explanatory power in Zak et al. The biosocial-eco factor is 
positively and statistically significantly related to trust (p=0.02, t-test). The lignan-factor has 
a non-different from zero effect on trust (p=0.3, t-test) and the isoflavon-factor is positively 
and statistically significantly related to trust (p=0.06, t-test). Therefore, it seems that the 
dietary  intake  of  isoflavones  is  more  relevant  than  non-flavonoids  when  affecting  the 
quality of social interactions that people have.  
 
Therefore, the extraction procedure described before will be the one used to construct the 
instruments for trust in the present study (described in section 3.3). 
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